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Fall 1987

Foreign Policy Research Institute

Attacking Reagan by Way of Pretoria

Underground Publishing in Poland

Three Steps Toward Opening Mainland China

Friends and Foes of *Glasnost*

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**The Struggle Over Foreign Policy**
Does America Need a *Verfassungsschutzbericht*? Guenter Lewy 275
Attacking Reagan by Way of Pretoria Ben L. Martin 293

**Underground Publishing in Poland** Ted Kaminski 313

**Policy Brief: Three Steps toward Opening Mainland China** Steven W. Mosher 331

**Living in China's Shadow** Raphael Israeli 339

**Documentation**
Friends and Foes of *Glasnost* Vladimir Tismaneanu 351

**Brief Reviews** 379
The United States 381
International Economics 387
War Studies 389
The Middle East 393
Asia and the Pacific 399
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 402
Latin America 408

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# Does America Need a Verfassungsschutzbericht?

by Guenter Lewy

Freedom of speech and the free exchange of ideas underpin the democratic society. Full, vigorous debate airs the options and thus helps a democracy to pursue an informed course. Differing views lead to the molding of public opinion and eventually the formulation of public policy.

But if the marketplace of ideas is really to benefit society, then it needs some basic ground rules. Just as the fair exchange of goods requires accurate representation of merchandise and adequate labeling, so ideas should compete openly and honestly, with full information available about the motives of those who would sway the body politic. Organizations that conceal their true purposes or sources of support are as deceptive as merchants who use inaccurate scales. The public must know that a group arguing for the legalization of marihuana is financed by drug dealers. Research results declaring the safety of smoking should indicate support from the tobacco industry.

Congress has long recognized the importance of this kind of information. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration provide data about the purveyors of economic wares. The Federal Communications Commission discloses the ownership of radio stations and the Post Office gathers data for newspaper and magazines that make use of special mailing privileges. The Federal Election Commission provides information on financial support for candidates. A multiplicity of statutes regulates lobbyists and peddlers of influence.

But consumer protection does not extend to foreign policy: although it is important to know when an individual or organization is in effect an agent of a foreign state, the public is left largely unprotected against deception in the marketplace of ideas. Groups operating under false names and labels and propagating calculated lies are entirely free to ply their mischievous trade. The effects of such subversion of the democratic process can be far reaching.

## Vietnam and Nicaragua

During the time of the Vietnam War, the radical Left sought not an end to the killing but victory for North Vietnam. It led important segments of the antiwar movement; organizations like the

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Indochina Resource Center and Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam worked to create a political climate in which the United States was seen as the aggressor and perpetrator of evil in Vietnam. Fred Halstead, a member of the (Trotskyite) Socialist Workers party and one of the movement's leading figures, revealed after it was all over that "our central task . . . was to put maximum pressure on the U.S. to get out of Vietnam. That would help the Vietnamese revolution more than anything else we could possibly do."[1] Although slogans like "victory to the Vietnamese Revolution" were sometimes used, these hardly appealed to the mass of Americans, and so were dropped. This is not to blame the American defeat in Vietnam on calumnies spread by the radical Left — the war was lost in Vietnam, not in Washington or in the press rooms — but the relentless barrage of dishonest accusations against the American war effort contributed to a mood of despair that put pressure on the government to abandon Vietnam.

A similarly calculated political deception is taking place today with regard to Central America. Much of the reason why the American public resists the Reagan administration's policy has to do with the machinations of an elaborate network of organizations that function as support groups for the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and communist regimes of the region, even while they claim to do no more than defend peace and justice.

Some of these organizations, such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), were actually created by alien agents. Farid Handal, brother of the head of the Salvadoran Communist party, organized CISPES while on a tour in the United States in 1980. According to Handal's travel log, later seized, he had the assistance of Cuban intelligence officers operating out of the United Nations. He also received aid from members of the American Communist party (CPUSA), most notably Sandy Pollack, a member of the party's Central Committee.[2] CISPES considers the coalition of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas fighting the government of El Salvador, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front), to be the legitimate representative of the people of El Salvador, and seeks to halt all economic and military aid to the elected government of José Napoleon Duarte.

CISPES today has 450 chapters and affiliates, most of them on college campuses. It engages in teach-ins, demonstrations, and lobbying. CISPES also collects humanitarian aid for the "liberated zones" of El Salvador. According to information obtained by the U.S. State

[1] Fred Halstead, *Out Now! A Participant's Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War* (New York, Monad Press, 1978), p. 80.

[2] A detailed report of Handal's U.S. trip was found in a Salvadoran safe house used by the guerrillas and was subsequently published by the State Department in its white paper *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, Special Report #80 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).



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Department, some of the funds collected for humanitarian aid have been diverted to the guerrillas. According to a 1986 fund-raising letter mailed on the letterhead of Congressman Mervyn M. Dymally (Democrat of California), checks to "The American Council" (which funds CISPES's "educational work") are tax-deductible. Many church groups and pacifist organizations like the American Friends Service Committee have endorsed CISPES and work in close cooperation with it. Congressman Ronald V. Dellums (Democrat of California), who knows better, refers to CISPES as a "broad, grassroots movement to stop U.S. intervention in Central America."[3]

The media have taken scant note of CISPES's origins and foreign links. No conclusions were drawn from CISPES's prominent role in disseminating a forged State Department document, "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America," a disinformation effort most probably carried out by Soviet-bloc intelligence operatives. CISPES's deceptive propaganda has led many well-meaning Americans to become unwitting supporters of what Arnaud de Borchgrave calls "a Cuban active measures operation."[4] For example, mainstream religious and labor leaders who allowed their names to be used for the "National Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa," held in Washington on April 25, 1987, unwittingly promoted the CISPES hidden agenda of not just halting U.S. commitments, but of promoting a victory for the Marxist-Leninist forces.

Many other organizations — such as the Mobilization for Survival, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, Women's Strike for Peace, and the North American Congress on Latin America — share CISPES's goals.

### Investigations into Early Front Organizations

CISPES is by no means the only organization that hides its pro-communist positions behind innocent-sounding slogans. The American Communist party operates a number of groups that front for the party — hence the name communist-front organizations — under the guise of honorable activities like promoting peace and brotherhood. Front organizations hide their real goals and are designed to attract "useful idiots"[5] who will do the party's work. They include the U.S.

[3] A summary of the State Department report on the diversion of humanitarian funds is given by Ed Rogers, "Another Case of Aid Gone Astray," *Insight*, January 12, 1987, p. 38. Dellums's appraisal of CISPES is contained in a fund-raising appeal for CISPES's national emergency campaign "A Million Voices for Peace" sent out on Congressman Dellum's letterhead in November 1986.

[4] Interview with J. Michael Waller, cited in Allan C. Brownfeld and J. Michael Waller, *The Revolution Lobby* (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, 1985), p. 34.

[5] This often quoted phrase was apparently coined by Lenin though it is not found in any of his writings. Both the Menshevik Rafael Abramovich and Angellica Balabanova, one-time secretary of the Comintern, have said that it was one of Lenin's favorite terms. Balabanova told John P. Roche that Lenin's manipulation of "useful idiots" contributed to her disillusionment with communism (John P. Roche to the author, June 13, 1985).



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Peace Council and the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, established by the party in 1943 and ostensibly dedicated to friendly U.S.-Soviet relations, but in fact an unfailing mouthpiece of Soviet policies.

The strategy of creating front organizations goes back to the early days of the communist movement. Comintern functionary Ottomar V. Kuusinen told the Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in March 1926 that to extend their influence, Communist parties had to "create a whole solar system of organizations and smaller committees around the Communist Party so to speak, smaller organizations working actually under the influence of our Party."[6] Following Kuusinen's recommendations, the Executive Committee approved a resolution that called on all Communist parties to organize "sympathizing mass organizations" which had to be under the control of "the more or less invisible communist fraction" within them.[7] The German Communist Willi Münzenberg, himself a master in the creation of such fronts, referred to them as "Innocents' Clubs."

The American Communist party excelled in the creation of such fronts during the 1930s, including the John Reed Clubs (for writers), the National Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, the League of Struggle for Negro Rights, the American League Against War and Fascism, and many more. All were ostensibly independent but actually were under the control of carefully placed party members. Joseph R. Starobin, former foreign editor of the *Daily Worker*, recalled that Communists who hid their CP membership were known as "submarines."[8] The members of communist front organizations, both "innocents" as well as those who realized that Communists were in command, became known as "fellow-travellers." The true nature of these manipulative organizations has been exposed so often, wrote a British student of Communism, "that people must indeed be simple to go on being taken in by them. But then the world is largely made up of simple people."[9]

The conspiratorial tactics of the American Communist party was a factor leading to the creation of the Special Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities in the House of Representatives in 1938, under Martin Dies (Democrat of Texas). The com-

[6] Cited in Clarene A. Hathaway, "On the Use of Transmission Belts in our Struggle for the Masses," *The Communist*, X (May, 1931), p. 413.

[7] From a resolution adopted on March 8, 1926, quoted in Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents*, Vol. II: 1923-1928 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 267.

[8] Joseph R. Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis: 1943-1957* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 39. See also Harvey Klehr, *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 104-05.

[9] R. N. Carew Hunt, "Willi Muenzenberg," in David Footman, ed., *International Communism*, St. Anthony's Papers no. 9 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), p. 87.



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mittee gathered useful information but often indulged in irresponsible accusations and headline hunting. This mixed record continued after the committee became a permanent committee in 1945. Its counterparts in the Senate (the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary) achieved somewhat better reputations for accuracy and fair play. But Senator Joseph McCarthy's sensation-mongering and bullying discredited congressional investigations in matters of loyalty and eventually led to the abolition of these committees.

In 1957 the Supreme Court ruled that the congressional power to investigate was "justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process" and that "there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure."[10] The House Committee on Un-American Activities went out of existence in 1975, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Internal Security died in 1979. The Senate's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism addressed similar concerns after 1981 only to be abolished when the Republicans lost control of the Senate in 1986. Comparable committees on the state level, once common, have mostly disappeared.

Along parallel lines, Congress enacted the first legislation in 1938 specifically aimed at foreign-sponsored propaganda. Designed to prevent political victimization, the Foreign Agents Registration Act required the registration of foreign principals and their paid agents engaged in the dissemination of propaganda in the United States.[11] The legislation was aimed at frustrating deception practiced by both Communists and Nazis. In practice, however, the Communist party was not hampered. To require registration under the act, the government had to prove in open court that the agent acted "at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal." In the case of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) and its fronts, this proved impossible. Although still on the books today, as far as the CPUSA is concerned, it remains a useless tool.

President Truman established a loyalty program for the federal civil service in 1947 which included a directive to the Justice Department to compile a list of organizations considered to be "totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive."[12] The Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations that resulted led an uneasy existence, involving several reorganizations and court challenges, finally to be abolished by President Nixon in June 1974.[13] The list was always out of date because the Justice Department had trouble keeping up with the ever-changing multiplicity of communist-front organiza-

[10] Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
[11] 52 Stat. 631, as amended 22 U.S.C. 611-621.
[12] Part 3, paragraph 3, of Executive Order 9835, March 21, 1947, 12 F.R. 1935.
[13] Executive Order 11785, 15 F.R. 20053.



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tions. Neither the criteria used nor the information on which the Justice Department's judgment was based were ever made public. These factors undercut the list's credibility and gave it an arbitrary and unreliable quality.

The Internal Security Act of 1950 also tried to force registration and exposure. Title I, the Subversive Activities Control Act,[14] called for registration with the attorney general of communist and communist-front organizations. These had to file annual reports giving financial and membership information. When such organizations published or broadcast over radio or television, their products had to be labeled as the work of "a Communist organization." If these organizations failed to register, the attorney general could petition the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB), also created under the 1950 act, to hold hearings to determine whether registration was required.

As expected, neither the Communist party nor any of its fronts registered voluntarily, and lengthy court battles ensued when the SACB tried to compel registration. A 1961 Supreme Court decision upheld the compulsory disclosure of Communist party members' names.

> Where the mask of anonymity which an organization's members wear serves the double purpose of protecting them from popular prejudice and of enabling them to cover over a foreign-directed conspiracy, infiltrate into other groups, and enlist the support of persons who would not, if the truth were revealed, lend their support. . .it would be a distortion of the First Amendment to hold that it prohibits Congress from removing the mask.[15]

The Court held objections based on the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to be premature. Four years later, however, the Court ruled the registration provision unenforceable. The Smith Act and other statutes treated the party as a criminal conspiracy. Compelled registration, therefore, was ipso facto self-incriminating.[16] The Court's opinion did not declare the legislation unconstitutional, because a party member theoretically could waive his privilege and register. Yet for all practical purposes the registration requirement was a dead letter.

Attempts to achieve the registration of communist-front organizations fared no better. The law required that it be shown such groups were controlled by the Communist party — not just by individual party members. Evidence was predictably hard to come by. The FBI and the Justice Department were at times unwilling to jeopardize their intelligence networks by letting truly valuable informants testify before the SACB; other informants proved highly unreliable. Between 1950 and 1970 the SACB found twenty-three

[14] 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. 783.

[15] *Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Board*, 367 U.S. 1, at 102-3 (1961).

[16] *Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board* and *Proctor v. Subversive Activities Control Board*, 381 U.S. 910 (1965).



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communist fronts, but a timely name change or dissolution often preempted legal action. Or proceedings dragged on for years, during which time witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable. By the time some cases reached the Supreme Court, it found the record "too stale" for serious constitutional adjudication.[17] President Nixon had omitted the SACB from his budget request for fiscal year 1974, apparently sharing the judgment of the Congress that the agency had outlived its usefulness. It ran out of funds on June 30, 1973, and closed its doors.

### Loss of Interest

If too many Americans suspected Communists under every bed during the McCarthy years, the political climate changed in the 1960s and 1970s until the assumption spread that no Communist lives under any bed. The country had, in short, completely lost interest in the issue of communist subversion. Any proposal to trace communist influences in the United States is decried as McCarthyism. The irresponsible and demagogic escapades of Senator Joseph McCarthy, relatively short-lived as they were, continue to discredit serious concern with questions of internal security and subversion.

By now, the United States faces a problem of reverse McCarthyism. Large segments of the U.S. intellectual community today embrace a philosophy of anti-anti-Communism no less reflexive than the anti-Communism it replaced. American liberals were, not very long ago, unanimous in their conviction that anti-Communism was a litmus test of political and moral integrity; today, it is considered bad form in these circles to refer to anyone as a Communist. Even Angela Davis, a highly placed CP functionary and recently the party's candidate for vice president of the United States, continues politely to be called a "black activist" rather than a Communist.

The new political climate also affected the government. After the disclosure of improper activities by the U.S. intelligence services, a Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Regard to Intelligence Activities — the Church Committee — was set up in 1975. It called for abandoning the term "subversion."[18] In 1976 Attorney General Edward H. Levi confined the domestic intelligence function of the FBI to activities that involve a violation of federal law, such as overthrowing the government or depriving persons of their rights under the Constitution. The FBI also keeps tabs on foreign-directed communist groups, but the efficacy of these efforts is uncertain. According to one observer, the FBI's domestic intelligence gathering capability has "become a joke in knowledgeable domestic

[17] *American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. S.A.C.B.*, 380 U.S. 503 (1963), and *Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. S.A.C.B.*, 380 U.S. 513 (1963).

[18] U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Regard to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 176.



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intelligence circles."[19] Herbert Romerstein, a well-informed student of this subject, writes that while the the CPUSA is well covered, "there is no reason to believe that the FBI is keeping adequate track of other groups that act directly or indirectly under the direction of Cuba, Nicaragua, Communist China, or other hostile states."[20]

The State Department has since 1976 released some information about Soviet-controlled front organizations, but it has been careful to deal only with international fronts like the World Peace Council, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, or the Women's International Democratic Federation, and not to mention their American affiliates.

New guidelines for FBI surveillance of domestic organization, issued by Attorney General William French Smith in 1983, have broadened the FBI's domestic intelligence function. The illegal activity yardstick, however, is still essentially preserved, and this limits the Bureau's effectiveness. The FBI probably had spread itself too thin and collected much useless information during the 1950s and 1960s, but by concentrating only on crimes and foreign intelligence activities, the Bureau now ignores the entire range of subversive activities that are neither illegal nor linked to a foreign power. Subversive activity is not necessarily illegal nor always instigated by foreign agents. To be politically dishonest by hiding one's true political aims or knowingly planting lies and disinformation is not to act criminally. Yet such conduct may poison the marketplace of ideas and damage a democratic society more seriously than the overt advocacy of forceful overthrow.

## The New Left

In addition to traditional Old Left organizations like the CPUSA or the Socialist Workers party, since the 1960s the United States has had to cope with the New Left. The New Left is an ever-changing scene of loosely organized groups that regard the United States as an imperialist country living on the exploitation of the Third World, and whose sympathies lie with various communist-led national liberation movements. During the Vietnam War, it appeared to seek peace while surreptitiously working for a communist victory. In a replay of the Vietnam experience, New Left organizations today ardently support the Sandinistas. They deny or minimize Soviet-bloc support for the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas of Central America while decrying U.S. aid for the democratic regimes of the region as an instance of imperialist intervention. Though not uncritical of certain

[19] Francis J. McNamara, *U.S. Counterintelligence Today* (Washington, D.C.: Nathan Hale Institute, 1985), p. 74.

[20] Herbert Romerstein, "What Information Should Be Collected and How Should Collection Be Organized," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Domestic Intelligence* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 111.



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repressive features of Soviet society, the New Left adopts a benevolent view of Soviet foreign policy. If it does criticize the Soviet Union, as in the case of Afghanistan, it blames the United States for compelling the Soviet Union to use military power to defend itself.

Of course, the New Left has the right, like any political group, to criticize U.S. foreign policy and to propose alternative courses of action. But the hidden agenda of its organizations makes them subversive and therefore unacceptable. Their criticism of U.S. policy is often based not on an assumption of U.S. interests but on the need to promote the interests of America's opponents. They function as a domestic lobby and a purveyor of disinformation for the enemy. Rather than acknowledge their espousal of Cuban-style Communism or their solidarity with Marxist-Leninists in Central America, New Left groups pretend to defend peace and justice and talk of a progressive social and economic order. Some speak of using a Marxist paradigm though in fact they are fully committed to Communism (or Marxism-Leninism, the currently fashionable term that appears to sound more benign).

It has now become far more difficult to decide who is to be regarded as a foreign agent. What of someone, James Q. Wilson has asked,

> who travels to a foreign country to receive training, or who accepts foreign money to cover the expenses of his organization, or who secretly collaborates, without pay, with foreign powers in the pursuit of their policy objectives? At the extremes, the distinctions are easy to make, but in the middle, where several American dissident groups may well belong, the distinctions will be maddeningly difficult.[21]

Humbert Wolfe's ditty about the British journalist sums up the problem:

> You cannot hope to bribe or twist,
> Thank God! the British journalist.
> But seeing what the man will do
> Unbribed, there's no occasion to.

If it was impossible to prove in the 1950s that the Communist Party USA functioned as an agent of the Soviet Union, what chance is there that existing laws can be used today to identify the real agenda of the much more elusive New Left organizations? Clearly, some other approach is needed.

### Private Initiatives

The impotence or unwillingness of government agencies to confront the issue of subversion effectively has led to the revival of private efforts aimed at exposing the "Revolution Lobby."[22] Such endeavors have a long history. In 1934 Elizabeth Dilling of Chicago

[21] James Q. Wilson, "Buggings, Break-Ins and the FBI," *Commentary*, June 1978, p. 57.
[22] See note 4.



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published *Red Network: A "Who's Who" and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots* which included 460 organizations and about 1,300 persons regarded as "Red," a term loosely defined to include "Communists, Socialists, anarchists, and pacifists."[23] A group of Christian businessmen founded the Church League of America in 1937. Located in Wheaton, Illinois, the Church League today calls itself "the largest private research organization and information center on the operations of the Communist Party and the New Left movement in the entire United States." The organization publishes twenty-four issues per year of *The National Laymen's Digest*, a monthly *News and Views*, as well as periodic *Special Reports*. In 1939 the Committee for Cultural Freedom, headed by John Dewey, issued a report on *Stalinist Outposts in the United States* and sought to keep its members abreast of the multiplicity of communist fronts then operating in the United States.[24] In 1947, American Business Consultants of New York began publication of *Counterattack: The Newsletter of Facts on Communism*, and in 1950 released *Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television* listing 151 persons said to be linked to a variety of "Communist causes."[25]

Private groups that currently seek to expose leftist-sponsored manipulation include the American Security Council, established in the mid-fifties to help corporations check the political background of potential employees. Lyndon LaRouche, founder of the U.S. Labor party, publishes the newsletter *Investigative Leads*. John Rees, formerly editor of the Church League's *National Laymen's Digest*, and his wife Louise created the Western Goals Foundation in 1968; it puts out the bi-weekly *Information Digest* and occasional special reports. Until his death in the KAL 007 plane crash, Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald (Democrat of Georgia) was the chairman and president of Western Goals (as well as a member of the National Council of the John Birch Society, which also seeks to expose subversive activities). Regnery Gateway inaugurated *Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast* in the fall of 1985; this quarterly, edited by Roy Godson, a professor of political science at Georgetown University, has the assistance of former high-ranking Soviet-bloc intelligence operatives like Ladislav Bittman and Stanislav Levchenko.

Communists and their allies denounce such groups as "red-baiters." This time-honored device shields the Old and New Left groups from criticism and redirects attention to those who would investigate them. Liberals too oppose these efforts, prefering to ignore the reality

[23] Robert W. Iversen, *The Communists and the Schools* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1959), p. 179.

[24] Eugene Lyons, *The Red Decade* (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1941), p. 377.

[25] *Red Channels* and the practice of blacklisting were analyzed in Merle Miller's *The Judges and the Judged* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1952), a report sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union, which quickly became as controversial as the original study. Cf. John Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1956).



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of communist- and New Left-front operations. Others defend the exposure of the Ku Klux Klan or Lyndon LaRouche but oppose similar efforts against the Left. This is the least justifiable position; why should those who operate deceptive schemes, whether on the Right or Left, not be identified and made to render political account? Those who charge fellow citizens with intellectual dishonesty and disloyalty must exercise great care, but throwing light on subversive designs is a valid undertaking.

Private efforts are as reliable as the backgrounds and characters of their originators. Information on front operations available to private individuals will necessarily be limited and this fact will always cramp the adequacy of such private exposure efforts. Nonetheless, some have done careful research and focused public attention on front operations that otherwise would have gone unexposed. Others have engaged in unsubstantiated name-calling that undermined the reputation of all such endeavors. Although local intelligence squads and businesses have made occasional use of this private information, the FBI looks on it negatively, insisting that the arena of subversion is no place for amateurs.

In the final analysis, private research has a role, but it cannot replace government efforts.

## The West German Model

The American experience of earlier decades pointed up a number of dilemmas: How does the state gather information on potentially subversive groups without infringing on individual rights? How does it protect citizens from falsely labelled ideas as it does already protect them from falsely labelled commercial products? How is information gathered by the FBI that does not reach the public kept from being manipulated for political purposes?

The German Federal Republic has developed a regimen for coping with these issues, and some of its practices may be usable in the United States. Determined to avoid the fate of the Weimar Republic, Germany's postwar political leaders sought to protect their country from the enemies of democracy. They applied the concept, first forwarded in 1937 by American political scientist Karl Loewenstein, that a democracy has a right to defend itself and in times of crisis may have to become "militant."[26] The West German "Basic Law" of 1949 proceeds on two levels. First, the government can outlaw parties and groups that seek to impair or destroy the democratic state, an instrument that has been used sparingly in recent years (and would seem to have no possible application in the United States). Second, the authorities can focus the glare of publicity on

[26] Karl Loewenstein, "Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights," *American Political Science Review*, Volume XXXI (1937), pp. 423-24, 432.



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anti-democratic political forces — an innovative and successful feature of West Germany's "militant democracy" that bears a close look.

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Verfassungsschutz*), a government agency with intelligence functions similar to those of the FBI, is in charge of compiling and publishing an annual book-length study known as the "Protection of the Constitution Report" (*Verfassungsschutzbericht*). These Reports are mostly based on publicly available sources, plus information gathered by covert means. Eight members of the German parliament serve as a commission that watches over the use of surveillance, covert photography, the opening of mail, or wiretapping — a function that resembles the one exercised by congressional intelligence committees over the CIA. The fact that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution has no police powers — it may not arrest, search, confiscate, or otherwise prosecute citizens — puts the burden on other government agencies to evaluate its information before deciding to act.

The Report covers extremist organizations of all persuasions. "Extremist" denotes individuals or groups who use the freedoms of the democratic state to destroy the democratic order. The Report amasses information on neo-Nazis, the German Communist party (DKP) and its auxiliaries and front organizations. It also contains information about DKP efforts to gain influence in the New Left, non-extremist groups, and mainline political parties. It includes — and this is crucial — activities that are not necessarily illegal. The tone is factual and unemotional; conclusions are buttressed by lengthy quotations or other data; qualified judgments are so indicated. The Reports enjoy a reputation for accuracy. The 1985 report, for example, carefully distinguished between organizations where the influence of the German Communist party is decisive and those where, despite communist inroads, other views can prevail.[27]

Can West Germany's way of throwing the light of publicity on anti-democratic forces be accommodated within the U.S. constitutional framework? It would seem so. Recent court rulings appear to give the FBI the right to collect most of the information needed for such an effort. Several methods of intelligence collection have been held to be fully legal. In 1971, a federal district court rejected a suit brought against the taking of pictures by local police officers at a demonstration. The mere existence of a chilling effect, the court declared, was not decisive. The leaders of the demonstration had invited media coverage. "They invited the publicity and must stand the consequences."[28] A federal court of appeals confirmed this ruling.

[27] Bundesminister des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1985* (Bonn: Bundesminister des Innern, 1986), pp. 48-49. For a good description of the theory and practice of the *Verfassungsschutzberichte* see Joachim H. Schwagerl, *Verfassungsschutz in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1985).

[28] *Donohue v. Duling*, 330 F. Sup. 308, 310 (1971).



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In 1972, in *Laird v. Tatum*, the Supreme Court upheld the right of army intelligence and related civilian investigative agencies to collect information about public antiwar activities with a potential for civil disorder. The information gathered in this case, the Court noted, was nothing more than what a newspaper reporter could have obtained by attending public meetings and clipping articles. There was no demonstration of harm or threat of a specific future harm to the plaintiffs. They simply "disagreed with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs and [claimed] that the very existence of the Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights." [29]

In another case, the Supreme Court in 1974 vacated an injunction that would have barred the attendance of FBI informants at the annual convention of the Socialist Workers party's youth organization, the Young Socialist Alliance. The Court noted that the convention was open to the public, and that any chilling effect caused by the attendance of the FBI informants, who were members of the organization, was not sufficient to outweigh the prejudice to the government of permanently compromising some or all of its informants in the organization. Governmental surveillance and infiltration that may dampen the exercise of First Amendment rights, Justice Marshall conceded, cannot be taken lightly. "But our abhorrence for abuse of governmental investigative authority cannot be permitted to lead to an indiscriminate willingness to enjoin undercover investigation of any nature, wherever a countervailing First Amendment claim is raised."[30]

But the Bureau probably cannot use intrusive investigative techniques (such as unconsented physical searches — "black bag jobs" — and electronic surveillance) against domestic organizations without a warrant unless there exists a "significant connection to a foreign power." The precise meaning of this phrase, used by the Supreme Court in the Keith case,[31] remains unclear for the Court did not indicate what kind of a connection is to be regarded as significant.

**Disclosure — An American Tradition**

Not only does it fit within the law, but a West German-style office to publicize the activities of extremists would constitute an approach to the problem of subversion that fits in well with the long-standing American commitment to maintain and defend an open society.

[29] *Laird v. Tatum*, 408 U.S. 1, 13, and 15 (1972).
[30] *Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States*, 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (1974).
[31] *U.S. v U.S. District Court*, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).



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The principle of "clear and present danger," first enunciated by Justice Holmes in 1919,[32] permits the government to impose limitations on freedom of speech and assembly that would be unconstitutional in the absence of such peril. By exposing subversive activities the government has the opportunity to minimize the need for abridgments of the First Amendment; it can check the machinations of the enemies of the democratic system before they constitute a "clear and present danger." Instead of having to conduct the struggle against anti-democratic forces with restrictive measures, this makes it possible to rely on the contest of ideas, a superior way in terms of both principle and expediency. In an open market of opinion, forced out from their deceptive covers, groups committed to communist and other totalitarian schemes are unlikely to find very many adherents.

This point was addressed in 1947 by the President's Committee on Civil Rights. Its report "To Secure These Rights" criticized the "totalitarians of both left and right" who "have in common. . .a reluctance to come before the people honestly and say who they are, what they work for, and who supports them." The principle of disclosure, the committee argued, was the appropriate means to deal with those harboring subversive designs. "Our purpose is not to constrict anyone's freedom to speak; it is rather to enable the people better to judge the true motives of those who try to sway them." The ultimate responsibility for countering totalitarians of all kinds, the presidential committee acknowledged, "rests, as always, with the mass of good, democratic Americans, their organizations and their leaders." The federal government, however, "ought to provide a source of reference where private citizens and groups may find accurate information about the activities, sponsorship, and background of those who are active in the market place of public opinion."[33]

Five years later, in 1952, the noted civil libertarian, Morris L. Ernst, repeated these suggestions. "Our freedoms are based on the principle that in the marketplace of thought, truth and justice win out. But that holds true only if there is free trade in the market. We think the rules of free trade should carry protection for society by accurate labels on the package." Ideas entering the market, Ernst argued, should be properly identified as to support and financial backing. There was ample protection in the law against overt acts of treason, sabotage, and violent overthrow. The real danger to America's free institutions stemmed from stealth and deception.[34] Or as the philosopher Sidney Hook put it, what we have to fear "is not heresy but conspiracy . . .a secret or underground movement which

[32] *Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).*

[33] President's Committee on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 51-53.

[34] Morris L. Ernst and David Loth, *Report on the American Communist* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), pp. 223-4.



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seeks to attain its end not by normal political or educational processes but by playing outside the rules of the game. . . The signs of conspiracy are secrecy, anonymity, the use of false names and labels, and the calculated lie."[35]

These insights are as pertinent today as they were thirty years ago. Indeed, the need to protect the marketplace of ideas against corruption and deception today is greater than ever. The emergence of the New Left in the 1960s made the extremist scene far more complex and subversion better camouflaged. And, reacting against the smears and character assassinations current of the McCarthy era, respectable organizations such as church groups, work today with almost any individual or group that shares some of their goals. Such non-exclusion leads to political alliances that lend legitimacy to anti-democratic forces, and makes it more difficult to counter them.

### Today's Subversives

Which organizations would be included in a West German-style annual report on the activities of extremist groups? The report could cover, as in Germany, all the enemies of democracy, whether on the Right or the Left, whether they act openly or through deception. Or it could focus only on organizations that hide their true political views and practice tactics of deceit — those for which the need for exposure is greatest.

Under either criterion, the Communist party and its fronts would be included. The party opposes democracy in the United States and seeks to subvert it in a variety of ways. Even though the CPUSA today is but a conclave of a few thousand diehards, a mere shadow of the party that exerted considerable influence in the 1930s and 1940s, the need for vigilance remains. As both the Congress and the courts have repeatedly noted, the CPUSA is not just another political party, for in addition to engaging in political activities on behalf of its master and mentor, the Soviet Union, the party uses methods of infiltration and deceit. Operating through subterfuge, it obtains the support of persons who would not knowingly support the party and its goals. In view of these well-substantiated findings, the Supreme Court observed in 1959 that "this Court in its constitutional adjudications has consistently refused to view the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, and has upheld federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem which in a different context would certainly have raised constitutional issues of the gravest character."[36]

More difficult questions arise in reference to the New Left. Most of its organizations are not controlled by a foreign power; they do

[35] Sidney Hook, *Heresy, yes — Conspiracy, no!* (New York: Committee for Cultural Freedom, 1951), pp. 4-5.

[36] *Barenblatt v. United States*, 360 U.S. 109, at 128 (1959).



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not fit any neat separation between domestic and foreign-directed subversion. The New Left's attitude toward the basic principles of political democracy is occasionally ambivalent rather than totally negative. Some groups operate fully in the open without concealing their pro-communist sympathies. Others pursue hidden agendas, functioning as propagandists for the Soviet Union and communist-led movements in the Third World. Many of them act from a deep alienation more than from allegiance to communism, but this is irrelevant from the viewpoint of surveillance.

An independent American can reach the same conclusions as the Soviet government on such issues as nuclear testing, the Strategic Defense Initiative, American missiles in Europe, aid to the Contras, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But when an individual or organization systematically agrees with all positions supported by the Soviet Union, this phenomenon exceeds coincidence. When such groups allege that the Sandinistas are democratic socialists and dedicated to Christianity, they are not staking out another legitimate political position but are manipulating a falsehood that can be shown to be a lie by the Sandinistas' own pronouncements and well-documented deeds. Organizations that spread such disinformation and surreptitiously promote communist schemes should be included in an American report on extremism and subversion irrespective of whether they have formal links with the Soviet Union or other communist regimes.

**The American Verfassungsschutz**

A self-confident president probably could establish an office that would issue a West German-style report on the activities of subversive groups by executive order, though it would be prudent to get the Congress to pass enabling legislation. To function effectively, the office needs the support of all three branches of the government as well as large segments of the American people.

Much of the information for these reports will be found in public sources. The FBI would have to collect that part that requires covert means, but there may be an advantage in entrusting another agency with the task of evaluating these data, gathering publicly available information, and drawing conclusions from all of these sources.

For this report to enjoy a credibility the old lists of subversive organizations never had, it must do justice to ideological and organizational complexities. It has to rely on the finest talents and be meticulously researched. Rather than merely label organizations, the report should document their activities and refute obvious falsehoods. Anything short of the most exacting standards will be worse than nothing; the last thing the United States needs is government officials who play fast and loose with the concept of subversion. Such incompetence encourages the intolerance of legitimate political dissent that



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often existed in the 1950s, and it would give an ill-deserved lift to the extreme Left, victim of a new wave of McCarthyism.

A precedent for such work was established in the early days of World War II. In 1939 Congress passed Section 9-A of the Hatch Act, aimed at barring Communists and Nazis from government employment.[37] In 1940 Congress followed with the Voorhis Act, requiring the registration of groups subject to foreign control and of those seeking the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.[38] To enforce these statutes, the Department of Justice had to determine what organizations were covered in the legislative descriptions. This task involved distinguishing between foreign-dominated subversive organizations and such legitimate groups as radical leftists, pacifists, and isolationists.

The ordinary lawyer, untrained in social history, could not do justice to these complexities, so the Department of Justice brought in a team of social scientists directed by a noted expert in the study of propaganda analysis, Professor Harold Lasswell of Yale University. In collaboration with the department's lawyers, his team studied and analyzed press reports, research monographs, legislative documents, private studies, and other relevant material, including FBI reports. Their efforts also helped the FBI in directing its intelligence collection. Ultimate judgments on the character of an organization were made by lawyers and social scientists acting in tandem.[39]

Were this kind of operation re-established, it would assure a product of high quality. Further, the data would serve other purposes, such as guiding security checks on federal personnel.

Legal precedent does not fully clarify whether organizations included in such a report should have rights to a hearing. The Department of Justice in 1940-41 did not give formal notice to the organizations analyzed, nor did it allow them hearings. But the Supreme Court upheld the right in 1951 of three groups not to be included in the attorney general's List of Subversive Organizations without "appropriate investigation and determination." Justice Frankfurter argued that such organizations were entitled to due process of law — notice and a hearing — so that they could learn the nature of the case against them and have a chance to answer it.[40] Irrespective of constitutional considerations, there is every reason to give notice and offer a hearing; this procedure would promote fairness and build credibility. It would also imply that if an organization were to challenge the accuracy of a characterization in court, the

[37] 53 Stat. 1148, 5 U.S.C. 118j.
[38] 54 Stat. 1201, 18 U.S.C. 2386.
[39] Cf. Eleanor Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953), pp. 164-6.
[40] *Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath*, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).



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challenge would have to involve substantive rather than procedural objections.

## Conclusion

It is difficult to defend a democratic society by democratic means. As Jean François Revel has observed: "To totalitarianism, an opponent is by definition subversive; democracy treats subversives as mere opponents for fear of betraying its principles."[41] An annual government report of the kind proposed here has its limitations. It will not do away with all deception and dishonesty in the public arena. It will face the traditional American distrust of authority, an attitude that has become even more pronounced after Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran/Contra affair. Moreover, Americans are politically naive, and it is difficult to make them realize that they face opponents who do not play by the rules. Finally, rational discourse in politics promises only limited results; psychological mechanisms often lock people into ideological positions and make them ignore or disbelieve evidence that challenges their basic beliefs.

Nevertheless, any enlightenment would be a net gain for openness and fairness in the competition of ideas. It would energize the democratic forces and help them counteract falsehoods propagated by extremist groups. This matters very much, for the course of a democratic society is ultimately decided in the forum of ideas.

[41] Jean François Revel, "Can the Democracies Survive?" *Commentary*, June 1984, p. 4.



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# Attacking Reagan by Way of Pretoria

by Ben L. Martin

The senator, it had been arranged, would drive up to the embassy door with a lady from the Philadelphia chapter of Women Strike for Peace and several others. The photographers from the media pool . . . were allowed to go along. Harry Naltchayaan . . . from the *Washington Post*, refused to join the pool. The *Post* wanted its own pictures. . . . As the police put the handcuffs on the senator (actually they were plastic ties not unlike what you use to tie up large-size Glad garbage bags), Mr. Weicker's staff people, standing near Harry, got excited and yelled at the police. "Move over! You're blocking the handcuff shots!" After the senator was taken off in the van, one of his housecarls chased Harry down the street to arrange to get copies of pictures of Mr. Weicker in bondage. "Well," Harry observed, "one senator is worth 50 regular arrests . . . but wait till Kennedy comes."[1]

Just nine months after the first demonstration at the South African embassy in Washington on November 21, 1984, Congress forced a reluctant President Reagan to impose sanctions on Pretoria. Then the next summer, that Congress overrode the veto of one of the most popular presidents of this century and enacted even harsher sanctions against South Africa.

Successful lobbying and congressional initiative in foreign affairs are extremely rare, so what explains these unusual developments so soon after the president's landslide re-election? The answer lies in Washington, where the South Africa issue was understood from the beginning as American racial politics as much as foreign policy. And this resulted from some very clever tactical thinking by the president's opponents.

Their campaign had three steps. First, it targeted U.S. business activity in South Africa through the disinvestment efforts. Second, it attacked the U.S. government's policy of constructive engagement with Pretoria. Third, when conservative Republicans joined congressional liberals in treating South Africa policy as a test of racism, the stage was set for a repudiation of Reagan's leadership. Congressional coalitions pressured the president to impose sanctions against South Africa in 1985; these then overrode his veto of a stiffer sanctions bill in 1986, a nearly unprecedented insurgency on a foreign-policy issue.

## The Embassy Protests and TransAfrica

Ronald Reagan's massive victory of November 1984 was deeply dispiriting for the Left generally and black political elites in particular. Their defeat was ideological as well as political, for the president rejected their notion that blacks are specially deserving wards of government and refused their redefinition of civil rights to mean racial preference (instead of colorblindness). What they called Rea-

[1] Nicholas Von Hoffman, "Under Arrest," *The New Republic*, February 11, 1985, p. 13.

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ganism challenged black leaders' custody of the race totem and its power and meaning in public life. In the aftermath of Reagan's 1984 victory, black leaders felt they had to take some steps to reassert their position.

Accordingly, just days after Election Day, Walter Fauntroy, Washington, D.C.'s congressional delegate, met with Randall Robinson of TransAfrica — the lobbying office set up by the Congressional Black Caucus — to plan demonstrations at the South African embassy. To Fauntroy, the election "made it very clear . . . that traditional means of influencing public policy are not likely to work in the next four years."[2] Accordingly, the two men planned a non-traditional tactic. On November 21, Robinson, Fauntroy, Mary Frances Berry (U.S. Civil Rights Commission), and Eleanor Holmes Norton (Georgetown University Law School) refused to leave the embassy grounds. As a result, they were all arrested (except for Norton, who had left to alert the press).[3]

Three days later, these four formed the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) and announced a national campaign to win the release of South African political prisoners, to negotiate for sharing power in South Africa, and to end the U.S. policy of constructive engagement (which they characterized as a policy that embraced "the most vicious system of government since Nazi Germany.")[4] Robinson told reporters the objective was to "put the issue squarely in the middle of the American political agenda." As we shall see, reporters and editors obliged this request, not only in the slow news weeks before Christmas but also through the next two years.[5]

South Africa became the latest issue to dominate the attention of liberal elites, the Left, college campuses, and the national press, replacing the nuclear freeze as the issue taken very seriously in Washington but unimportant to most Americans. The protests received so much attention, they quickly became fashionable. In fact, the organizers soon had trouble scheduling all the volunteers. Fauntroy and Robinson decided who could be arrested and when, balancing the schedules and affiliations of the volunteers "to space out the big name officials or celebrities to keep the media's attention."[6] Protests also opened outside South African consulates; so many volunteered in New York, there too it soon became difficult to get approval for arrest.[7]

[2] Karlyn Barker and Michel Marriott, "1960's Tactics Revived for Embassy Sit-Ins," *Washington Post*, November 29, 1984.

[3] Dorothy Gilliam, "D.C. Sit-In Led The Way," *Washington Post*, September 9, 1985.

[4] "U.S. Drive Opposes South African Racial Policies," *New York Times*, November 24, 1984.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Karlyn Barker and Michel Marriott, "U.S. Denies Policy Aids South Africa's Segregation System," *Washington Post*, December 4, 1984.

[7] "South Africa Protesters Take Part in Daily Drama," *New York Times*, December 16, 1984.



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A coalition of arrestees appeared from the Washington staffs of unions, church denominations, and Jewish organizations. They included civil rights activists, Congressmen, mayors, athletes, and show business celebrities. Embassy demonstrations began in November 1984 and continued through the summer of 1986, providing a daily drumbeat of anti-apartheid activity. In all, more than 3,000 protesters were arrested at the embassy, including two dozen prominent politicians.[8] None was prosecuted. Jesse Jackson was also brought into TransAfrica's anti-apartheid tent and persuaded to coordinate his publicity efforts with theirs. He joined the FSAM steering committee with Fauntroy and Robinson, and the Black Caucus agreed to help retire his campaign debt.[9]

The black leaders' media success must have come as something of a surprise, even to them, for there was no popular groundswell for an anti-apartheid campaign. From the mid-1970s, apartheid was a salient issue for black and liberal elites but scarcely so for the public at large. Despite Jesse Jackson's campaign, racial issues were marginal to the 1984 election. When polled in July 1984, fewer than 0.5 percent named "U.S. relations with South Africa" as their most important issue in that year's presidential campaign.[10] Over a year later, after a period of intense anti-apartheid publicity, only 13 percent of a national sample said they closely followed events in South Africa.[11]

TransAfrica, the small organization that deserves much of the credit for making apartheid an issue in the United States, was founded in 1977 by the Congressional Black Caucus. The Caucus, a group of some twenty members of the House, established TransAfrica in the hope of representing black African (and Caribbean) interests to Congress and influencing U.S. policy toward South Africa. Modeled on the Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), TransAfrica also sought to involve black Americans in foreign-policy issues.

The trouble is, TransAfrica lacks the grassroots strength of AIPAC, which can mobilize hundreds of local Jewish communities to raise money or besiege Congress. American blacks tend to take minimal interest in foreign affairs, and of those few who do, only a tiny number of intellectuals feel affinity for any country other than the United States. Also, few American blacks know from which part of Africa their ancestors came, so they lack a focused allegiance.[12] As a

[8] Lisa Leff, "Embassy Arrests Cap NAACP March," *Washington Post*, June 30, 1986.
[9] Juan Williams, "Black Leaders Find a Hot New Issue," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1984.
[10] Gallup Poll-AIPO, July 30, 1984, Q49A, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.
[11] Gallup Poll-AIPO, October 14, 1985, Q08A, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.
[12] Kenneth Longmyer, "Black American Demands," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1985), p.7.



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result, only a third of American blacks polled in August 1984 claimed that race relations in South Africa worried them "a lot."[13]

Also, while AIPAC is strictly bi-partisan, TransAfrica supports only the Left. Indeed, its efforts betray a profoundly anti-Western bias, not just in Africa but also in the domestic U.S. context. Thus, TransAfrica seeks to build a "Pan-African political identity, inducing [U.S.] blacks to see themselves as a 'Third World people,' analogous in their relations with Americans of European descent to the position of the nonwhite peoples of the developing countries vis-à-vis their former European colonizers."[14] In this and other ways, TransAfrica fits closely into the forty-year tradition of several small, leftist organizations focusing on Africa, such as the New York-based American Committee on Africa (ACOA).

Randall Robinson had been trying for years to publicize apartheid, with only limited success. Nor had anyone else managed to get much attention for this issue. Indeed, the Reverend Jesse Jackson had led a demonstration at the embassy just ten days before the first TransAfrica sit-in, but the press paid him no attention. Why then did things change so dramatically in late November 1984? Not because of events in South Africa itself. Demonstrations in Sharpeville over rent and utility rate increases led to riots there and in other black townships during September 1984, but this unrest never challenged the government's control. Rather, opposition forces looked to the United States to bring down the Pretoria government. The key was TransAfrica's executive director, Randall Robinson. A Harvard Law School graduate, then a public interest lawyer in Boston and a House aide, Robinson retained his radical politics but traded his combat boots and dashikis for conservative dress.[15] He benefited from the credibility and media savvy of his brother, Max Robinson of ABC News. His low-profile management avoided antagonizing whites or sparking jealousies within the black leadership. For example, while Mayor Richard Hatcher, chairman of TransAfrica's board, had proposed a White House protest, Robinson wisely decided not to focus directly on a popular president and instead targeted the South African embassy.[16] Similarly, Robinson specifically left Jean Sindab of the militant Washington Office on Africa off the FSAM steering committee.[17] In contrast to Jesse Jackson, Robinson and the FSAM were cool and secular, and they produced peaceful and respectable sit-ins. The press flocked to cover a well-organized, purposeful black operation that stressed policy, not personality. The well-credentialed and

[13] Data Black Public Opinion Polls, January 1985, R02F, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[14] Glenn C. Loury, "Behind the Black-Jewish Split," *Commentary* (January 1986), p. 26.

[15] David Remnick, "Facing Off at the South African Embassy," *Washington Post*, February 5, 1985.

[16] Williams, "Black Leaders."

[17] Manning Marable, "African Links," *New Statesman* (April 1985), p.22.



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sober founders of the FSAM crafted an image that fit the centrist mood of the times.

The *Washington Post* supported the protests from the beginning with front-page coverage and sympathetic editorials. This heavy emphasis may have had something to do with the newspaper's local audience; whatever the reason, the story was picked up immediately as national news.[18] Waves of coverage in the elite press continued through the post-election holiday season, and South Africa (understood as anti-Reagan racial symbolism) was added to the political news agenda surprisingly quickly.[19] On each weekday afternoon at the South African embassy for more than a year and a half, arrestees were introduced to reporters, escorted past police barricades to the embassy door where they sang "We Shall Overcome," and were then gently arrested by sympathetic D.C. police.

The sudden appearance of the South Africa issue had an immediate impact in Washington. It inaugurated the post-election campaign against the Reagan administration in which liberal elites quickly joined, eager to divert the momentum of the electoral landslide. And Conservatives had to respond. Sixteen days after the protests began, incoming Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar met with Jesse Jackson and told reporters that the administration "needs to do more" to "manifest our strong feelings about South Africa."[20] Invited to "Meet the Press" the next Sunday, Lugar was asked about South Africa and said the president should denounce apartheid "much more sharply and more often."[21] Bishop Desmond Tutu, about to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, was invited to the White House for Reagan's first meeting with a South African opposition figure.[22] The president also included criticism of apartheid as a major focus of his address on international human rights.[23]

The embassy protests also affected the post-election debate among Democratic leaders over the party's future, a debate in which blacks were initially not prominent. Many Democrats argued for a move to the center, away from over-identification with unions and minorities. The Black Congressional Caucus (through TransAfrica)

[18] Kenneth Bredemeier and Michel Marriott, "Fauntroy Arrested in Embassy," *Washington Post*, November 22, 1984; "Protesting Apartheid," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1984; Joe Davidson and David Ignatius, "Sanctions on South Africa Are Seen as a Victory for Randall Robinson and 1960's-Style Protests," *Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1985.

[19] B. G. Fourie, "Things Are Changing and for the Better," *Washington Post*, December 9, 1984; Williams "Black Leaders."

[20] Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "South Africa: The Next Chapter," *Washington Post*, December 7, 1984.

[21] Sandra Evans, "Move Against Apartheid Urged," *Washington Post*, December 10, 1984.

[22] Sandra Evans and Lou Cannon, "President Will Meet With Tutu," *Washington Post*, December 6, 1984; Evans, "Move Against Apartheid Urged."

[23] David Hoffman, "President Chides Pretoria," *Washington Post*, December 11, 1984; Lou Cannon and James B. Dickenson, "Several Pressures Said to Prompt Reagan Speech on South Africa," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1984.



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asserted three points to the party via the embassy demonstrations: its centrality among black elites; its claim to continue to define racial justice and racism; and the continued legitimacy of the Left in the party and the nation.

### Divestment Campaigns

In 1985 and again in 1986 the South Africa issue went through a cycle of spring rallies and protests leading to late summer political climaxes in Congress. This annual cycle had much more to do with the rhythms of American politics than with events in South Africa. Indeed, the continuing violence in South Africa did not govern the surges of publicity and political activity in the United States. Rather, the anniversaries of Martin Luther King's birth and death became prominent dates in the divestment and sanctions campaigns, explicitly bringing these into the context of American racial politics.[24] In some cases, the connection was made even more explicit; thus, NAACP protesters mounted a cross-country March for Human Dignity in South Africa and at Home.[25]

Divestment (quitting business in South Africa and selling shares in companies that refuse to leave) became synonymous with concern for South African blacks. So widely accepted was this view that Helen Suzman, the Liberal South African parliamentarian, surprised American college students when she opposed both apartheid and U.S. divestment, pointing to the unnecessary damage divestment inflicts on the South African economy. She found a "simplistic equation" had become the touchstone of public morality: "unless you're pro-sanctions, you're racist."[26]

The acceptance of this equation among state and local governments, colleges and universities, and banks and corporations was extremely rapid; no one organized to oppose the divestment/sanctions campaign. By the fall of 1986, 19 state governments and 83 cities and countries had passed some anti-South Africa measure, and at least 30 cities had adopted "selective purchase" bans on contracts with South Africa-linked firms.[27] American banks' fear of divestment publicity caused them to refuse the renewal of short-term loans. Twenty-six of the 105 largest U.S. banks refused loans to anyone in South Africa by mid-1986, and 55 prohibited loans to government agencies, up from 26 in 1984.[28] The result was a credit crisis and a sharp drop in the value of the South African rand.

[24] Karlyn Barker, "Apartheid Protests to Mark King Anniversary," *Washington Post*, April 3, 1985.

[25] Leff, "Embassy Arrests."

[26] Alan Cowell, "South African Opposition Splits Over Divestment," *New York Times*, June 3, 1986.

[27] Michael Isikoff, "Threat to Profits Spurs U.S. Exodus From South Africa," *Washington Post*, November 17, 1986.

[28] Robert Stevenson, "Pretoria Divestment Quickens," *New York Times*, May 26, 1986.



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Of the 310 U.S. companies doing business there in January 1985, 69 had sold out by late 1986.[29] Although two-thirds of U.S. companies with interests in South Africa had subscribed to the Sullivan principles (requiring nondiscriminatory employment practices and later direct action against apartheid), they found it hard to match the escalating demands of black elites. Indeed, the Reverend Leon Sullivan himself demanded the complete withdrawal of U.S. firms from South Africa in 1987.

That business exodus was not demanded by the American public. In November 1985 fewer than one-third of a national sample favored divestment.[30] By two-to-one margins, Americans consistently looked positively on U.S. business activities in South Africa.[31] Majorities opposed divestment and laws barring American companies from South Africa.[32]

Proponents of divestment held that the cost of sanctions to Americans would be negligible, but the U.S. Bureau of Mines estimated their annual cost to U.S. consumers as high as $3.6 billion, with the Soviet Union the chief beneficiary.[33] For example, it could cost up to $50 million over three years just to divest the New Jersey state employees' pension fund.[34] Divestment could reduce Columbia University's return on equity by nearly $5 million annually, or roughly half the university's 1986-87 tuition increase.[35]

## Apartheid in America and the World

Casting South Africa sanctions as an American civil rights issue was the critical step in shaping consensus and making policy. Civil rights issues had undergone a profound change in recent years in the United States. The 1960s saw colorblindness widely accepted as a goal in U.S. domestic life; it offered a morally just and economically equitable solution. But the shift from colorblindness to racial preference (by affirmative action) in the 1970s made civil rights no longer a matter of simple justice, wide acceptance or automatic legislative majorities. Blacks became another special interest group.

Making U.S. policy toward South Africa a civil rights issue allowed black (and white liberal) elites to regain the moral heights lost

[29] Isikoff, "Threat to Profits."

[30] Associated Press/Media General, November 1985, R35, R36, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[31] *Business Week*/Harris, February 11, 1985, 1985, RH; *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, May 2, 1985, Q25; *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 7, 1985, Q23, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[32] *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 7, 1985, Q22A, Q22B, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[33] Gary Thatcher, "U.S. Could Pay a High Price for a Moral Statement on Apartheid," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 6, 1986.

[34] Joseph F. Sullivan, "Citing Apartheid, Jersey Withdraws $1.5 Billion," *New York Times*, September 27, 1986.

[35] Edward B. Fiske, "Portfolio Divestment Over South Africa: A Time of Anxiety for Universities," *New York Times*, May 18, 1986.



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in their quest for quotas. Divestment and sanctions were demanded as a matter of high principle, in the public interest. The welfare of South African blacks became the main criterion of U.S. policy; and Bishop Tutu, Winnie Mandela, the African National Congress, and the United Democratic Front became the authoritative interpreters of that welfare.

The divestment and sanctions campaign was presented as an apolitical good cause with mainly humanitarian stakes at issue; but the campaign had sharp ideological and political undertones. In fact, it was not a mobilization of black communities but of the grassroots Left. The South African issue appealed to liberal elites and activists in the post-election season not only as a racial issue but also as foreign-policy symbolism, evoking Vietnam-era imagery. It provided a congenial symbolic venue to challenge Reaganism as imperialism as well as racism.

In his first term, President Reagan re-established several ideas discredited in the 1970s, especially a positive view of the United States in the world and the need to fight communism. In drafting the South Africa issue, the president's critics reasserted the pessimism and defensiveness that Reagan had dismissed. The Left saw South Africa as a microcosm of global racial and class relations: "There is a worldwide apartheid. . . . A 'white' minority controls the wealth, monopolizes the weapons and determines the crucial policies for a dark majority of the earth."[36] The "epic drama of South African liberation promises scenes of . . . colonialism shrinking from the continent and the empire of the West in retreat."[37] Evoking an inevitable, imminent, and irresistible rising of South African masses was the second essential step in the U.S. divestment campaigns, making sanctions a matter of practicality as well as principle.

Moreover, just the idea of a divestment "movement" had "long-term radical implications. . . . It makes the claim that investment decisions should be shaped by moral criteria and that citizen groups should have a voice in them — a step toward economic democracy."[38] By late 1986 divestment campaign tactics (shareholder resolutions, boycotts, pension fund pressure) were being studied for campaigns on other issues of "social responsibility."

The South Africa issue revitalized the Left coalition of the late 1960s. Angela Davis, Daniel Ellsberg, Cesar Chavez, and Mario Savio were arrested in Berkeley.[39] Frank Collins told a Capitol rally: "It was just great to see the gathering of people after a ten-year lag when we were basically between shows."[40] Apartheid joined budget

[36] "Warning and Hope," *The Nation,* November 22, 1986, p. 538.
[37] Andrew Kopkind, "Facing South Africa," *The Nation,* November 22, 1986, p. 545.
[38] Todd Gitlin, "Divestment Stirs A New Generation," *The Nation,* May 18, 1985, p. 587.
[39] Robert Lindsey, "New Protests Recall 60's in Berkeley," *New York Times,* May 19, 1985.
[40] Arthur S. Brisbane, "Activists Train for 'Blockade'," *Washington Post,* April 22, 1985.



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cuts, Central America, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the arms race in the constellation of left-wing causes.

The media had a prominent role in making South Africa an urgent issue in Washington. Press attention to South Africa over the two years sustained the issue for political elites if not for ordinary Americans. In early February 1985 the *Washington Post* was already referring to a "divestment band wagon." Its enthusiasm for this cause easily overlooked the fact that polls showed half a national sample had not seen or heard about the South Africa protests, 25 percent had no opinion, 15 percent approved, and 10 percent disapproved.[41]

The media shifted into high gear. *Newsweek* adopted an openly activist stance through 1985 and 1986.[42] *U.S. News* consistently summarized Reagan positions fairly, and *Time*'s coverage varied. *Time* was not fully on the sanctions bandwagon through the early summer of 1985, but by August it began conforming to the national press' standard view. Then in August 1986 *Time* resumed caution, warning of another "moral rampage against an unpopular pro-Western state."[43]

The "imagery of protest" both in South Africa and abroad damaged the Pretoria regime politically far more than the actual damage done by rocks and gasoline bombs.[44] Favoring 1960's Southern civil-rights action story lines, American television featured violence in the streets — the "emotive, sensational coverage from riot areas" that Pretoria set out to erase with its ban on picture and audio coverage in November 1985.[45] The ban worked. The three U.S. networks' coverage declined from sixty-one evening news stories from South Africa in August 1985 to only twenty in November. At first, ABC and CBS ran several South Africa pieces in defiance of the ban (as a CBS editor put it, "We don't give up that easy"), despite the lack of moving pictures.[46] But graphics and analysis did not make up for the missing pictures (especially since South Africa holds little interest for most American viewers), and coverage slackened. Despite heavy press attention through 1985, ignorance remained widespread. In September of that year, half of a national sample did not know

[41] Karlyn Barker, "States, Cities Fight Apartheid," *Washington Post*, February 8, 1985; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 1985, R24, R25, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[42] "Dealing with Apartheid," *Newsweek*, March 11, 1985, p. 28; "At Last, Sanctions," *Newsweek* (October 13, 1986), p. 49.

[43] Robert Stengel, "Falling Short," *Time*, August 4, 1986, p. 12.

[44] Alan Cowell, "A Farewell to South Africa," *New York Times Magazine*, January 25, 1987, p. 37.

[45] Glenn Frankel, "Botha's Press Ban is Working," *Washington Post*, March 2, 1986; John Corry, "TV's Coverage of South Africa," *New York Times*, November 5, 1985.

[46] Peter J. Boyer, "South Africa and TV: The Coverage Changes," *New York Times*, December 29, 1985; Eleanor Randolph, "S. Africa Ban Hurting TV News," *Washington Post*, March 1, 1986.



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whether black South Africans had the right to vote.[47] In November 76 percent of registered voters admitted knowing little or nothing about apartheid.[48]

Conveying the South African issue in the image of American racial politics, the press cast some South African blacks as representatives of the black masses. Not only did they become spokesmen, but they gained celebrity status. For example, Desmond Tutu became prominent after his 1984 Nobel nomination by Norwegian anti-apartheid activists was lauded in the Western press. That fall, he was featured in the news, visiting Washington and working in New York. His overseas trips were carefully managed media events.[49] Indeed, Tutu's prominence in the United States and Europe made him a hero in South African black townships, rather than the other way around. Thus, the U.S. networks virtually ignored leaders like Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the Zulu tribe, the largest in Africa, who happened to oppose American divestment.[50] The *Washington Post* called Tutu the "foremost spokesman for black South Africans" and explicitly drew the similarities between him and Martin Luther King.[51]

The media resisted any challenge to their choices. When Jerry Falwell called Tutu "phony" for claiming to speak for black South Africans, columnist Mary McGrory decried Falwell's "squalid campaign" against "the radiant, committed Tutu," calling Falwell's "smear" "the depths of offensive know-nothingism."[52] The criticism of Falwell was so strong, he had to apologize.[53] Similarly, the *Post*'s polling director took pains to discredit a study of the widely divergent views of U.S. black "leaders" and ordinary blacks, who opposed divestment by 74 percent.[54]

The Left also boosted the legitimacy of the African National Congress (ANC) as representative of South African blacks, despite the prominence of white leaders of the South African Communist party in the ANC executive committee. The ANC has gained international recognition tantamount to that of a government in waiting.[55] Other guerrillas (like the Nicaraguan contras) remain on moral probation in the United States, but questions about non-democratic ele-

[47] ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 1985, R17, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[48] *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 7, 1985, Q19, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[49] Elizabeth Kolbert, "An 'Elated' Bishop Tutu Winds Up Tour of U.S.," *New York Times*, January 26, 1986.

[50] Corry, "TV's Coverage of South Africa."

[51] Allister Sparks, "Bishop Tutu: Man on a Tightrope," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1985.

[52] Mary McGrory, "Sinking to New Lows," *Washington Post*, August 27, 1985.

[53] "Falwell Cools Criticism of Tutu," *Washington Post*, August 24, 1985.

[54] Barry Sussman, "Loaded Questions, Faulty Data," *Washington Post* (national weekly ed.) (October 14, 1985), p. 37.

[55] Pauline Baker, "Facing Up to Apartheid," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1986, p. 47.



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ments in the South African liberation movement are brushed aside.[56] The ANC office in New York was swamped by calls for participants in anti-apartheid rallies.

Oliver Tambo of the ANC was treated as a hero in international gatherings, meeting with British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe and with Secretary of State George Shultz, while Buthelezi was shunned. The (Republican-controlled) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence moved in 1986 to limit the information U.S. intelligence agencies could share with the South African government about the ANC.[57] Once the United States agrees that the ANC is the legitimate voice of South African blacks, it effectively becomes the only group Pretoria can deal with to gain international credit for good-faith efforts at accommodation.[58]

### Anti-Apartheid Bipartisanship

Congressional measures against white rule in South Africa passed consistently by lopsided margins. On the anniversary of Martin Luther King's assassination in April 1985, dubbed "National Anti-apartheid Protest Day," the Senate condemned Pretoria by an eighty-nine to four vote. More lopsided votes followed in committee and on both floors. This wide consensus to destroy a friendly government meant that most legislators had been persuaded to treat U.S. policy toward South Africa as a low- or no-cost domestic civil rights issue.

The *New York Times* found a "new mood in Congress" as a result of greater public interest in South Africa as seen in the April 1985 demonstrations, and in June Senator Lugar said Senate sentiment on South Africa had changed significantly in six months.[59] Since January the proportion of the mass public claiming to have seen or heard of South Africa protests was up slightly, to 62 percent; half still had no opinion on them.[60]

In each of the next two summers, a crescendo of media attention and congressional activity against South Africa built to a climactic defeat for President Reagan. Policy making usually requires a sense of crisis and trigger events, and each summer these were successfully simulated. Urgent warnings of impending disaster were exchanged

[56] Gregory Fossedal, "A Morality Test for South Africa's Opposition," *New York Times*, February 4, 1986.

[57] Steven V. Roberts, "Senate Panel Rejects Divestment But Leans to Other Pretoria Curbs," *New York Times*, August 1, 1986.

[58] Karen Elliott House, "Don't Push South Africa to the Wall," *Wall Street Journal*, October 30, 1985.

[59] Bernard Gwertzman, "Congress Turns Its Eye on Race in South Africa," *New York Times*, April 10, 1985; Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Senate Panel Backs Anti-Apartheid Bill," *New York Times*, June 5, 1985.

[60] ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 1985, R21, R22, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.



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in Congress and the press each year.[61] Speeches by President Botha (defiantly refusing to repudiate apartheid completely) in August 1985 and President Reagan (apologetically refusing to repudiate Botha completely) in July 1986 were treated as trigger events in Washington. The *New York Times* saw a "gathering force of sentiment against South Africa, both in Congress and among the American public. Even before Mr. Botha spoke, opposition . . . was growing as violence spread through black townships and U.S. public opinion hardened against apartheid."[62]

Later in 1985 nearly two-thirds of a national sample did say they sympathized with "the black population" over the South African government, but only 16 percent felt the United States should "take sides" with blacks in case of rebellion; and 78 percent would "stay out of the situation altogether."[63] In other surveys that fall, three-quarters did not know what the United States should do next or wanted to leave South Africa alone and not get involved.[64]

President Reagan's speech in July 1986 was also taken as a turning point in Washington atmospherics. Senator Nancy Kassebaum, chairman of the Africa subcommittee, observed that before the president's speech "many of us thought the House bill [a total economic embargo of South Africa] was far too restrictive, but now, I don't know. In the vacuum and the disappointment, it's hard to say what will happen."[65] Late in the cycle, the issue dominated the national news agenda, getting twice the news coverage of Soviet-U.S. relations.[66]

Thus, on one Sunday in July, Senators Richard Lugar and Edward Kennedy were invited to talk with Bishop Tutu on "Meet the Press," while Senator Orrin Hatch and Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker appeared on "Face the Nation."[67]

In contrast to most foreign-policy crises, which increase the president's popularity and therefore his freedom of action in Washington, the South Africa sanctions issue did the opposite. The president's

[61] Robert S. McNamara, "Before It's Too Late in South Africa," *New York Times*, August 14, 1985; "The South Africa Debate," *Washington Post*, August 26, 1985; "Mr. Botha's Tirade," *Washington Post*, August 16, 1985; Edward Walsh, "Civil Rights Experiences Affect Stands on S. Africa," *Washington Post*, July 28, 1986; "Republican Sanctions," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1986; Steven V. Roberts, "Senators Say Bill to Prod Pretoria Has Wide Support," *New York Times*, July 16, 1986.

[62] Neil A. Lewis, "Washington Urged Anew To Alter Role," *New York Times*, August 17, 1985.

[63] Gallup Poll, November 3, 1985, R1; *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 7, 1985, Q27, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[64] Associated Press/Media General, November 1985, R38; Gallup Poll, August 25, 1985, R2, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[65] Jane Mayer and Robert S. Greenberger, "Reagan Talk on South African Sanctions Fails to Blunt Their Support in Congress," *Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 1986.

[66] Edward Walsh, "Reagan's Forced March to Sanctions," *Washington Post* (national weekly edition), September 30, 1985, p. 7.

[67] Susan Benesch, "Senators Push Administration to Act Against Apartheid," *Washington Post*, July 28, 1986.



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opponents had to create enough of a sense of urgency, popular concern, and imminent disaster in Washington to energize an anti-Pretoria coalition without alarming the public enough to strengthen the president.

Although three-quarters of those polled disapproved of apartheid when it was explained to them, it was hard to convince many Americans that destroying the Pretoria government was helpful to U.S. national interests.[68] In September 1985 — when congressional majorities were forcing sanctions from a reluctant president — 61 percent agreed that his constructive engagement policy needed more time to work.[69] Unfortunately for the president, these public sentiments were not reflected in Washington, where a bipartisan legislative coalition lined up to take a stand on racism.

Congressman Marvin Leath said many Representatives voted for sanctions "because of the perception that if you oppose it you're racist."[70] Just as the Senate was about to vote on sanctions, a dozen members of the Black Caucus from the House walked onto the floor, figuratively parading the racial totem in a highly unusual physical display of symbolic intimidation. Said one: "We wanted some black faces on the Senate floor when they voted."[71]

That "simplistic equation" ("Unless you're pro-sanctions, you're racist") that had earlier been imposed on cities, colleges, and corporations was now applied in Congress, where centrists and even conservatives accepted it.[72] In December 1984, thirty-five members of the Conservative Opportunity Society in the House signed a letter to the South African ambassador promising support for U.S. sanctions unless a new urgency in reforming apartheid was adopted in Pretoria. These advocates of supply-side economics and deregulation felt they had already outflanked liberal Democrats on domestic policy and wanted to do the same in foreign policy with a commitment to freedom everywhere.[73] Criticizing apartheid seemed an obvious way to begin including black voters in the new Republican majority.

A study of Senate voting in the 1970s found that "with no domestic constituency and little public concern, southern Africa is, in political terms, something of a 'free-play area' for American political leaders," and ideology was decisive for voting.[74] But in the 1980s

[68] Harris Survey, September 12, 1985, RO1, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[69] Ibid., RO5.

[70] Jonathan Fuerbringer, "High Anxiety Over South Africa," *New York Times*, September 13, 1985.

[71] Ibid., Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Bid to Toughen Pretoria Curbs Fails in Senate," *New York Times*, September 12, 1985.

[72] Cowell, "South African Opposition Splits."

[73] Vin Weber, "Why the Republicans Should Act on South Africa," *Washington Post*, December 11, 1984.

[74] William J. Foltz, "United States Policy Toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints," *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1977, p. 62.



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most American conservatives did not back the Pretoria government against its likely alternatives. The extreme right was almost defined — isolated — by South African issues, and its arguments — that apartheid is repugnant but the South African regime is a strong anti-communist ally, that communist totalitarianism is a worse offense to human rights — were dismissed summarily in Washington outside the White House.

The House conservatives' anti-apartheid letter was important in making the sanctions campaign look nonpartisan and non-ideological. Many young Republicans joined Jack Kemp in August in voting for the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985. When even GOP conservatives accepted it as an ideologically neutral human rights issue with primarily symbolic domestic political impact, the president faced a bipartisan coalition of a sort he was more used to forming than fighting.

This pro-sanctions coalition was less a bipartisan opposition on foreign policy than a bipartisan consensus on racial symbolism. Accepting the South Africa sanctions issue as a simple test of racial morality rather than a complex matter of foreign policy allowed congressmen to rely confidently on their parochialism and vote against the president. As freshman Senator Mitch McConnell expressed it: "The apartheid issue made civil rights black and white again. It was not complicated."[75] The usual congressional diffidence due to inexperience, lack of expertise, and reliance on the executive branch was gone when South Africa became a cost-free domestic issue.

No groups formed to counter the publicity and lobbying of TransAfrica, ACOA, and the Left coalition, and even most Republicans decided it was smart politics to be on "the right side of history." Congressman Willis Gradison: "South Africa is a non-issue in most of our districts. I think this is one of the rare matters where politics and principle come together. . . . Republicans are tired of taking a bum rap on this kind of issue. And, of course, there aren't many South Africans voting in our districts."[76]

### Administration Accommodation (Rejected)

The congressional resurgence of the 1970s produced restraints on executive action but did not make legislative initiative easier or more likely. Congressional alternatives, other than inaction, imposed on presidents continued to be rare. President Reagan's opponents — a liberation coalition that included the Black Caucus, Democrats in Congress and on campuses, State Department Africanists and most of the national press — backed anti-Pretoria sanctions, support for the African National Congress, and aid to the "frontline states" (the

[75] Walsh, "Reagan's Forced March."
[76] Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter in Washington," *New Yorker*, October 1985, p. 115.



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Marxist governments ringing South Africa). That coalition — along with moderates and even conservatives of both parties convinced to take a stand against racism — succeeded in its first two goals by forcing presidential sanctions in 1985 and enacting its own in 1986 and by legitimizing the ANC. But the opposition was not able to stop Reagan aid to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas fighting the Marxist regime in Angola.

The anti-South Africa agenda was also backed by an international liberation front including opposition parties, the UDF, churches and unions in South Africa; the ANC and frontline regimes in southern Africa; the Organization of African Unity, the non-aligned movement, and the U.N. General Assembly; and European socialists. These pressed a longer list of specific demands upon South Africa, most of which the Reagan administration agreed to, including: an end to the state of emergency; the release of political prisoners, including Mandela; a lifting of the ban on black political movements, including the ANC; a timetable for ending apartheid; government dialogue with opponents to create a system resting on consent of the governed; and respect for the fundamental rights of all South Africans.[77]

In 1985 the Reagan administration also stopped just being "deeply troubled" by the bloodshed (and focusing on agitators as catalysts of violence) in South Africa and began declaring apartheid "repugnant and largely responsible for the violence" — another key liberal viewpoint.[78] The administration also stopped stressing South Africa's strategic importance as an anti-communist bastion and strategic metals producer and accepted the liberal premise that these were not important enough reasons to leave Pretoria alone.[79]

The Reagan administration also joined the international Left in criticizing South Africa unequivocally at the United Nations and elsewhere. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker, the architect of the constructive engagement policy, said the administration regarded the ANC as "freedom fighters," and that State favored ANC participation in a South African national dialogue.[80] Crocker's early condemnations of apartheid earned him the enmity of Senator Jesse Helms, who held up his nomination as assistant secretary of state for nine months in 1981.[81]

Led by the State Department the administration also agreed to key goals of the Left with regard to regional issues. Crocker devel-

[77] President Ronald Reagan, "Ending Apartheid in South Africa," address before World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association, White House, July 22, 1986, Department of State, *Current Policy*, no. 853.

[78] Joseph Fromm, "Can Reagan Save South African Policy?" *US News & World Report*, August 5, 1985, p. 29.

[79] William E. Smith, "Black Rage, White Fist," *Time* (August 5, 1985), p. 32.

[80] David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Favors Black Rule in S. Africa," *Washington Post*, March 13, 1986; "The President, As Amended," *New York Times*, August 31, 1985.

[81] Christopher Coker, *The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), p. 160.



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oped an elaborate plan for South African withdrawal from Namibia; the administration condemned South African attacks on ANC bases in neighboring countries, and the administration's approaches to the Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique belied its usual anti-communist stance.[82] It accepted the inevitability of apartheid's demise, the need for "power-sharing," and the welfare of South African blacks as the primary criterion of U.S. policy. The White House never accepted, however, the full liberal view of South Africa's masses rising spontaneously and choosing the ANC for national liberation. It did not dismiss white South Africans nor middle-class blacks as collaborators, nor did it accept the necessity of armed struggle.

President Reagan's opponents would accept only categorical denunciations of South Africa. They rejected his insistence that Botha's extensive reforms (like abolishing the pass laws) made a difference as a full defense of apartheid ("snatching at any straw" was the phrase used).[83] They condemned any reference to South Africa in its African context or in comparison to other authoritarian settings as a racist subterfuge.

Reagan's 1985 sanctions met with contempt, though they were only slightly milder than those in the House bill. Randall Robinson called them "inadequate and toothless."[84] Mary Frances Berry said Reagan was giving "aid and comfort to the Botha government";[85] and the *New York Times* called Reagan's "grudging" conversion still suspect.[86]

## Overriding Reagan

President Reagan succeeded in his first term in dominating the national agenda by picking his issues, framing them publicly in widely appealing terms, and isolating his opponents. Despite being the first postwar president to have his popular approval rating rise (to 65 percent) in the first year of his second term, he could not dictate outcomes. The liberal leadership of the Democratic House strenuously resisted his programs, and the president could only win when he appealed to centrist and conservative House Democrats. This meant that the president had to compromise often. Congressional coalitions forced him to withdraw his request for advanced weapons for Saudi Arabia and Jordan, to limit foreign imports because of "unfair trading practices," and to accept a foreign-aid package including nearly sixty provisions limiting presidential authority to act abroad. Liberal Democrats coalesced enough to limit funds to the

[82] Rothchild and Ravenhill, "From Carter to Reagan," p. 352.

[83] "How America Stands on South Africa," *New York Times*, August 15, 1986; "Winking at Apartheid," *New York Times*, August 28, 1985; "The President, As Amended."

[84] Karlyn Barker, "Sanctions Called 'Inadequate'," *Washington Post*, September 11, 1985.

[85] "The Week," *National Review*, October 4, 1985, p. 10.

[86] "Mr. Reagan Slaps at Apartheid," *New York Times*, September 10, 1985.



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Nicaraguan contras, MX missiles, antisatellite weapons testing, chemical weapons delivery vehicles, and defense spending increases.[87]

Despite President Reagan's huge re-election victory, changes in the White House and in the Senate left him more vulnerable to a skillful insurrection in Congress. In his first term, Senate majority leader Howard Baker had worked closely with White House chief of staff James Baker and Secretary of State Shultz. Senator Baker's successor, the more independent Robert Dole, clashed with the equally forceful new White House chief of staff Donald Regan, who lacked his predecessor's Washington experience and congressional contacts.

The new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar, wanted to re-establish the importance of his committee. He steered the first foreign aid bill since 1981 through Congress, helped convince the administration to support Corazon Aquino in Manila, and brokered deals with House liberals on several issues, including aid to Jordan and to the Nicaraguan contras.[88] By May 1985, after the first round of spring divestment protests, Lugar was ready to consider sanctions against South Africa.[89] He managed the Senate sanctions bill but backed the president after Reagan decided to impose sanctions by executive order to avoid the embarrassment of being required to do so.

The *Washington Post* joined a moderate consensus then content with the rare feat of forcing presidential action, though Senate liberals tried repeatedly to force a (racism test) vote on sanctions to embarrass Republicans. The president had been brought into a "respectable national consensus," the *Post* said, while complaining that Reagan's defeat had not hurt him politically as much as it would have hurt Carter.[90]

In June 1986, House Republicans unexpectedly agreed to an extreme bill proposed by Black Caucus veteran Ron Dellums requiring total U.S. embargo of South Africa. The Republicans wanted to isolate the Left, and by summer's end, they partially succeeded. Senator Lugar wrote a bill to hurt South African whites and the Pretoria government but spare blacks. As the time for reconciling sanctions bills shortened, Lugar's package became the focus of a consensus that included the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *New Republic*, *Time*, Senator Kennedy, and the other Senate Democrats.[91] Most Republicans, seeking cover against charges of rac-

[87] Jeffery L. Sheler, "The Pressure Builds," *US News & World Report* (September 23, 1985), p. 21.

[88] Bernard Weinraub, "Power Plays By Congress," *New York Times*, September 9, 1985.

[89] David B. Ottaway, "GOP Sen. Lugar Ready to Consider Immediate Sanctions on South Africa," *Washington Post*, May 23, 1985.

[90] "In a Single Voice," *Washington Post* (national weekly edition), September 23, 1985, p. 26; "Reversals," *Washington Post* (national weekly edition) (September 30, 1985), p. 25.

[91] "The Old South Africa Policy," *Washington Post*, July 23, 1986; "Walk, Do Not Run, Out of South Africa," *New York Times*, June 22, 1986; "Targeting South Africa," *New Republic*,



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ism, agreed to Lugar's bill; and the Black Caucus reluctantly accepted a less-than-total embargo, adding the Left to the consensus as well.

President Reagan was personally committed to veto the bill, but he tried first to propitiate that Washington consensus with offers to order partial sanctions, allot $500 million to South Africa's neighbors hurt by trade embargoes, name a black American ambassador to Pretoria, and have Secretary Shultz travel to Africa. The administration asked for time to coordinate moves with European allies. Meeting with Republican swing-vote senators, Shultz argued that overriding the president would hurt him at the upcoming Iceland summit. Shultz even planned to meet Oliver Tambo, helping legitimize the ANC, but neither the Left nor Lugar would agree to the president's offers.

Although Senate majority leader Robert Dole was willing to support a veto backed by a new executive order, Lugar was proud of his bill and insisted the president sign it.[92] Liberals claimed the president did not speak for the American people in opposing the "consensus plain in Congress and in the country."[93] The *New York Times* welcomed the challenge to the president's primacy in foreign policy as a "healthy maturation for the Congress," for "when the executive lags too far behind the public will, it is Congress' duty to speak up."[94]

In August 1986 fewer than one-third of a national sample said that combating apartheid was a very important issue facing the nation.[95] Forty-five percent admitted they still had not read or heard enough to have an opinion about South Africa, but in October a majority said they thought Congress was right to overrule the president.[96]

The Reagan veto was announced late Friday after the evening news shows, but liberal Democrats had already taped their protest that morning. At the peak of "TV triangle," the spot on the Capitol steps where any crowd looks huge, Senators Kennedy, Simon, Cranston, and Riegle joined Black Caucus leaders Mickey Leland, Ronald Dellums, and William Gray before flags and banners for the seventeen waiting cameras, and the networks aired their response even before the veto was announced at 7:58 p.m.[97] Despite the bipartisan patina on the Reagan defeat when his veto was overridden, it was clearly

July 7, 1986, p. 10; Bruce Nelan, "Beyond the Debate," *Time*, August 4, 1986, p.22; Steven V. Roberts, "Reaction in Congress to Speech Is Mostly Negative," *New York Times*, July 23, 1986.

[92] Steven V. Roberts, "G.O.P. Leaders Fight Over Africa Bill," *New York Times*, September 19, 1986.

[93] "Mr. Reagan's Veto, Not America's," *New York Times*, September 27, 1986.

[94] "Whose Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, September 30, 1986.

[95] Roper/*US News*, Cable News Network, September 8, 1986, R14G, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[96] NBS News/*Wall Street Journal*, August 26, 1986, RO4; *Business Week*/Harris Poll, October 27, 1986, RH, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Ct.

[97] Sidney Blumenthal, "Democrats Make Sure TV Networks Focus on Veto," *Washington Post*, September 27, 1986.



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a victory for black elites and the Left. Randall Robinson and Coretta King watched from the Senate gallery, and celebrations followed at the TransAfrica office near the Capitol.[98]

## Conclusion

Until late summer of 1986, Congress had overridden only five of Reagan's forty-eight vetoes, and not one concerned a major foreign-policy issue. Only twice before in this century had foreign-policy vetoes been overridden — a World War II immigration act and the 1973 War Powers Act. Ronald Reagan's first significant loss on foreign policy came at a time of unprecedented popularity in a second term; the South Africa issue provided his opponents their only successful vehicle for an ideological and partisan insurgency.

In his first term President Reagan seized the high and popular ground by controlling the national agenda, isolating liberal Democrats, and keeping them on the defensive. Raising the South Africa issue was a masterful counterplay, for it forced the president on the defensive. It offered liberal Democrats an opportunity to reassert a racial standard raised and consecrated in the 1960s, a standard of racial equality that seemed a universal guide to morality in public policy, including U.S. foreign policy.

Pursuing the South Africa issue distracted attention from the president's agenda, subverted his re-election mandate, and swallowed time from his second term. South Africa consumed weeks of Senate activity and Washington attention through two summers. The sanctions issue broke Dole's record of success in keeping the Senate floor free of opportunities for Democratic victories. Another fiscal year began in October 1986 without congressional decision on any of the spending bills, but there had been time for South Africa.

Rendering such a popular president seemingly out of step with the country was an impressive feat. Creating an anti-Reagan coalition that included not just the Black Caucus and the Left, but also moderate Democrats and even conservative Republicans was extraordinary so soon after the 1984 election. Enacting policy over a presidential veto was even more remarkable.

Presidential victories build on each other and so do defeats. President Reagan's reputation for dominating events and winning or compromising in time to avoid defeat was torn by the sanctions fights. The South Africa issue provided the single most successful symbolic venue for the president's opponents in the two years between his re-election and the first revelation of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's deals with Iran.

[98] Patrice Gaines Carter, "Triumphant Moment for TransAfrica," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1986.



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


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# Underground Publishing in Poland

by Ted Kaminski

Five years after the imposition of martial law in Poland, uncensored historical, literary, and cultural works continue to play a major role in the resistance to communist rule. While the "second circuit" (*drugi obieg*) in clandestine films, video cassettes, and radio grows unabated, literature remains the chief medium for the diffusion of an alternative non-communist culture. Solidarity may have troubles on the shop floor, but it offers a vision of the alternative society that fills a critical niche in Polish life.

Details of the underground publishing movement in Poland are little-known and offer a fascinating glimpse into the workings of counter-culture under communist rule. This study presents what is known about the movement, evaluates its strengths and weaknesses, and comments briefly on some of its implications.

## Early Clandestine Publishing, 1795-1980

Clandestine publishing is a cherished tradition in Poland that goes back two centuries. The Austrian, Prussian, and Russian overlords severely curtailed free expression during the period of partitions (1795-1918). Adam Mickiewicz, considered Poland's national poet, was banished to Central Russia for belonging to a secret patriotic society, and throughout the nineteenth century most of his works reached Poland only by being smuggled from France. In 1894 the young revolutionary Józef Pilsudski printed the clandestine socialist *Robotnik* while in hiding from the Czarist police. His account of his experiences in clandestine publishing, *Bibula*, has been reprinted by the underground and circulates widely. A well-developed clandestine press and radio system came into existence during World War II despite harsh Nazi efforts at suppression.[1] In the immediate postwar period, some 3,500 anti-communist groups loyal to the London government-in-exile printed hundreds of newspapers and newsletters before being scattered by the new communist authorities.[2]

Given this history, it is not suprising that many Poles associate forbidden literature with the national cause. Those who are active within the underground movement today see themselves as heirs to a patriotic struggle initiated by great luminaries of the past, safe-

[1] Stefan Korbonski, *Polskie panstwo podziemne* (New York, 1983), pp. 72-73. In the preface, p. 5, the author acknowledges that the underground Krąg structure had printed 4,000 copies of his work.

[2] Witold Pilecki, "O polskich wydawnictwach konspiracyjnych i niezaleznych," in *Kontakt* (Paris), January 1985, pp. 33-34. See also *Kultura* (Paris), June 1985, pp. 81-82 for a discussion of Pilecki's article.

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guarding "true" Polish values from communist attempts at subjugation and acting as the authentic voice of the nation.

The modern age of clandestine publishing began in 1976, spurred by the industrial unrest in Radom and the Warsaw suburb of Ursus. As Edward Gierek's government lost control over the economy and the spectre of disaster loomed, an ever-larger portion of the public became alienated from the "propaganda of success" spewed out by the official media. Uncensored literature found a particularly large audience among the professional intelligentsia and the better educated and politically aware workers, the "workers' intelligentsia." The future leader of Solidarity's underground structure, Zbigniew Bujak, for example, credits the opposition press of the 1976-1980 period for his political education.

The driving force behind the early printing activity was the Warsaw-based KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow — Workers Defense Committee) group. KOR was formed by several dozen academics, lawyers, and physicians in 1976 to defend the workers imprisoned following the 1976 protests. It collected aid for the families of the victims, provided legal counsel and publicized the trials at home and abroad. By 1978, thanks in no small measure to KOR's activities, the last imprisoned workers had been released. In all, during the so-called KOR era of 1976-80, an estimated 500 clandestine printing operations were launched with varying degrees of success, many of them KOR initiatives.[3]

Many leading Solidarity activists began their political careers in clandestine publishing and distribution before the birth of the trade union. Bogdan Borusewicz, a Solidarity TKK (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordinacyjna, or Provisional Coordinating Committee) member, and Andrzej Gwiazda, Solidarity's number two figure in the National Commission, brought out *Robotnik Wybrzeza* (Coastal Worker).[4] Jan Lityński, a key adviser to Solidarity in 1980, was editor of *Robotnik*, KOR's most influential paper (whose title harked back to the socialist magazine of the 1890s). Other key people involved with the *Robotnik* were Bogdan Cywinski, a future Solidarity adviser, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Solidarity's press spokesman. The nationwide circulation of *Robotnik* was estimated at more than 50,000.[5]

KOR's *Biuletyn Informacyjny* (1976-78) became a model for future newsletters. Edited by Seweryn Blumsztajn, later head of Solidarity's Paris-based bulletin (1982-85), and Joanna Szczesna,[6] it disseminated information rapidly on legal proceedings against the workers and efforts to have them released. KOR members were

[3] *Kultura* (Paris), June 1985, p. 81.

[4] Jan Josef Lipski, KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow — Workers' Defence Committee), (London, 1983), pp. 98, 200.

[5] Pilecki, "O polskich wydawnictwach," p. 34. See also Krzystof Pomian, *Wymiary polskiego konfliktu 1956-1981* (London, 1982), p. 106.

[6] Lipski, KOR, pp. 97-98; Pomian, Wymiary polskiego konfliktu 1956-1981, p. 81.



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involved in launching intellectual periodicals like *Krytyka*, *Puls*, and *Glos*.[7] Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza (Independent Publishing House) was the most enduring of KOR's publishing efforts. Known as NOW-a, its editor in chief was Miroslaw Chojecki, a chemist and an original KOR member.[8] Chojecki sought to provide the public with works of history, politics, and literature that the state refused to publish. By 1980, NOW-a had produced eighty-seven books and had won a national reputation.

In all, about 300 illegal titles circulated in Poland between 1977 and 1980.[9] Most of these were homemade efforts that relied on primitive methods and tremendous perseverance on the part of editors and printers. However simple, these early efforts lay the foundations for today's far more sophisticated underground publishing.

## The Solidarity Period, 1980-81

Uncensored literature swamped the country with the formation of Solidarity in 1980. Although a milder censorship law passed in July 1981 gave the official publications a far greater degree of credibility, there was still a tremendous demand for uncensored materials. Solidarity received a large quantity of printing equipment from Western trade unions and published virtually without hindrance. Its publications were legally bought and sold. About 300 information bulletins and uncensored newspapers appeared between 1980 and 1981 with a total circulation of about 1.5 million.[10] *Tygodnik Solidarność*, a weekly that enjoyed a national circulation of about 500,000, was the union's official voice and the most popular newspaper.[11] Solidarity also organized its own press agency, BIPS (Biuro Informacyjne Prasowe Solidarności). Headquartered in Gdańsk, this posed an unprecedented challenge to the official press agency PAP (Polska Agencja Prasowa). Because of Solidarity's near universal membership BIPS was able to obtain a wealth of information and offered a speedy and creditworthy version of the undeclared war between Solidarity and the Kania-Jaruzelski regime.

Several clandestine publishers debated the merits of emerging from hiding, thinking the time had come to publish openly. The largest house, NOW-a, led the group that advised caution. Though its publications could be found on the open market, the publishing facilities themselves remained secret. In the words of the editor, "As long as even one item of national culture is blocked by the censors,

[7] Jakum Karpinski, *Countdown* (New York, 1982), p. 200; Pomian, *Wymiary polskiego konfliktu 1956-1981*, p. 102.

[8] Miroslaw Chojecki, "Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza NOW-a," in *Kultura* (Paris), January-February, 1981, pp. 175-80; Roman Wojciechowski, "O Mirku Chojeckim," in *Krytyka* (Warsaw-London), no. 6, 1980, pp. 1-2.

[9] Pilecki,"O polskich wydawnictwach konspiracyjnych i niezaleznych," p. 35.

[10] Kevin Ruane, *The Polish Challenge* (London, 1982), p. 224; Pomian, *Wymiary*, p. 159.

[11] Ibid.



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the (secret) work of NOW-a is imperative."[12] At the same time, NOW-a secured an agreement to reprint almost all the titles of the Paris-based Instytut Literacki, the chief publisher of Polish works abroad.[13]

Krąg, a major new publishing house appeared in February 1981. Its first effort was Maurycy Mochnacki's *History of the Polish Insurrection 1830-1831*, a work that the state censors deemed too anti-Russian. (It was published officially in 1984.) Another early project was the third volume of Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski's *Polish Political History 1939-1945*, a vociferously anti-Soviet work that more than once equates the Russian treatment of the Poles with that of the Germans.[14]

The two chief clandestine houses, NOW-a and Krąg, arrived at an informal division of labor: NOW-a dealt with literature, politics, and economics, while Krąg primarily concerned itself with history.[15] Furthermore, something of a cartel was established whereby all clandestine publishers maintained prices at about one zloty per page, though this agreement ended with the imposition of martial law (after which the price shot up to about 4 zloties per page) by 1985.[16]

Solidarity publications during this period made great inroads in the working class, particularly those in the large factories. Poles demanded the truth concerning those topics that threatened "eternal Polish-Soviet friendship" and undermined the ideological justification of communist rule. To many observers it appeared that the communist apparatus was in danger of dissolution and that Soviet intervention was impending. The ideological struggle was clearly being won by the "enemies of socialism." Recognizing the challenge and prodded by the Soviets, the Kania-Jaruzelski regime methodically prepared its counterattack. The liquidation of Solidarity's press was at the top of the list of the regime's priorities when martial law was declared.

## Martial Law and After

Martial law was imposed in December 1981 and changed everything for the clandestine publishers. All of Solidarity was caught off guard; while some groups kept their wits, others needlessly destroyed thousands of books.[17] Further, the police confiscated equipment and

[12] Chojecki, *Niezalezna*, p. 180; interview with an anonymous NOW-a editor, in *Kultura* (Paris), September 1984, p. 82.

[13] Text of the agreement is found in *Kultura* (Paris), November 1981, p. 3.

[14] Interview with an anonymous Krąg editor in: *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Warsaw), 47, reproduced in *Biuletyn Informacyjny Solidarność* (Paris), no. 63 (1983), p. 8. (hereafter BI Paris).

[15] Interview with an anonymous NOW-a editor, in *Kultura* (Paris), September 1984, p. 86.

[16] "Underground Publishing. An interview with Pawel Bekowski" (former NOW-a collaborator), in *Poland Watch*, no. 6., 1984, p. 56.

[17] Interview with an anonymous NOW-a editor, in *Kultura* (Paris), September 1984, p. 82.



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materials and many leaders of Solidarity press were interned or found themselves abroad.

Martial law created an even greater demand for reliable news. The regime controlled the media tightly and gave out very little news. In response, the public largely boycotted the regime media and relied on radio broadcasts, church announcements and word of mouth for information.

The first publications after martial law dealt almost exclusively with the concerns of the moment — the fate of political prisoners, government disinformation, and the violation of human rights. They urged Solidarity members to continue paying union dues and advocated numerous strategies of passive resistance, from the "Halian Strike" to non-participation in regime-sponsored events. In January 1982, NOW-a responded to an appeal from remaining Solidarity structure to resurrect the union's press and began printing the newspaper *Tygodnik Mazowsze* and the intellectual periodical, *Krytyka. Tygodnik Mazowsze*, which printed its 200th issue on February 25, 1987, is cited repeatedly by other underground papers and in the foreign press, while Solidarity's offices abroad translate it into many languages.

NOW-a's contribution was acknowledged by the chief Warsaw underground activist, Zbigniew Bujak: "I was confident our printing needs would be satisfied as long as NOW-a remained intact."[18] Krąg, which also survived the crackdown in December, printed 6,000-15,000 of the first issues of *KOS*, the publication of the new Committee for Social Resistance.[19] In Gdańsk a newsletter, *Gdańsk Solidarność*, appearing in late January has a circulation of about 60,000; in Wroclaw the Lower Silesia Solidarity group began to print *Z dnia na dzien* (From day to day); in Cracow-Nowa Huta, the *Hutnik* (Foundry Worker) and the *Serwis Informacyjny* (Information Service) newsletters were soon appearing regularly.[20]

In July 1982, the police printed a bogus edition of the *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (no. 22) in the hope of infiltrating the presses' distribution network.[21] They did identify several couriers through this ruse and succeeded temporarily in shutting down the paper.[22] Although Warsaw's chief of secret police assured General Jaruzelski by the autumn

[18] Zbigniew Bujak, interviewed in *KONSPIRA, Rzecz o poziemnej Solidarnośći*, eds. Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskwit, Mariusz Wilk (Paris, 1984), p. 16; Bekowski, Interview, p. 47.

[19] Interview with an anonymous Kos editor, in: Kultura (Paris), January-February 1984, p. 93.

[20] *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Warsaw) no. 154 from January 16, 1986, reproduced in "Survey of Underground Periodicals," in *East European Reporter* (hereafter EER), Winter 1986, p. 26; "Spis wydawnictw podziemnych w PRL," in *Kultura* (Paris), June 1982, p. 75; *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin* (hereafter UPNB), August 8, 1985, no. 16, p. 31.

[21] "Spis wydawnictw podziemnych w PRL," in *Kultura* (Paris), May 1983, p. 102.

[22] Bakowski, Interview, p. 53; interview with an anonymous NOW-a editor, in *UPNB*, October 18, 1984, no. 20, p. 34.



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that the printing centers would soon be smashed, this was not to be.[23] Many groups were broken up after martial law, but the largest structures remained intact.

Prominent Solidarity activists who had escaped internment formed the TKK (the underground Provisional Coordinating Committee) in April 1982. This body called for publishing initiatives to keep the worker's cause alive.[24] TKK strongly supported clandestine publishing activity in its January 1983 program and urged publishers to go beyond the diffusion of information to build an independent social consciousness:

> Society must be immune to ideological manipulation. Therefore, one of our major tasks must be to promote independent thought; to break through the state's monopoly on the spoken and written word relating to information, education, culture, academic research, and political and social thought. . . . Independent institutions such as publishing houses, artistic groups, press, radio, and a free culture are all part of our common good. They must be supported and protected. They give our society a certain liberty that will prepare us for life in a democratic and sovereign republic.[25]

As late as 1982, many activists felt that uncensored, independent media could eventually replace those of officialdom.[26] By 1987, however, this aspiration is dead. Once again, the majority of Poles rely on the state media for most of their information (80 percent, according to a 1985 Solidarity report).[27] Rather than replace official publishing, independent organizations now try to supplement it; by breaking the regime's monopoly on information and publishing illicit books, they hope to enlighten and lead the populace. Clandestine publishers — in conjunction with the theater, videos, films, and study groups — profoundly challenge the totalitarian model of culture that has dominated Eastern Europe since 1945.

### Audience

The skeptical observer may well question public access to clandestine publications. How widespread is their diffusion? Evaluation is difficult; the very nature of secret publishing renders authoritative figures impossible. At the end of 1984, Wincenty Wolski of *Le Monde* placed the number of clandestine publications at 500; Seweryn Blumsztajn, then director of the Solidarity Office in Paris, disclosed

[23] "Spis wydawnictw podziemnych w PRL (4)," in *Kultura* (Paris), June 1984, p. 118.

[24] Article 7 of the TKK declaration on an underground society of April 22, 1982, signed by the original TKK members: Zbigniew Bujak (Warsaw), Wladyslaw Hardek (Cracow), Bogdan Lis (Gdańsk) and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk (Wroclaw). *Biuletyn Malopolska,* no. 9., June 1982.

[25] "Solidarność Dzis" (Solidarity today), TKK document of January 1983, in *Z dnia na dzien* (From day to day), RKS Dolny Slask (Lower Silesia), no. 5/264, February 3, 1983.

[26] Wiktor Kulerski in an interview with *Kultura Niezalezna* (Warsaw), February 1986, reproduced in *Kultura* (Paris), October 1986, p. 7.

[27] *Raport Polska 5 lat po Sierpniu* [Poland Five Years After August] (London, 1986), p. 336. Popularly known and cited hereafter as "Raport Walesy" because of Lech Walesa's foreword. See also Roman Cekalski, "Miedzy Opozycja a Kolaboracya," in *Kontakt* (Paris), November 1986, p. 80. "We should remember that public opinion is not only formed by the *Tgodnik Mazowsze, Aneks* or *Radio Free Europe.* The major influence are those newspapers one can purchase at kiosks, and, unfortunately, the state radio and television."



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the same number in early 1985.[28] In January 1986 *Tygodnik Mazowsze* knew of 930 different publications since early 1982 but could only confirm that 400 were still in existence.[29] In February 1986 Wiktor Kulerski, TKK's liaison with many independent cultural organizations such as the ZON (Zeopoly Osuraty? Narodowej), spoke of a number as high as 1,000.[30] According to Solidarity sources then, unofficial newspapers and periodicals number between 500 and 1,000.

Archives kept by the *Tygodnik Mazowsze* in Warsaw and by the Solidarity Office in Paris show that the figure changes from week to week as the police eliminate careless groups or they die from workers' exhaustion or lack of funding, only to be replaced somewhere else. Archivists in both Warsaw and Paris stress that they are probably unaware of many publications in smaller towns.

It is also difficult to calculate readership. Regional Solidarity bulletins are more likely to have a large circulation than those restricted to a single factory or profession. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, best known of the underground papers and the voice of Solidarity in Warsaw, has a normal circulation of 50,000, but it reached 80,000 in February 1985.[31] The *Hutnik*, a large factory paper serving the Lenin Steelworks in Nowa Huta, had a circulation of 7,000 in mid-1983.[32] Specialist papers, like *Solidarność Lekarska* (Physicians Solidarity), or *Solidarność Radia i Telewizji* (Radio and Television Solidarity), may have circulations from several hundred to a few thousand. The Warsaw-based *KOS*, which represents a political orientation rather than a factory, region, or profession, has a print run of between 6,000 and 15,000, depending on capabilities.[33] The regional *Feniks* printed in Gorzow Wielkopolska, has been broken up by the police several times but still appears in about 5,000 copies.[34]

In addition to the newspapers and bulletins, independent publishers put out well over 1,000 books with a circulation between one thousand and ten thousand copies each.[35] The KOS group publishes many of the textbooks of the ZON (*Zespoly Oswitaty Niezaleznej*).

[28] "Survey of Underground Periodicals," p. 26.

[29] Wincenty Wolski in *Le Monde*, December 12, 1984, read over the *BBC Polish Language Broadcast*, December 14, 1984; Seweryn Blumsztajn, Speech at the Paris Colloquium on Human Rights 30-31 May, 1985, in *IB* (Paris), no. 117 (1985), p. 9; Leszek Szaruga, "Kultura niezalezna a struktury oficjalne," in *Kultura* (Paris), February 1987, p. 152, also places the number at 500.

[30] Wiktor Kulerski, Interview, p. 7.

[31] "O drukowaniu TM" in *BU* (Paris), no. 162, I.4. 1987, p. 11. Seweryn Blumsztajn, Speech, p. 9.

[32] *Hutnik* (The Foundry Worker) (Cracow-Nowa Huta), May 27, 1983.

[33] Interview with an anonymous *Kos* editor, p. 93.

[34] "Spis wydawnictw podziemnych w PRL (4)," in *Kultura* (Paris), June 1984, p. 118.

[35] A list of uncensored books can be found in Kultura under the heading "Spis wydawnictw podziemnych w PRL"; *Kontakt* (Paris), November 1986, pp. 144-59; *Puls* (London), no. 26 (1985), pp. 151-56. These journals all caution that their lists may be incomplete.



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About twenty volumes were printed by KOS between 1982 and the end of 1985, each with a circulation of 5,000 to 7,000 copies.[36]

In comparison, the state media printed forty-two dailies in 1985 with a circulation of about 8 million, while over 8,000 titles were published in 1985 alone.[37] Although the total amount of clandestine materials may seem small for a population of 37 million, each publication is usually read by several people; issues are read and passed along or borrowed from secret libraries. Opposition and government both estimate that about 3 million people regularly read uncensored literature. Solidarity sources estimate that some 15 percent of the working class have access to the Solidarity press.[38]

The state media are losing circulation, and this seems to be a direct result of clandestine publishing. Circulation of the official Communist party daily *Trybuna Ludu* dropped from 900,000 in 1982 to 600,000 in 1984. Newspapers per household per year in Warsaw dropped from 160 to 134 between 1980 and 1983; in Cracow from 112 to 99; in Gdańsk from 122 to 105.[39] Solidarity sources report that up to 50 percent of many party-sponsored papers go unsold.[40] The 10 to 15 percent drop in state media circulation roughly matches the number that regularly read uncensored publications.

The pressure of clandestine materials confronts the state media with some hard choices. For example, in 1985, 650,000 copies of an eighth-grade history book were shredded because the censors, competing with the clandestine publications, initially approved a controversial text and then changed their minds. In general, though, the existence of a clandestine press has made the official publications more open on a wide range of economic and social issues, such as Poland's foreign debt, sluggish productivity, and cases of corruption.[41]

## The Difficulties of Clandestine Work

Unauthorized activities in Poland are subject to varying degrees of repression by the secret police, the *Sluzba Bezpieczeństwa* (commonly known as *Bezpieka*). The official media portray an omniscient police, aware of all initiatives, waiting only for the right moment to close in. The official media frequently note police raids, complete with film of allegedly captured materials and contrite activists under arrest, ready to say they had erred and would not do so again.

[36] Interview with an anonymous *Kos* editor, p. 93; *IB* (Paris), no. 129/130, December 1985, p. 25; Witold (a pseudonym), "OKN Organizing Underground Education, Culture and Science," in *EER*, Summer 1985, p. 13.

[37] *Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook 1986*, pp. 900, 956.

[38] IBI (Paris), 14 May 1986, no. 139, p. 7; Wiktor Kulerski citing an intercepted government document, Interview, p. 6.

[39] BI (Paris), no. 117 (1985), p. 39.

[40] UPNB, March 27, 1985, no. 7, p. 42.

[41] UPNB, March 27, 1985, no. 7, p. 41.



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The record shows otherwise; while the regime often hinted that it could easily have disposed of the TKK, it needed four and a half years to root out the original founders — and even so, two of them, Wiktor Kulerski and Jan Lityński of the Warsaw executive committee, were not apprehended but surfaced on their own. Generally, leading Warsaw publishers (NOW-a, Krąg, Wola, KOS) do better than their small town counterparts. Greater anonymity and more conspiratorial know-how in the larger urban areas explain these differences.

Distribution presents the most exposed part of the process, as distributors (*kolportarze*) are in contact with the general readership and must physically transport materials. A number of rings have been broken up by the arrest of a distributor who knew too much about the publishing organization and was frightened into disclosure. To avoid this, Krąg has organized a decentralized distribution with several key people leading teams of couriers, none of whom know the rest. Further, the editorial staff is isolated from printers, who in turn do not know the distributors.[42] The *Tygodnik Mazowsze* is put together by twenty separate groups in thirty-seven secret locations around the country.[43] The police may not have broken up major institutions, but they have compelled activists to adopt time-consuming, expensive, and tiring practices.

The catch-all law against clandestine publishers until October 1986 was article 282a of the Criminal Code, "undertaking activity with the intent to create public disorder." Conviction could lead to three years' imprisonment, but almost always entailed long periods of detention, grueling interrogation, occasional physical maltreatment, and dismissal from the workplace. The amnesties of 1984 and 1986 freed many convicted activists before their terms were served; indeed, about 70 percent of the 225 prisoners freed in September 1986 had been sentenced under article 282a.[44]

In October 1986, the authorities introduced a new bill, article 52a of the Code, which reduced penalties for anti-state activities to monetary fines and confiscation of the offensive property.[45] Offenders are detained up to three months, fined, and then released without trial, eliminating the embarrassment of political prisoners. Laws against illegal publishing were relaxed in 1986 due to both domestic (the Catholic Church, intellectuals, the regime-sponsored trade unions, and Solidarity) and foreign pressures. From November 1986

[42] Interview with an anonymous Krąg editor, p. 10.

[43] "O drukowania TM, rozmowa z szefem poligrafii Tm," in: *BI* (Paris), April 1, 1987, pp. 11-12.

[44] CDN (Warsaw), September 27, 1986, no. 167, p. 1.

[45] Przeglad Wiadomosci Aggencyjnch (Warsaw), January 4, 1987, reproduced in *CSSR*, February 23, 1987, no. 49, p. 18; *Time*, November 3, 1987; and Romaszewski, "Befzdroza," p. 14.



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to mid-January 1987, 186 individuals were fined a total 6.7 million zloties (c. US $30,000) for violations of the new bill.[46]

Activists insist that police repression is not their major worry. Key difficulties are less heroic than midnight raids: they have to do with physical exhaustion and financial insolvency.[47] Most of those engaged in the work maintain normal jobs. Under the "parasite" law of 1983, every citizen must have conventional work. Further, as the intelligentsia slips deeper into poverty, more and more activists are obliged to take second jobs and have little time or strength for the arduous task of late evening printing in drafty cellars. The major book publishers have begun to pay their editors and printers a competitive wage, causing painful debates over whether the motivation behind clandestine work is patriotic or financial.

The number of those involved in underground publishing can only be estimated. The Interior Minister, Czeslaw Kiszczak, put it in mid-1986 at 1,500 people, but this figure seems far too low.[48] Several hundred people allegedly work for the NOW-a organization.[49] A clandestine Wroclaw paper claimed in 1984 that up to 2,000 people were involved in the Lower Silesia region alone.[50] This author's estimate is that the number involved nationally is likely to be between 10,000 and 30,000. The many dismissed workers and intellectuals mean there is no shortage of authors, but there are always too few dedicated editors, printers, and distributors. Most of those arrested in connection with underground publishing are distributors. To minimize the risk, publications are sold largely within circles of friends or in bulk to other clandestine organizations, such as secret factory libraries.

Constant shortages of equipment, paper, and ink cause persistent problems. Some of the major equipment may be smuggled from abroad, but operating supplies must be purchased locally, and these cause frustrating delays. Over the years, regular access to Solidarity support organizations in the West has led to a greater degree of professionalization of the larger initiatives, such as NOW-a, Krąg, KOS, and *Tygodnik Mazowsze*; but, to the dismay of Solidarity's leaders, a decline in the outlying regions with no access to Western support or to the large Warsaw structures has been recorded. Many activists fear that Solidarity is losing its hold on the working class and is becoming an extended version of the pre-1980 Warsaw intellectual opposition. Rural Solidarity is virtually nonexistent; and the number of Solidarity sympathizers on the shop floor is declining as Polish

[46] CSSR, March 31, 1987, no. 50, p. 19.

[47] "Ile mamy bibuly," interview with a *Tygodnik Mazowsze* archivist, in *BI* (Paris), April 30, 1986, no. 138, p. 12; Romaszewski, "Befzdroza," p. 14.

[48] BI (Paris), October 1, 1986, no. 149, p. 6.

[49] On the NOW-a figure, Bekowski, Interview, p. 55. See also Raport Walesy . . . p. 338; Chojecki, "Niezalezna," p. 178.

[50] On the figure for Lower Silesian activists, UPNB, November 29, 1984, no. 23, p. 38.



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society drifts deeper into frustration and apathy.[51] Certainly, the publishing data confirm these trends. The number of Solidarity factory bulletins dropped from 134 to nineteen between 1983 and 1985, while the number of serious intellectual periodicals rose. In Warsaw, Gdańsk, Cracow, and Wroclaw publications remained stable at 285, while outside these four cities, the number dropped from 165 to 135.[52]

Demand for forbidden literature is greater than supply. In an interview in mid-1983, a Krąg editor said that just about everything printed sells out within the month.[53] A Solidarity report concludes that what appears meets only a fraction of the demand.[54] Prices are high, and so is their resale value. Recently, however, complaints have been voiced over exorbitant prices. The academic intelligentsia, whose wages have not kept up with the nation's soaring inflation, often find the prices prohibitive. This factor has contributed to a drop in the number of secret study groups where academics provide supplementary education to the official school system.[55]

To counter this decline, opposition circles have formed underground libraries. Hidden away in personal homes or church basements, these libraries serve the needs of church-sponsored study groups, university students, factory workers or professionals. Needless to say only trusted individuals are permitted to borrow items and the locations are kept strictly secret.For quite some time the isolation of the opposition presses prevented a co-ordinated national effort. Lack of communication led to duplication of efforts, especially in the area of translating foreign-language texts. At the end of 1985, a Foundation for Independent Publishing and a consortium of major publishers was set up to co-ordinate a nationwide publishing strategy. The aims were to purchase equipment, subsidize expensive projects, construct a national division of labor, and support various local ventures in danger of extinction.[56]

Some of the money was put up by Solidarity structures in Poland; some came from special fund collection drives among Solidarity sympathizers abroad, e.g., the Institut Literacki in Paris or the efforts of Leszek Kolakowski in the United States. Because of the high value of hard currency on the black market, a relatively insignificant

[51] Wiktor Kulerski, Interview, p. 9; Zbigniew Romaszewski, "Befzdroza Solidarności," in *Kultura* (Paris), February 1987, p. 9.

[52] BI (Paris), May 1, 1986, no. 138, p. 13.

[53] Interview with an anonymous Krąg editor, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 63, 1983, p. 10.

[54] Raport Walesy . . . p. 300. See also Witold, "OKN," p. 13, who writes, "Requests for publications exceeded available amounts by 10 times."

[55] *Tu Teraz* (Here now) (Warsaw), voice of the independent education movement, no. 48, 1986, pp. 1-2; on complaints of high prices, Romaszewski, "Befzdroza," p. 14; *Kontakt* (Paris), April 1986, p. 15.

[56] "Interview with a member of the Foundation for Independent Publishing," in *Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports* (hereafter CSSR), February 23, 1987, no. 49, pp. 21-24. The foundation's representative in the West is Irena Lasota.



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amount can go a long way in Poland. During 1986, the foundation gave grants to forty publishers, but 45 percent of the funds went to Krąg, NOW-a, Przedswit, Oficyna Literacka, and the Wszechnica Spoleczno Polityczna.[57] The consortium has set up an insurance policy to reimburse individuals whose investments are confiscated during police crackdowns, thus minimizing their personal risk.[58] Individuals contribute to the plan and sign agreements (likely invalid under Polish law) and the consortium determines what amounts are to be paid out to luckless individuals caught by the police. The consortium also manages a bank of translators that pools talent and makes it available to those in need. In this way it is hoped that the best translations are achieved and that efforts will be co-ordinated. It is very difficult to judge the effectiveness of these initiatives, but one should remember that they are all in their early phases of development

## Analysis of the Literature

The bulk of underground publishing still appears under the "Solidarność" banner. It is worth recalling that Solidarity's political program as defined in the Gdańsk Congress of September 1981, is social democratic in nature.[59] Solidarity publications concentrate on domestic affairs, seeking a better future within existing structures — as no others appear likely to materialize soon. Their maximalist program is the regime's compliance with the twenty-one points agreed upon at Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Jastrzebia in August 1980. The publications devote little attention to the issues over which the Polish opposition can have no influence, such as Poland's foreign relations or the East-West rivalry.[60]

Several other groups have their own press organs, and some even have radio stations. Most are generally loyal to the Solidarność banner but insist on autonomy. These include: CDN (Ciag Dalszy Nastapi — To Be Continued), Solidarność Walczaca (Fighting Solidarity) and KOS (Komitet Oporu Spolecznego — Committee for Social Resistance). Fighting Solidarity, as its name suggests, often opposes the moderate positions adopted by Lech Walesa and the TKK. Its leader, Kornel Morawiecki, has been in hiding since 1981 and recently criticized the final lifting of trade and credit sanctions against Poland: ". . . it should be said openly: this money (new credits) will not be for Poland, nor for Poles. So long as there is no social

[57] Ibid., p. 24.

[58] BI (Paris), April 30, 1986, no. 138, p. 14. Details on the progress of the insurance fund in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Warsaw) 28.1.1987, no. 196, translated into English in *CSSR* 31 March, 1987, no. 500, pp. 29-31.

[59] For a wider discussion see Sejan (a pseudonym), "One Man's View of the Political Geography of Polish Opposition," in *UPNB*, August 2, 1984, no. 15, pp. 29.40.

[60] "From Inside Looking Out. International Perspectives in the Opposition Press," in *EER*, Summer 1985, pp. 22-24.



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control over the economy, this money will be wasted, just as the previous $30 billion were . . . money given to a communist regime will serve foremost the Communists."[61]

KOS publishes *Kos*, whose motto for 1987 is "Every moment of optimism promotes the end of communism." The magazine is co-edited by Dawid Warszawski (a pseudonym), a self-styled left-wing anti-Communist, and one of Poland's most famous underground publicists. (He is one of the few who tried to communicate Poland's problems to Western audiences.)[62] Warszawski recently pointed to the price to Poland for Gorbachev's reforms: "Gorbachev's failure would result only in the continuation of the status quo. If he succeeds however, we can expect that domestic liberalization in the USSR will be accompanied by a turning of the screw in the peripheral areas of the empire as a sop to the CPSU conservatives."[63] Jan Zaleski, another *Kos* writer wrote (in "How Much is Two Times Two Today in the Soviet Union?") that a Gorbachev success would signal Poland's total absorption within the Soviet economic orbit and the Russification of Poland's "natural allies" in the Soviet Union (meaning the Ukrainians, White Russians, Baltic, and Asian peoples).[64]

An entire edition of *Kos* appeared in English in early 1986 to coincide with a "peace congress" sponsored by Poland's military regime. In the words of *Kos*, "The defense of peace must not consist in preserving the status quo in a world in which slavery rules. The defense of peace cannot be a capitulation before a rule of force which breaks a people's fundamental right of freedom. . . . You have come to a country in which a war has been declared on their own people by those who govern and who, without a trace of embarrassment, bombard you with slogans of peace."[65] The Wola publishing house put out an edition of its newsletter in French to commemorate May Day 1986.

In contrast to "Solidarnośćiowcy," the moderate or social democratic opposition, the "niepodlegloscIowcy" advocate national independence through a fundamental reassessment of Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union. They point to the futility of working for a new, free Poland within the confines of communist rule. Leading nationalist groups include the KPN (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej — Confederation for an Independent Poland); and *Niepodleglosc* (Independence), a self-proclaimed "liberal democratic" group that quarrels with everyone.[66] *Niepodleglosc* has compiled a

[61] Solidarność Walczca, November 9, 1986, no. 21 (140).

[62] An example of *KOS*'s concern over Western audiences is its message to the Yalta Heritage Conference in Berlin in January, 1985, in *UPNB*, March 27, 1985, no. 7, pp. 36-37.

[63] David Warszawski, "Rewizjonista u wladzy," in *KOS*, February 8, 1987, no. 111.

[64] Jan Zaleski, "Ile jest dzis 2 x2 ZSRR?"

[65] "Underground Journal KOS addresses Congress of Intellectuals," in *EER*, Winter 1986, p. 14.

[66] Seweryn Blumsztajn, "Uwagi o prasie podziemnej," in *Baza*, no. 2/9, February 1984, discussed in *Niepodleglosc*, July-August, 1984, no. 31-32, pp. 12-13.



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political program whose first article reads, "A Polish state does not exist: the Polish People's Republic is only an administrative unit employed by the Soviet Union to administer Polish lands."[67]

*Niepodleglosc* is often harshly critical of the Solidarity press, particularly KOS, considering it too "leftist." One should be cautious about what the Polish opposition means by "left" and "right," or "conservative" and "liberal," because these terms do not correspond fully with a North American or West European context. The periodical *Polityka Polska* (Polish Policy) is regarded as a nationalist (and hence rightist), but it shares little with the pre-World War II right. The Cracow publication *13* (originally *13 grudnia*) calls itself "liberal-Christian," but its liberalism approximates the economic liberalism of the West German Free Democratic party rather than American political liberalism. One of the most interesting debates in the underground press, heightened by Poland's joining the International Monetary Fund, is the notion of "re-capitalization" of the economy. Conceding that real economic reforms will bring about a serious short-term social dislocation, liberals argue that a free market economy still has much more to offer both the individual and society than socialism.[68]

**Subject Matter**

While not united on how Poland should proceed, both moderates and nationalists close ranks when evaluating its tragic past. All the published historical works challenge the legitimacy of communist rule in postwar Poland. The clandestine press deals with issues the state would prefer forgotten, including the Polish-Soviet war of 1920-21, the character of Pilsudski and the portrayal of the interwar years, the causes of Poland's defeat in 1939 and the Soviet invasion, the Red Army's 1944-45 treatment of the Polish partisan Home Army, and the nature of the anti-communist opposition in 1944-48. Other topics can be inferred from Krąg's list of titles: "In the Shadow of Katyn," "The East German Uprising of 1953," "Questions about Russia," "The Concentration Camps and Soviet Literature," "The Polish Underground State" and the very popular "Solidarity, 1980-1981" (with a circulation in the tens of thousands).[69] For a nation as conscious of its history as Poland, the battle for the past has great stakes.

Contemporary literature, political and social thought, and alternative educational programs also receive attention. Collections of political essays by leading dissidents and Solidarity activists have appeared: authors include Adam Michnik, Jacel Kuron, Marek Nowa-

[67] *Niepodlegloc* (Gdańsk) January 1984, no. 25, p. 3.

[68] "Glowne nurty Solidarnośći," in *Kontakt* (Paris), December 1982, p. 8. For an underground discussion of liberal economics see, Andrzej Kozieradzki, "Sad o wolnym rynku," in *13* (formerly *13 grudnia*) (Cracow), June 9, 1984, p. 5.

[69] *BBC* commentary by Jan Repa on the Polish-language service, August 8, 1984.



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kowski, Zibigniew Romaszewski, and Jan Josef Lipski. The works of Poles abroad are published, such as those of Zdzislaw Najder (head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe), the poet Adam Zagajewski, Leszek Kolakowski, an Oxford professor of philosophy, and Stefan Baranczak, professor of Polish literature at Harvard University.

There is no shortage of material; in "Poland Five Years After August" Solidarity reports that after martial law official state publishing houses canceled signed contracts with over twenty authors.[70] There is some debate over whether the underground press should concern itself with works by authors who may one day be published officially. Clandestine publishing is one way to beat the long waiting period before one author's work can officially appear.

Since early 1985, Solidarity has undertaken to publish its own archives. Each volume is designed to cover a region and Rural Solidarity will be studied separately. The goal is to preserve all the documents and disputes concerning the birth of Solidarity and its period of legal existence. In the words of one of the editors, "The strength of Solidarity is that it is not afraid of its own history, but makes it public even as it happens. We want everything to come out in the open, both what was good and what was not so good."[71] This has proved too large a project for any single publisher so a new firm, NOWA-ARCH, has been created. The first volume, *Szczecin — December-August-December* appeared in early 1985 followed by volume two, *Gdańsk — August 1980-December 1981* in late 1986.[72]

Several publishing houses reprint unauthorized editions of *Kultura*, *Zeszyty Historyczne*, *Kontakt*, *Aneks*, *Puls*, and other Paris- and London-based emigré literature. The motives of these pirate publishers is likely more financial than patriotic, for the copying of these journals can be a lucrative undertaking, given that editing, typesetting, and honoraria are eliminated. The Instytut Literacki in Paris sends about 3,000 miniatures and 600 standard-size copies of *Kultura* to Poland per month but cannot satisfy the demand.[73] The same problem likely exists for cassettes, videos, and films.

Youth magazines are a growth area for clandestine publishing. The number of titles has increased from twenty-five in 1983 to thirty-four in 1985.[74] Studies of the post-1981 teenagers suggest that young people are more materialistic, demoralized, and skeptical than they had been; indeed, what Zbigniew Romaszewski has called the "anarchization of modern times"[75] leads them to succumb to narcotics and alcoholism at alarming rates. Because of this, Solidarity structures

[70] Raport Walesy . . ., p. 330.
[71] UPNB, February 28, 1985, no. 5, p. 34.
[72] *KOS* (Warsaw), December 29, 1986, no. 108, p. 5; UPNB, July 25, 1985, no. 15, p. 28.
[73] Interview with Jerzy Giedroyc, editor in chief of *Kultura* (Paris), in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, November 8, 1986, no. 183, p. 3. See also *Kultura* (Paris), September 1985, p. 139.
[74] "Survey of Underground Periodicals," p. 26.
[75] Romaszewski,"Bezdroza," p. 8.



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are making a major effort to attract the young by offering them a vision of a democratic and sovereign future. In late 1984 KOS printed a serious comic-book style history of the Solidarity era, August 1980 to December 1981. Even school children have their own forbidden literature, such as the *Okienko* (The Window) whose first issue appeared in September 1986.

## The Future

There is certainly enough to write about. Jacek Kuron of KOR expressed the dilemma of the democratic opposition in a title: "What Is to be Done When Nothing Can Be Done?" Can democratization and real reform be achieved through passive resistance in a police state? Can the standard of living be improved within the existing model of a centrally planned economy? Is there any point in pursuing a national dialogue with the *czerwoni* (Reds), or should the Poles adopt a policy of negation and await a disruption of the existing geopolitical balance?

The very audacity of these issues raises another question: how long will the authorities tolerate this sort of illegality? For now, they do not seem very worried. The amnesty of September 1986 suggests the regime believes it has broken bonds between the intelligentsia and the working class. The clandestine press may be seen as a safety valve which will help prevent another crisis on the scale of 1976 or 1980. Further, repressive measures to eliminate the publications failed once, and filling the prisons again would lower Jaruzelski's standing in the West just as he is looking for credits and technology.

But even if it is tolerable, this illegal publishing movement (and smaller movements in Hungary and Czechoslovakia) has immense implications for Poland. It means, first, that the totalitarian cultural and information policies there are being rigorously challenged and are obliged to offer their citizenry more than in other communist states.

Second, uncensored Polish publications provide a wealth of information for those Western economists, journalists, bankers, statesmen, and political analysts who long formed opinions on economic policy towards Poland on the basis of the official reports. The information base of a Soviet-bloc country has been significantly increased. This is no small matter; the large loans of the early 1970s were based on a glib acceptance of the regime's figures and promises from Western diplomats and bankers. Uncensored literature smuggled to the West, often compiled by the same people who produce the regime reports, offer far more realistic assessments. Independent structures have so infiltrated the Polish government that hardly any sensitive economic or political information can be kept secret. Soviet observers of Polish affairs cannot but be disturbed by any truly independent initiatives. The new program of *glasnost* may touch on many of the



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same themes as Poland's free press, but the Soviet experiment is fully controlled by the party. Politically, the Gorbachev leadership seems to have accepted Jaruzelski's assurances that the party is once again firmly in charge. The danger exists that the Polish example may be adopted by other Eastern-bloc dissident groups, especially the Hungarian intellectuals and to a lesser extent the Czechoslovaks. The Polish democratic opposition has ties to the Charter 77 movement, and Polish and East German peace groups have recently established contacts.

Underground publishing in Poland has great purpose and resilience. Functioning under conditions hard for those living in a free society to imagine, the movement has grown in size and matured in operation. It has become a steady fixture of the Polish scene, which cannot dethrone the official media but whose "second circuit" allows an alternate vision for all Poles.



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# ANNOUNCEMENT

## Seventh Annual Competition for the Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship in International Security Affairs

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Applicants should submit copies of three publications (or writings accepted for publication), a curriculum vitae, three letters of recommendation and a six page, double spaced research proposal on some aspect of international security affairs. Fellows must have received a doctoral degree or have equivalent experience.

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# Three Steps Toward Opening Mainland China

by Steven W. Mosher

Pluralization in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a key to long-term peace in the Asian-Pacific region. Until the Chinese people win the right to free association, and China's numerous ethnic and sub-ethnic groups a true measure of local autonomy, the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist party will persevere in political excess at home and (after the current preoccupation with development is sated) may revert to adventurism abroad.

Of course, pluralism would seriously threaten the Peking regime. If this is doubted, recall that nearly all of China's sensitive border regions are occupied by minority groups — the Mongols in the north, the Muslims in the northwest, the Chwang in the south, and the Tibetans in the southwest. That Tibet is still run by the army twenty-seven years after its conquest by Peking is a testament not to Peking's shortsightedness but to its prudent assessment of the dangers presented by a pluralization of the Chinese empire along ethnic and religious lines.

Even in the Chinese heartland, the Han Chinese majority is riven by dialectal and cultural differences, most often falling along provincial lines. The recurring friction between "mainlanders" and "native Taiwanese" in the Republic of China on Taiwan would be repeated a dozen times over in a pluralizing China.

Given the existence of continued diplomatic relations and substantial academic and cultural exchanges between the United States and the PRC, the following question arises: What can the United States do to encourage pluralization in the People's Republic of China? What American policy would help to create alternate centers of power on the Chinese mainland that would compete with the Chinese Communist party's monopoly on power?

Such a policy would include three main elements: a strong program of radio broadcasting; an active human rights policy; and a purely private program of cultural and scholarly exchanges. Each of these has far-reaching implications for Chinese life.

## RADIO BROADCASTS

The Voice of America (VOA) currently broadcasts to the Chinese mainland for nine hours each day from relay transmitters in the Philippines and Thailand. Its reports provide the only reliable source

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of information the Chinese have about events in the rest of the world and, most importantly, in China itself. While the huge internal propaganda machine run by the state rightly enjoys little credibility, the VOA broadcasts receive high marks. "We can trust the VOA," one student protester in the recent demonstrations for democracy was quoted as saying. Apparently many of his compatriots agree with him, for an estimated 60 million listen to the network's Chinese-language broadcasts. This constitutes one of the largest radio audiences in the world. These broadcasts should be expanded.

The enormous impact of VOA broadcasts received a backhanded testimonial in January of this year, when the *People's Daily* attacked "a certain foreign radio station" for disseminating news about the student demonstrations. The official New China News Agency (NCNA) went further, attacking the Voice of America by name for alleged "inaccurate" reports on the democracy movement in Shanghai and Peking. The NCNA's most vociferous denunciation was reserved for a broadcast interview with American leftist I. F. Stone. Among other things, Stone urged the Chinese students not to "lose heart," saying that the protests "have been a comfort to dissidents everywhere." The NCNA claimed this and other reports thwarted government efforts to end the demonstrations.

VOA broadcasts were certainly a primary means by which news of the demonstrations spread throughout the country. To cite but one example, two hundred Peking University undergraduates who arrived in Shanghai to join the marches told foreign reporters that they had heard of the unrest on the Voice of America. VOA reports rendered the initial news blackout by the government ineffective and forced the official media to cover the protests. It was this breach of the party's monopoly on information as much as the reporting itself that angered the Peking officialdom.

How did VOA react to its own importance? By retreating. VOA began a policy of pre-emptive appeasement. In the words of Richard Carlson, the director of the VOA, "We have refrained from analysis, from background stories, from editorials — all of which might lend itself to the story generally — but just to be sensitive to the reporting so we would not in fact play some part in the story." Rather than treat the events in China as another news story, the VOA bureaucracy engaged in self-censorship; rather than exploit its strengths, it unilaterally retreated.

[1] *The People's Daily*, December 31, 1986.
[2] UPI Peking wire, "Chinese media urge punishment of 'enemies' who led protest and assail VOA," *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1987.
[3] Andres Roche, "Shanghai police seal off city to stop protesters." *The London Daily Telegraph*, December 22, 1986.
[4] Southerland, Ibid.
[5] Herbert Horowitz. "Greetings from the U.S. Government," *China Exchange News 13*, December 1985, p. 5.



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This is conceding too much to the Chinese state. The VOA must apply the same standards of reporting events in China that it does to events in the Philippines and South Africa. Better yet, its programming should be expanded and include regular features discussing the principles of democracy, the free market, rule of law and other fundamental principles of politics in the United States. During the demonstrations, some Chinese students openly spoke of their respect for American democratic ideals, but when pressed proved to know little about representative democracy. A VOA program devoted to these concepts might help to distill concrete demands from inchoate yearnings.

Programming is limited to the Han Chinese in scope and in language. Broadcasts should be expanded to include programming in the languages of the major Chinese minorities, the Mongols in the north, the Muslims in the west, and the Tibetans in the southwest. These groups need information on world affairs independent from that given them by the party's highly censored media; they especially need to know about the activities of their compatriots outside China. Reports on the Dalai Lama to Tibet and on Afghanistan to Muslim areas would go far toward helping the minorities understand the larger context of their relationship with Peking.

**Human Rights**

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Peking has been largely exempt from U.S. pressure to conform to international human rights accords. This reluctance to apply internationally accepted standards consistently to the P.R.C. must end.

The program of economic reform — family farms, rural markets, privately owned shops — has increased the freedom of choice in the economic sphere. But these promising developments should not obscure the Chinese Communist party's unwavering commitment to its own political and cultural ascendancy. The PRC remains a one-party, Leninist state determined to maintain tight control over its populace's thinking and behavior.

In Deng's China, as in Mao's, the mass mobilization campaign remains the primary means by which this control is imposed on a recalcitrant population. Single-minded efforts at directed social change, and similar campaigns remain as much a part of the tempo of life in the People's Republic as the wheel of the sun and the cycling of the seasons. The rights of individuals, accorded little enough respect in normal times, are ignored altogether during these campaigns.

Three major campaigns have taken place since 1982. The 1983-86 Anti-Crime Campaign saw hundreds of thousands of alleged criminals arrested, tried, and sentenced. The on-again, off-again Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign aimed at eliminating the political and



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cultural ideas that accompanied Western science and technology through the "open door"; in fact, it led to reduced artistic and personal freedoms. The Population Control Campaign led to millions — perhaps tens of millions — of forced abortions and sterilizations.

To date, attention to PRC violations of human rights has come mostly from non-governmental agencies. Amnesty International made the Anti-Crime Campaign in the PRC, with its tens of thousands of executions, apparently under a quota system, the subject of a lengthy report. The foreign press gave the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign fairly wide coverage because of its points in common with the Cultural Revolution and its anti-Western bias. The one instance of U.S. government action involved the Congress: reports of forced abortions and sterilizations in China's population program led Congress to cut off U.S. funds to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities supporting the program. The executive branch of the U.S. government, however, has maintained a discreet silence concerning this and other issues.

Washington must treat human rights abuses in China with as much concern as it does abuses elsewhere. Moral consistency calls for the same standards to be applied to the PRC that are applied to the Soviet Union, South Africa, and El Salvador.

This effort would not be quixotic. Traditional Chinese concern with reputation (or "face") makes the PRC far more anxious about its international image than the Soviet Union. Chinese authorities may be impervious to public opinion at home, but they respond to international criticism with alacrity. When reports began to appear in the world press about widespread female infanticide in rural China, for example, the authorities responded by relaxing the one-child restriction there, thus eliminating one of the causes of that barbaric practice.

The United States should exploit this sensitivity. Washington could engage the Chinese in confidential exchanges on issues of human rights. In the heat of oppressive campaigns, when the most serious violations occur, it should air its concerns publicly. These actions would not halt the campaigns, but they might, as in the case of female infanticide, curb the worst abuses.

Economic and military assistance can also be used as levers to improve human rights. Congress is right to withhold funds earmarked for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities until the Fund discontinues support for China's coercive birth control program. Scientific associations and universities should raise issues related to their activities, such as the rights of Chinese scholars to travel, to communicate, and to emigrate.



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**Scholarly Exchanges**

Pluralization would also be aided by scuttling the U.S.-PRC scholarly exchange programs that depend on government sponsorship. Instead, individuals and private institutions should have this field to themselves.

Most international communications, visits, and conferences between American and foreign scholars are arranged privately, without the interference of governments (though public money is often used to support such activities). But the Department of State concluded a broad agreement on cultural exchange between the United States and the PRC in 1978. Under its provisions, a Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), jointly sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Sciences Research Council, was set up to manage exchanges. The agreement (and the more than twenty government-to-government accords that followed) created a national committee to parallel a Chinese bureaucratic structure. But there is one difference: the Ministry of Education (now the State Education Commission), the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences are all arms of the Peking regime, while CSCPRC and its component parts are not. Not only did the U.S. government accept the PRC's initiative but it compounded its own weakness by not controlling the U.S. organization.

In the entire history of international scientific relations with other nations, there is only one precedent for such an agreement, the now defunct bilateral agreement governing exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union signed in 1972. For this reason, were the United States to cancel the government-to-government exchange program with China, it would be reverting to the normal state of affairs, not discriminating against the PRC. In fact, a special privilege would be ended.

The United States made this concession not out of an eagerness to communicate with mainland Chinese academics, who for the most part have little to offer in scholarly terms, but to gain access to data on social, natural, and physical phenomena on the China mainland. Ironically, the degree of access permitted by Peking has been extremely limited, with researchers allowed only short periods of time on non-sensitive topics. China's vast countryside remains off-limits.

Ending the official exchange would not in fact, require much of a policy change, for private exchanges outnumber the CSCPRC and official programs combined. Sponsors of private programs include voluntary organizations, scholarly and professional societies, and institutions of higher education. American colleges and universities alone have over 100 formal exchange agreements with Chinese in-



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stitutions, many of which were signed in the initial post-normalization rush to establish linkages of all kinds. (For comparison, the Republic of China has over 200 exchange agreements with American institutions of higher learning.) This proliferation reflects the decentralized nature of American higher education and university administration, the entrepreneurial character of American academics, and the divergent motives within these institutions. Most agreements have worked very well and have clear advantages over national-level programs: they give Americans entry into many different areas and types of institutions in China; they are flexible in a way that national programs are not and can meet the needs of diverse constituencies; and their reciprocal nature creates incentives for the Chinese to respond to American needs and desires.

That some of these exchange agreements are inactive or even moribund is attributable partly to the heavy cost of the national level programs, which have first call on human and financial resources. Dismantling these programs would invigorate non-governmental activities and help them reach their full potential. Such a move would also be in harmony with the greatest strength of American academe, its pluralistic nature.

Complete reliance on non-governmental exchanges would influence mainland China in the direction of pluralism. Direct overseas ties partially free institutions from central government controls. In the past, Chinese universities and research institutes have tried to circumvent the Peking bureaucracy, gain visibility, and overcome restrictions on hard currency. The complete abolition of government-to-government exchanges would force Peking to grant freer rein to universities, professional associations, research institutes, and individuals, thus promoting a nascent pluralism in the academy.

A new U.S.-People's Republic of China Cultural and Educational Exchange Agreement signed on July 23, 1985, does, to be sure, make explicit reference to non-official exchanges. At the insistence of the American side:

> The Parties agree to continue to encourage and promote direct educational exchanges and cooperation between educational organizations, universities, colleges, schools, research institutes and individuals of their respective countries. The assistance to these exchanges should be facilitated in accordance with each country's laws and regulations.

But Peking's view differs decidedly from this. Shortly after the signing of this exchange agreement, its State Education Commission released a set of regulations governing foreign research scholars in the PRC that directly contradicts it. "In general, foreign research scholars coming to People's Republic China should do so through government exchange programs (except for those who come on inter-university

[6] The protocol is printed in full in the *China Exchange News 13*, December 1985, pp. 26-7.



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exchange programs). Peking's stand reflects its desire to maintain strict central control over the program; were the United States to abolish government-to-government programs, it would have to permit unofficial exchanges. Some argue that the CSCPRC serves a purpose: (1) without it, the United States would lose control of the exchange program, (2) the PRC's importance gives it the prerogative of special treatment, (3) changing an established policy would alienate Peking, and (4) American universities lack sufficient funds to maintain the exchanges.

But the United States lost control of the exchanges long ago. The early abandonment of strict reciprocity foreclosed the possibility of gaining leverage on Peking. Further, the CSCPRC does not control decisions by American universities and so, has no favors to withhold from the PRC. Second, however important the People's Republic of China may be to the United States, the United States is immeasurably more important to the People's Republic of China. The flow of knowledge, especially the scientific and technological knowledge essential for modernization, is almost entirely one-sided. Therefore, the fear that the United States might alienate Peking by disestablishing government-to-government exchanges is unfounded. Finally, funds could be supplied in part from the same Fulbright programs and other government programs already in use.

More VOA broadcasts, attention to human rights, and privatizing the exchange programs would help promote competing centers of political and cultural influence on the Chinese mainland. In this way the United States would give support and encouragement to those in the People's Republic of China who call for a Fifth Modernization: a move away from feudal totalitarianism towards modern democracy.

[7] "Regulations Concerning Applications by Foreign Research Scholars to Engage in Scientific Research in Institutions of Higher Education in China," Paragraph 3. This document is reprinted in its entirety in the *China Exchange News 13*, December 1985, pp. 28-9.



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# Living in China's Shadow

by Raphael Israeli

## The Setting

When the People's Liberation Army of China unleashed a major offensive into Vietnam on February 17, 1979, Peking justified the invasion by declaring an intent to punish Vietnam for two transgressions: its expulsion of Chinese nationals and its invasion of Cambodia. Actually, Peking was interested in much more than refugees and Cambodia. Disturbed by the rise of a potential rival on its southern border, it feared for China's security.

The conflict with Vietnam had important implications for China's standing throughout Southeast Asia. Beyond Vietnam and Cambodia (and Laos) lay other major countries. Some of them (Thailand and Indonesia) had been long within China's traditional world order, while the rest were within her cultural sphere (Singapore) or too important (Malaysia and the Philippines) to let slide into the Vietnamese or Soviet orbit. These countries had lived under China's menacing shadow until the mid-1970s, when Vietnam's expanding presence and the Soviet Union's growing military power became the main threats.

China's Open Door to the West, begun in the late 1970s, encouraged rapprochement between China and the countries of Southeast Asia except Vietnam. Not only had Peking become more pro-Western and favorable to their association with the United States, but its economic policies spurred international trade. As economic opportunities opened, China became anchored in cooperation with, and became less worrisome to, the countries of Southeast Asia. The 1980s thus witnessed their steady, if cautious, inching toward China.

These developments, almost unthinkable a decade before, reflected the dramatic changes that occurred in China. But economic cooperation and diplomatic openness still need to be qualified by several factors: Vietnam and the unresolved war in Indochina; economic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the presence of Chinese minorities, Communist parties, and insurgencies in Southeast Asian countries; and the revival of Islam.

## China's View of Southeast Asia

Just as the Great Wall was never a political border but rather a boundary between a settled society and nomadic barbarians, so were the oceans a bridge for traditional China to the kingdoms of Southeast

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Asia. Most of these paid homage to Chinese power through the tributary system. This point deserves emphasis, for China was primarily a continental power and Chinese naval strength tends to be forgotten.

Three principles underlying the historic Chinese world order are worth remembering. First, the Middle Kingdom stood at the political apex with other states subordinate to it. Relations between it and the periphery were governed by the tributary system, according to which rulers deferred ceremonially to the Chinese state and in return for which they gained prestige, legitimacy, trade, and sometimes protection. Second, the order was founded on *te*, the virtue of the emperor. So long as the emperor was virtuous, he could maintain harmony throughout the Chinese world order. Third, the order was universal, exclusive, and unchallengeable; no other source of power was recognized. Theoretically, there was no need to form alliances in this sino-centric world.

These principles could not always be maintained. When China was weak, the tributary system faltered, for example, but China's leaders never admitted this to themselves. And the northern barbarian dynasties that occupied China between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries (Jurchen Mongols, Liao, T'o-pa, Chin) forced the Chinese to alter their attitudes toward the north, in practice if not in theory. But there was no break in China's view of her relations with Southeast Asia, because this region did not challenge China until the coming of the West in the nineteenth century.

During the Sung dynasty (A.D. 998-1278), China had maintained close commercial relations with Southeast Asia, and these continued through the Yuan, or Mongol, Dynasty (1278-1369). The Mongols threatened Annam (today's Vietnam) with outright subjugation, regarding it as an extension of China; they reverted to the tributary system only when their power declined. The Ming (1368-1644) relied less on brute force and were more successful than their predecessors. Put in Chinese terms, virtue made might acceptable, while unmitigated force was doomed to failure. Ming rulers acted under a double assumption in their relations with Southeast Asia: conscious of China's moral and political strength, at the same time they were aware of their military might and material wealth, compared with the weak states around them. As long as this was the case, they could exercise their virtue and draw tribute.

Ming emperors sent edicts to the rulers of Southeast Asia, never treating them as equals, of course, but bestowing on them all roughly the same status. This policy of impartiality was linked to China's size, resources, power, and imperial interests. Within this impartiality, China showed the most interest in Annam and Korea due to their immediate proximity, and expected higher standards of behavior from them.



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Under the Ch'ing (1644-1911) the world order shifted somewhat: no longer was the universe divided along a China/non-China axis. Rather, the Middle Kingdom, East and Southeast Asia, were regarded as one system. These countries became ceremonially and symbolically extensions of China itself. Paradoxically, the relations of the Ch'ing with Southeast Asia had only marginal economic importance, because they produced similar commodities.

The encroachment of Western powers on China gradually eroded its power and rendered Chinese concepts of virtue irrelevant. Physical erosion occurred more rapidly than the conceptual transformation of the Chinese world order. The old sense of superiority persisted even beyond the fall of the last imperial dynasty in 1911, transformed into a condescension that derived from the Chinese self-perception as the major power of Asia.

In essence, the rise of the People's Republic did not alter these feelings. A Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology replaced *te*, the Confucian virtue of Sung times, as a universal model for emulation. Setting China as an example to follow and Mao as the personification of the new virtue preserved the old hierarchical order. As in the old days, when Confucian culture brought the literati/bureaucrats of adjoining countries into China's orbit, many intellectuals in Southeast Asia adopted Marxism during the 1950s; and most of the leaders in this area became committed to some kind of socialism.

The political atmosphere in Southeast Asia facilitated China's task. Except for Thailand all of the states had recently emerged from Western domination and anti-colonial resentment was still fresh. They followed the Chinese lead into neutrality. Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai took advantage of this sentiment at the Bandung Conference of May 1955 by charming his audiences with his moderation and wit, and inviting non-communist leaders to visit China. As China was desperately attempting to break through the American encirclement in the early years of communist rule, Peking displayed flexibility on the international scene by maintaining friendships with such nationalist non-aligned leaders as Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu and Nasser, and mollifying pro-Western states such as Thailand and Pakistan. In so doing, China claimed to be reviving earlier contacts with Asian countries, contacts that had been severed by Western imperialism.

These were the years when China's leaders felt that they had consolidated their rule at home and so turned their attention to foreign policy. Attempts to negotiate with the Americans having failed, Peking was determined to unite the countries of Asia and Africa to confront the West. Toward this end, it offered not only government-to-government support but also communist party networks and mass efforts. Mao disparaged negotiations with the United States as a betrayal to worldwide revolution, implicitly condemning Khrushchev's formula of coexistence.



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Then, in the aftermath of the Hundred Flowers campaign during the mid-1950s, China's foreign policy became more dogmatic. If the bourgeoisie could show such resilience after a thorough overhaul of Chinese society and nearly a decade of communist rule, resistance would surely be even greater in non-communist countries. The Tibetan revolt of 1958-59 lent further impetus to this state of mind. In the resulting struggle against rightists everywhere, the Chinese government hardened its policies toward Southeast Asia.

Peking's policy alienated Asian countries and created rifts from Indonesia to Egypt. Only Albania remained firmly in the Chinese camp; others, fearing Chinese meddling in their internal affairs, vigorously shunned her. With time, Mao was forced to cease his aggressiveness and patch up relations with the Asian world. He stopped criticizing Indonesia and even supported Sukarno's bid to recover West Irian from Holland. Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Indonesia in March 1961 and signed a treaty of friendship. By 1961 Peking had mended fences with the Asian countries and was again optimistic about leading revolutionary groups throughout the Third World in their struggle against Western domination. The United States involvement in Vietnam, which posed a danger in China's backyard, not only dictated Peking's unlimited and unconditional support to North Vietnam, but also confirmed the Chinese leadership's understanding of imperialism's direct menace to Asia.

Then the rampages of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, the power struggle following the deaths of Zhou En-lai and Mao, the ongoing diplomatic and ideological rift with the Soviet Union, and the beginning of the thaw with the United States pushed China's Asia policy to the back burner during most of the 1970s.

An upturn in China's Asia policy occurred when Deng Xiaoping reached power in the late 1970s. Although the Four Modernizations, Open Door policy, special economic zones, and gradual shift to a market economy attracted Western business, China favored Southeast Asian countries, for their proximity and small economies precluded their dominating large portions of the Chinese economy. Moreover, overseas Chinese living in those states could help Chinese economic efforts; most of the 2,000 plus new foreign businesses that had invested in China by the end of 1984 were owned or operated by overseas Chinese.

China's new economic orientation affected its foreign policy in dramatic fashion. Peking tried to get along with everyone (even Vietnam) in an effort to concentrate Chinese attention and resources on economics. It spared no effort to convince neighboring Asian countries, especially the non-communist ones, of its entirely peaceful intentions. The revolutionary bombast of the 1950s and 1960s evolved into pragmatic whispers of cooperation. Aid to communist rebels in Thailand ceased and Peking publicly renounced assistance to rebels



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in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Instead, China supports guerrilla fighters only against its communist neighbors — Afghans against the Soviet Union and the Khmer Rouge and other members of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's coalition against Vietnam.

Deng's socialism is far from orthodox Marxism, and even further from the dogmatic policies of earlier years. He is reported to have said, "In carrying on Socialism, I think we should uphold two things. First, public ownership should always play a dominant role in our economy; second, we should try to avoid class polarization and we should always keep to the road of common prosperity. . .Anything goes if it will lead China to development."[1] Not only can the non-communist countries of Asia live with such a version of socialism, they might even wish to emulate it. But now China's leaders have new fears: the developing countries of Southeast Asia may be harmed by China's competition for both markets and foreign investments and take measures to counter this threat. Also, Peking is sensitive to voices that say a strong and modern China could reduce Southeast Asia to a state of vassalage reminiscent of the old tributary system.

## The Economic Lure of China in ASEAN Countries

The non-communist countries of Southeast Asia — namely Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei — belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional alliance based on shared political and economic interests. The member states have always loathed Communism, whether from the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s and 1960s, or from Vietnam more recently. In the earlier two decades, an American-inspired military alliance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), was supposed to hold the line against the Soviet Union and China. As SEATO collapsed, two of its members — Thailand and the Philippines — pulled out and joined hands with the other regional powers to form ASEAN. Brunei, its latest addition, joined in late 1985. The presence of a large Soviet fleet in the South China Sea, based on the vast complex at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, encouraged a strong rapport between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and gradually drew the ASEAN countries closer to China. At the same time, the ASEAN countries made no secret of their underlying fears and suspicion of China.

The ASEAN countries share several characteristics. All have Chinese minorities and a substantial number of Muslims. Their regimes are basically pro-Western and authoritarian. They command strategic sea and air lines of communication. Except for Java and central Luzon, the immense tropical expanses they occupy are sparsely populated when compared with India, China, and Japan.

[1] *Time*, January 1986.



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They dispose of vast territories and rich resources, including 90 percent of the world's rubber, 60 percent of its tin, and 80 percent of the copra and coconut oil. They export large quantities of oil, rice, teak wood, tea, coffee, spices, and tobacco. The economies of these countries are, however, 70 percent agricultural and, except for Singapore, they will not become significant industrial powers for many years.

Members of ASEAN coordinate policies in many areas: to face the Vietnamese threat, they pursue bi-lateral and multi-lateral military maneuvers and cooperate diplomatically to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. They have also created joint economic ventures and joined forces in the common struggle against insurgents, be they communist or Muslim. But the potential bonanza that China offers creates a more problematic set of issues; here, they sometimes collaborate and sometimes compete. All ASEAN members suffer from either economic difficulties (such as rising unemployment), or internal disturbances and domestic leadership struggles; and so they ponder the new challenge China offers.

ASEAN's members do not benefit uniformly from economic links with China. The dynamic city-state of Singapore will no doubt obtain the lion's share of the new corporative relations with China. Under Lee Kuan Yew's vigorous leadership, Singapore has become an important financial and industrial center in Southeast Asia, with worldwide trade outlets. The keen interest of Singapore bankers in China — an economically sound country with little foreign debt but needing huge investments — reflects their belief that Singapore can serve China's international banking needs. For their part, the Chinese look to Singapore for the means to expand their consumer industries and markets. From a mere trickle in the 1970s, Singapore's trade with China has grown dramatically in recent years. By December 1985, Singapore held 4 percent of China's trade and placed fifth on the list of that country's trading partners, following Japan, Hong Kong, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Should the return of Hong Kong to China undermine its special trading status, Singapore might well take Hong Kong's place as China's money center.

Malaysia too has sought to increase trade with China. Despite resentment about Peking's support for the outlawed Communist Party of Malaysia, Malaysia's adverse trade balance compels the leaders to pursue economic opportunities offered by China. Even in Indonesia, where the leaders most fear Chinese meddling in their country's internal affairs, the pull of increased trade with China appears irresistible. In the absence of formal diplomatic relations, exchanges of trade missions during 1985 and 1986 paved the way for expanded trade.



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**Ethnic Politics and Domestic Insurgencies**

Ethnic politics often govern inter-ASEAN politics and the relations of these countries with the outside world, including China. Chinese communities living in all the ASEAN countries are often at odds with the rest of the population. In many cases too, Chinese minorities are heavily involved with illegal Communist party activities. Tensions are often exacerbated by the rise of fundamentalist Islam, which sets Muslims against Chinese. This said, a distinction should be made between ASEAN countries where Muslims predominate (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei) and those where they do not (Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines). For in the latter, fundamentalist Muslims are only insurgents, while in the former they pose a threat to the very regime. Conversely, Chinese are numerous in some countries (Singapore, Malaysia) and relatively few in others (Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei, the Philippines). The more Chinese the more the relations with their host country become problematic for China, although in some cases, a restless minority can constitute a major problem too.

Indonesia is perhaps the only ASEAN country in which ethnic and religious conflict poses a real threat, plagued as it is by two problems: hostility toward the Chinese minority (about 3 percent of the population) and a burgeoning of fundamentalist Islam. Since independence in 1949, Indonesian politicians have been deeply concerned about the ethnic Chinese: not only do they control much of the retail trade of the country, but their links to China invite suspicions among the Malay-Muslim majority.

As for fundamentalist Muslims, they have been active since the early 1970s. Perhaps their most dramatic and dangerous undertaking was the January 1985 bombing of the 1100-year-old Borobudur Palace, one of the most sumptuous shrines of Buddhist-Javanese culture. It is noteworthy that this outrageous act of sabotage was launched during the trial of fundamentalist Muslims who had attacked a number of Indonesian Chinese in October 1984. In August 1985, the government announced that it would take stringent measures against female pupils who wore veils in public schools in defiance of government prohibition. Those who persisted, the government warned, would be transferred to Islamic religious schools. The government also initiated an international seminar on "new trends in Islam" in August 1985, where the message was that Islam should no longer be learned exclusively from the decaying Arab world.

Caught between communism and Islam, Jakarta fears that continued fundamentalist Muslim attacks against Chinese businessmen might prompt Peking to retaliate. The Indonesian regime has adopted a middle course — cracking down on both dangers. Thus, domestic politics dictates that any steps taken against fundamentalist



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Muslims be balanced by anti-communist measures directed against the local Chinese.

Other ASEAN countries also suffer from Muslim rebellions and communist insurgencies. In Thailand, Muslim rebels are active in the south along the border with Malaysia, while communist activity is extensive among the Chinese minority (the largest in any Southeast Asian country except Malaysia). Moreover, as Thailand is the only ASEAN country bordering China, it is more exposed than the others to direct Chinese infiltration and subversion.

Tiny Brunei, which has only recently joined ASEAN, is 65 percent Muslim and 35 percent Chinese. In Brunei, however, only Muslims are full citizens, and this has created a potentially explosive situation that may elicit a response from China on behalf of the oppressed Chinese. Or these may resort to underground activities sponsored by Communist parties.

An Islamic rebellion supported by Libya has been ravaging the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines for the past fifteen years. Indonesia and Malaysia intercede on behalf of their fellow ASEAN member to prevent worldwide Islamic support for a Moro secession, and so provide major assistance. The Aquino government, which has been making advances toward settlement of the communist uprising, is attempting to proceed similarly towards the Muslim separatists. The old "autonomy plan" that had been negotiated between Qadhdhafi and Marcos has been revived. It remains to be seen whether it can be put into practice.

The rise of fundamentalist Islam throughout Southeast Asia has occurred in part as a reaction to the perceived threat of the Chinese. Because the overseas Chinese have been resident for generations and have been successful in major sectors of the local economies, they are much feared for their economic prowess. Add the omnipresent Chinese communist undergrounds, and the complexity of relations between China and its Southeast neighbors becomes apparent. Thus, while Indonesia remains mostly hostile to China, the Philippines shows indifference, Singapore and Malaysia are cautious, and Thailand exhibits open warmth.

### The Indochinese Complex

France tore Vietnam from the Chinese sphere of influence in 1885 and for decades China was powerless to do much about this. After the Second World War, however, the Chinese Communists offered direct assistance to Ho Chi Minh against the French. Had Ho accepted China's help, the French might have been expelled a great deal sooner, but he feared this aid would lead to the resumption of Chinese domination. As Ho reputedly put it: "It is better to sniff



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the dung of France for a while than to eat China's all our lives."[2] Hanoi did accept some aid from the Chinese, but only so long as it fought against the French and then the Americans. After that it veered towards the Soviets.

Before the end of the Vietnam War, China and North Vietnam seemed poised for joint expansion and subversion, threatening all the countries of Southeast Asia. But the war's end saw the Sino-Soviet conflict begin to affect Hanoi. China did its best to prevent an ally and erstwhile protegé falling into Moscow's arms. Peking was deeply disturbed by the large-scale Soviet military build-up around her borders — from Central Asia in the west, along the northern border of Siberia and Manchuria, to the Japan Sea and the South China Sea, and now along the continental border with Vietnam. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 further increased Chinese fears. China countered this threat by supporting NATO, turning to the United States, and courting such regimes as those in Pakistan and Iran.

Vietnam's mistreatment of its ethnic Chinese minority from the spring of 1978 exacerbated geopolitical tensions. On the grounds that the Chinese engaged in smuggling, blackmarketeering, and trading for private profit, Hanoi moved against them. It is hard to tell whether the authorities genuinely sought to purge "corrupt" elements or whether they were venting their hatred of the Chinese, or both. Some 150,000 Chinese fled or were expelled across the border to China (through the ironically named "Friendship Pass") and were settled in southern communes. Others, estimated in the tens of thousands, the "boat people," fled in desperate conditions to other countries, most of the survivors ending up in Thailand, and thence to Western countries, which gave them refuge.

The overland movement of refugees betweem Vietnam and China made border incidents a daily affair. In June 1978, Peking withdrew its experts from Vietnam, in an apparent effort to pressure the Vietnamese. But the Chinese leaders miscalculated much as the Soviets had done two decades earlier when they withdrew experts from China. This precipitous withdrawal not only sacrificed China's huge economic and military investment (almost $12 billion) in Vietnam over a twenty-year period, but also increased Hanoi's determination to resist Chinese demands and to rely on Soviet assistance. The Vietnamese regime ended its neutrality between the two communist powers, aligning completely with Moscow. Symbolic of this, it joined COMECON and signed a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.

[2] Quoted in Paul Mus, *Vietnam: Sociologie d'une guerre* (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1952), pp. 196-97.



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The Chinese responded swiftly. Communist Party chairman Hua Guo-feng rushed to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran, signaling that Peking could cause trouble in the Soviet Union's backyard should the Kremlin not desist from meddling in China's backyard — Vietnam. A treaty of friendship with Japan and formal diplomatic relations with the United States soon followed.

In December 1978, Vietnamese armor moved into defenseless Cambodia. Hanoi had gone out of its way immediately after the Vietnam War to concentrate on unification and economic reconstruction, and to assure its neighbors, Thailand in particular, that it harbored no aggressive intentions. The domino theory was dismissed as fancy. But Vietnam's already powerful war machine had become yet more capable on account of the huge stockpiles of captured American weapons and steady Soviet support, and Hanoi could not resist terrorizing the weaker states of Southeast Asia, especially Thailand. When Vietnamese power was extended to Laos in the course of 1979, its neighbors looked to China for balance; and they did so again after the invasion of Cambodia to demote the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime.

The Chinese supported the Khmer Rouge, not because they sympathized with its catastrophic regime, but because of their confrontation with Vietnam. Hanoi supported the Heng Samrin rebellion and calculated that the world was so disgusted by Pol Pot that no one would shed tears over his defeat. It probably also counted on *post factum* Soviet support, and this bet ultimately paid off. China came out the loser, for Vietnam's audacity diminished its prestige and Peking was exposed as an unreliable ally. Moreover, the expansion of pro-Soviet power into Cambodia exposed China's weakness.

After much hesitation and an international campaign to prepare the ground (which included Deng's trip to the United States in early 1979), Peking countered with its "campaign of punishment" on February 17. The 450-mile border with Vietnam turned into a war front, with armor and artillery forces raging. Chinese forces initially made easy inroads into Vietnam, and Peking declared they would be withdrawn only when Vietnamese troops left Cambodia. But three factors caused Deng to evacuate his troops without having achieved his objective: Vietnam's resistance to the Chinese troops, its own swift occupation of Cambodia, and world pressure on China to withdraw, including the presence of a Soviet fleet in the China Sea. Hanoi's stature grew, its hold on Cambodia tightened, and Peking emerged battered.

If the break between China and Vietnam initially came as a great relief to the ASEAN countries, the Chinese defeat began to worry most of them. Inter-ASEAN politics and relations of its members with China respond in large part to the Vietnamese threat. Indonesian leaders have deep suspicions of China and therefore cultivate links with Vietnam. But this is an exception. Most ASEAN



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members, especially Thailand, look to China to contain Vietnam. Indeed, all ASEAN members publicly demand the evacuation of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and support the Kampuchean Resistance coalition headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Peking has won a reputation as Southeast Asia's protector from the Vietnamese menace. The role is credible because of its concentration on economic affairs and proven interest in good relations with all.

ASEAN members see a united stance toward China and Vietnam as the best guarantee of their security vis-à-vis both communist powers. Thailand is closest to China and Indonesia is closest to Vietnam, and the rest stand in between — assuring ASEAN of good links to either country.

Thais have a special concern, for battles between Vietnamese troops and Kampuchean rebels brought the Vietnamese threat right to their border; indeed, the Vietnamese sometimes pursued Cambodian rebels into Thai territory. Thailand was a member of SEATO, but this organization has evaporated; and its bilateral treaty with the United States permitting U.S. air bases in Thailand has expired. Therefore, with the active support of its ASEAN allies, Bangkok has been trying to keep the Vietnamese at bay by cultivating close relations with China. Knowing full well that it could count on neither in a crisis, Bangkok nonetheless maintains correct relations with both Vietnam and China.

Indonesian leaders believe the warm Thai-Chinese relationship leads to a blindly anti-Vietnam stand. Though displeased with ASEAN because of the united stand on Cambodia, so long as Suharto and General Murdani, the chief of the armed forces, are in power, there is little likelihood of major change toward ASEAN or China. In the long run, however, Indonesian ambitions to play an independent role in the region may lead it on a separate path, with signficant implications for its relations with China. The Indonesian government feels that it is large enough, populous enough, safe enough from outside threat, and influential enough to raise its profile, and erect its own sphere of influence, rather than stand in the shade of others.

## Conclusion

Communist China's modernizing drive of recent years may, if successful, serve as a model for authoritarian Third World regimes, including those in ASEAN. The rehabilitation of Confucianism and reassessment of Confucian values — such as respect for authority, filial piety, self-improvement and social harmony as tools of humanizing socialism — may in the long run increase China's appeal among overseas Chinese, as well as Asian and African states that are searching for solutions to their economic and social problems. For they, like China, having outlived the petrifying dogmas of Marxism, socialism,



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and Third Worldism, would like to try the new pragmatic path that the Old Brother will have charted for them.

The Middle Kingdom's old world order has irrevocably disappeared, of course, but an amended version of the hierarchical system in which China stands at the apex can still be maintained. The universality of China as the only source of power must make way for the more realistic concept of a multi-polar world. Impartiality, a key aspect of the old universality, survives in Chinese thinking and influences the way Peking currently handles its foreign relations. Further, Peking has reverted to the primacy of virtue over might: it has relinquished violence through surrogate Communist parties in the Third World and seems to have abandoned the Ming notion that virtue justifies the use of force. Following the failure of the purist Marxist dogma, the virtue of China, its *te*, derives from a somewhat humanized socialism to be transmitted to others by example. Unable to maintain its ancient status of overlord, China seems to aspire to the role of big brother.



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# Documentation

## FRIENDS AND FOES OF GLASNOST

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

*Breathtaking events are taking place in the Soviet Union. As Mikhail Gorbachev's reformist course gathers momentum, friends and foes of* glasnost *have become increasingly outspoken. Even the Soviet media acknowledge that long-delayed ideological relaxation necessarily leads to polemics and controversies: "There's no denying that the development of openness and the expansion of democracy are yielding various fruits."*[1] *In a recent talk with writers and journalists, the secretary general admitted opposition to his course but denied his critics' allegation that liberalization had gone too far.*[2] *Gorbachev's political survival hinges on his capacity to reconcile the aspirations of the liberal intelligentsia with the apprehensions of the apparatchiks.*

Glasnost *has put an end to the all-pervasive monotony of Soviet media. Published reactions to Gorbachev's liberalization range from enthusiasm to panic. Advocates of liberalization clash openly with those nostalgic for Stalin's dictatorship. Indeed, while the former receive most attention in the West, the latter are also becoming more unabashed. Totalitarian apologies surface in speeches, articles, and letters published in the Soviet press.* Glasnost *has catalyzed the rival undercurrents in Soviet society. These could be critical years for the future of the Soviet Union.*

### Ending Stalinism?

*Writers like Andrey Voznesenskiy, Bulat Okudzhava, or Yevgeniy Yevtushenko are spearheading the struggle for reforms. They have allies among party intellectuals who were brought up during Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign (1956-1964) and then were frustrated during Brezhnev's years of stagnation and corruption. Fedor Burlatskiy, a journalist prominent in this group, is one of Gorbachev's most outspoken supporters within the establishment. Together with playwright Mikhail Shatrov and novelist An-*

[1] *Izvestia*, June 3, 1987.
[2] *Pravda*, July 15, 1987.

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*atoliy Rybakov, he has long maintained the need for an overhaul of Soviet history concerning Stalin.*

*To voice his views, Burlatskiy wrote a one-act play and published it in* Literaturnaya Gazeta, *a weekly sponsored by the Soviet Writers' Union. The play, which represents a significant attempt to rehabilitate one of Stalin's most celebrated Bolshevik victims, implicitly challenges official Bolshevik party history.*

*The play takes place during the climactic moment of the struggle between Stalin and Nikolay Bukharin, his "right-wing" adversary. In the late 1920s, at the time of this imaginary talk, Stalin abandoned the New Economic Policy (NEP) and imposed a "revolution from above." Bukharin opposed Stalin's intention to launch forced collectivization and back-breaking industrialization. Stalin defeated Bukharin and had him executed in March 1938.*

*Until now, Soviet leaders have resisted many calls (some from West European Communist parties) for Bukharin's rehabilitation. The publication of Burlatskiy's fictional debate between a Stalinist and a Bukharinist points to the likelihood of Bukharin's official rehabilitation. Bukharin's American biographer, Stephen F. Cohen, is undoubtedly right in describing the text that follows as "one of the most important political documents to appear in the Soviet press in decades." But it is difficult to share Cohen's certainty that the play "shows the determination of Mikhail Gorbachev's radical supporters to dismantle the Stalinist bureaucratic system."*[3] *Nothing points to the current Soviet leadership's readiness for a genuine divorce from Stalinism.*

*The main characters in the play are Petr and Alexey, two brothers whose views echo those of the rival Bolshevik factions: Petr is a committed Stalinist; Alexey is Bukharin's disciple. The brothers' dialogue in the presence of their father — a poor peasant confused by this apparently esoteric dispute — highlights the tragic implications of Stalin's victory over Bukharin.*

## Transcripts of History: Burlatskiy's Dialogue of 1930s Communists[4]

[Burlatskiy introduction] We are proud of the great gains of socialism, which are the most important part of our 70-year history. But that does not mean forgetting or forgiving the grave trials, errors, and tragedies of the past. It is important for those alive today, and above all for young people, to know what torments, struggles, and disputes accompanied the quest for the unknown paths to socialism. Today we badly need objective, truthful information about our own

[3] *The Nation*, August 15/22, 1987.

[4] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 22, 1987, translated by FBIS, *Daily Report*, Soviet Union, July 24, 1987, pp. R10-23. This and following excerpts have all been slightly adapted.



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experience, with no omissions or silences. Only this approach makes it possible to learn the lessons of history. The dialogue shows how the eager debates which took place among the party leaders in the late 20s were reflected in the minds of ordinary communists.

[Play begins] A small room in the Red Professors Institute. A dim light bulb. The teapot is warming on the portable stove, at the table Petr and Aleksey Polenov, flushed with arguing, are drinking tea; Petr has a jacket with sewn-on pockets (a Sun Yat-sen jacket) slung over his shoulders. Aleksey wears an embroidered, peasant-style white shirt. Enter the father in a smock and boots, carrying two bags on a stick.

Aleksey: Dad! (Runs to his father and helps to take his load.)

Petr: Father? That is all we needed!

Father: Are you not glad to see me? I have brought some presents. Mother packed some pies, and lard, and our good country bread and butter.

Petr: Come off it! Do you think we are starving here, or what? Times have changed.

Aleksey: Well, of course you are not starving. You get your rations without fail (. . .)

Petr: I think they feed you future professors here quite well too. I had a look into the lunchroom yesterday — everything was in good order. If your heads were in equally good order, our commission would be unnecessary.

Father: What is all this? What are you all steamed up about? Have I come at the wrong time, with our village troubles?

Petr: What troubles do you have, Dad? You have it made. You are getting rich! Our Aleshka's idol [Nikolay Bukharin] yelled to the whole country: Get rich! And so you have set about it. (. . .)

Father: Listen to you . . . You start in on me as soon as I come in the door . . . Or have you quarreled with your brother about something?

Aleksey: Dad, he has come to kick me out of the party. They sent him from up high. He is head of a commission. He is purging our Red Professors Institute.

Petr: It is no use pretending to be some kind of Poor Demyan [early twentieth-century peasant poet]. It is true, Dad: Tomorrow we will decide who is with us and who is against us. And Aleshka too — if he does not repent, if he does not take care — he will come crashing down like all the rest.

Father: So that is how it is . . . You fought together, joined the party



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. . . You even dragged me off, poor sinner that I am, to brandish a saber . . . And now what, has it come to in the crunch?

Aleksey: Petrukha wants to be one of the leaders, Dad. So he is blindly crushing everything around him. He is even prepared to sacrifice his own brother, like Cain and Abel. They might appreciate it! They might raise him up, bring him in closer. Only I tell you what, Petr, do not forget to disentangle yourself in good time. Do not forget! If your own brother has become an opportunist, you too, sooner or later, will fall into the same hole!

Petr: Who are you threatening? What are you angling for? Why are you saying all this to Dad? And who are you to the party? Nobody! It will step over you and not even notice.

Aleksey: And over you too? ( . . . )

Father: What is this deviation? You used to make so much noise about union [*smychka*]. We could not get used to it — what did you mean by union? Now that we have gotten used to it you think up a new word.

Aleksey: They have thought up this word to use it against us. First they declare us enemies, and then you.

Petr: What lies are you telling now? Why are you trying to intimidate the countryside?

Father: The countryside . . . Since when have you been the city? But tell me this — is this NEP of yours a serious plan or have you just brought it in out of fear? So the fright will pass and you will go back to direct confiscation again?

Aleksey: You have hit the nail on the head there, Dad. That is what we are arguing about. What to do about the NEP? Continue with it or axe it? And if you axe it, where do you go: back to war communism, or do you think up something else of that kind?

Petr: That is not what the argument is about, not that! You are distorting it! The argument is about industrialism. Where do you get the resources? What speed do we move at?

Aleksey: Well, if you want to be strictly accurate, the argument is about Lenin's political testament.

Petr: There was no testament. Your Bukharchik [diminutive of Bukharin] invented the whole thing.

Aleksey: Incidentally, it was your master [Stalin] who called him "Bukharchik." How did he put it that time? Are you demanding blood? We will not give you our Bukharchik's blood!

Petr: Well, that just shows how objective he is. But now you have



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really gone berserk! Political testament! Political testament! You want to take one little piece out of the whole of Leninism and turn it against the party line.

Father: So was there some kind of a testament, Lekha? What did Lenin leave? It is interesting. Did he name an heir? Or did he not have time?

Aleksey: What kind of an heir? That is not in the party's traditions, Dad!

Father: I do not mean in the way of kinfolk. But the other comrades — maybe he pointed to whoever is strongest.

Aleksey: He did do some pointing out, only not who to appoint, but who to remove.

Father: And who did he order them to get rid of?

Aleksey: I will read it to you now (takes a paper from the table). "Stalin is too brash . . . Therefore, I suggest that the comrades consider some means of transferring Stalin from that post and appointing to that post someone else who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in only one advantage, namely, that he is more tolerant, fairer, more polite and more attentive to the comrades, less capricious, and so forth."

Petr: Well, and what are you reading into that? The party answered frankly: Stalin is brash, with enemies, with deviationists! But you read what it says about your own man — it is very pointed.

Aleksey: Well, I will read it. "Bukharin is not only a most valuable, major party theorist, he is also rightly regarded as the favorite of the whole party, but his theoretical views can only very dubiously be regarded as entirely Marxist, because there is something scholastic about him (he has never studied and I think he has never fully understood dialectics)."

Petr: Well? Is that not clear? Lenin criticized Stalin only for personal shortcomings, and Bukharin for departing from Marxist ideology.

Aleksey: And Stalin? What is his ideology? With Kamenev and Zinovyev, against Trotsky. With Bukharin, against Kamenev and Zinovyev, and with people like you, against the last member of Lenin's Politburo. What is so incomprehensible about that? Lenin proposed collective leadership. What arguments there were in his time, and on what issues! Brest alone was enough. And what about war communism? And the NEP? Only Lenin had the authority to keep the debates within the party and go on moving forward.

Father: So why did they not remove that one? Since Lenin advised it?



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Petr: Who would they put in his place? When Ilich [i.e., Lenin] left us, all the leaders started trying Lenin's caftan for size. And it did not fit anyone perfectly. They then decided to inform only the congress aktiv [the carefully handpicked delegates to the Bolshevik party congress], and to put the letter to one side for the time being. They all decided, unanimously.

Father: Well, they would! They did not ask the others.

Aleksey: And after that, they divided the whole history of mankind into three periods: matriarchate, patriarchate, and secretariat. And the secretariat trampled the Politburo underfoot.

Petr: Drop that Trotskyite rubbish! You are just repeating it, lamebrain! That will count against you too!

Aleksey: Dad, there were seven members of the Politburo after Lenin's death. They have already gotten rid of five. Now they are finishing off the sixth.

Petr: That is what they are fighting for; they have got their teeth into his coattails like dogs and you cannot drag them off.

Aleksey: And what started the fight, Petrukha? How do you understand it?

Petr: What? There is no question about that. The exacerbation of the class struggle. As reflected in the party.

Aleksey: How come it was exacerbated the very day after Lenin's death?

Petr: Because our enemies decided to take advantage of the leader's death.

Aleksey: How did they manage to turn from comrades-in-arms into enemies so quickly? Or did Lenin not see through them? But what does that matter, it is not a question of personalities alone, now . . . The main thing is where to go next. At the end of 1922, when Lenin was ill, he dictated five articles. That is what we are arguing with the commission about.

Petr: And which articles do you count as the testament?

Aleksey: You know: "Pages From a Diary," "On Cooperatives," "How We Should Reorganize the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate," "Better Less, But Better," and, last, the letter to the congress.

Petr: The letter! You are prowling round and round it like cats waiting to pounce. You are eager for power! But that letter is top secret. And you know it very well. For that alone, you should be expelled from the party. I expect the whole gang has documents like that, has it



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not? And maybe you have started distributing them outside the institute?

Father: That is enough from you! Lesh, will you explain better what kind of socialism Lenin laid down in his testament? How do you understand it?

Aleksey: Cooperatives — that is number one. Two, culture for everyone, especially the peasantry; three, development of industry; four, democracy as against bureaucracy. Collective leadership of the party — that is the most important thing in his "Letter to the Congress."

Father: And him, Petrukha, and those others, what do they want? What are they fighting over?

Aleksey: Them? Super-industrialization in the city. Forced collectivization of the countryside. The cult of one-man leadership in the party. Lenin made no mention of any of that. "Revolution from above" — they did not get that from Ilich, they borrowed that from Saltykov-Shchedrin [a classical Russian satirical writer]. ( . . . )

Petr: Drop it. I am not at all nostalgic for war communism. Lesha, dear boy! Remember, remember October! What enthusiasm! What faith in the future! And then the Civil War . . . What trials! How much blood was shed! And all for what? So the *nepmans* [petty speculators profiting from the NEP] could throw their gold 10-ruble coins around in the restaurants today? So that a trader would rank higher than a communist? Live better and have pretty women, and entice us party people with all kinds of temptations? We dreamed of a world revolution, Alesha!

Aleksey: Petrukha, you are my big brother! Do you think I do not understand you? Of course we had faith, that we only had to touch the fuse to the cannon. And how it would thunder then, that cannon! We would rouse not only Europe, but the whole world. But it did not work out that way, Petya! We were left alone with our country — a backward, poor, illiterate country. Everything changed, and changed radically. But people's mentality? The mentality remained the same.

You remember the first time Lenin told the Communists to learn to trade? It knocked us flat! He said that to us, who had put every trader, every bagman up against the wall without a second thought! But Ilich stuck to his guns. Learn not only to trade, but to manage an enterprise, to work in a new way. And do you remember the komsomol congress? We were waiting for the leader to say to us any minute: Well, lads, mobilize your forces, do not begrudge your blood, and . . . And he said: "Learn communism." And not from books, not from textbooks, not even from Marx alone. Learn the real work of



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communism. We came out after the congress then with perplexity written on our faces: What did it mean?

And when the NEP burst upon us, it was not only we beardless youths who faltered, but even the leaders. Opposition after opposition. Platform after platform. Faction after faction. And what words: betrayal of the revolution! Deviation from communism! Degeneration! They flung everything at the party leader. And who was right? You take a look around, Petya, weigh it up calmly. Forget for a minute that you were sent here like an *oprichnik* [member of Ivan the Terrible's elite force] to carry out reprisals.

Petr: What do you mean, an *oprichnik*? If you want to know, I asked to join the commission. Because I do not agree with your gang. I do not agree in principle. And I am sorry for you. I want to save you.

Aleksey: But look around you. What was the country like after the Civil War? And what has it become, in just a few years? Nobody expected it. We have surpassed the production level that existed before the revolution. True, true. The peasant lives better than under the old regime, under the landowners. True? True. And in the city — the working day has been reduced to seven hours. Wages are higher. The level of literacy among the people is twice what it was before the revolution.

Petr: You always paint rosy pictures. You always see the NEP in bright colors. But the fact that we have more than a million unemployed — how do you regard that? As a great gain? True, we tried to seize communism with a cavalry charge. It did not come off, so we withdrew to the reserve positions. Well, we reformed, retrained, and now it is into the attack again. Otherwise, you never know, maybe we will slip imperceptibly back into a bourgeois society.

Father: Does it mean you will take everything away from the peasantry?

Petr: We will not take away, we will unite. We will change the whole of society. It is inevitable. You should realize that however much you accumulate of your cows, and horses, and calves, you are not accumulating for yourself. Sooner or later you will have to hand it over.

Father: To whom?

Petr: The *kolkhoz* [collective farm].

Father: What might that be, what do you eat it with?

Aleksey: That is just the question, dad. They want to replace the Leninist cooperative with *kolkhoz*es. (. . .)

Aleksey: They are launching this revolution against you, Dad — against millions of peasants!



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Petr: It is not us launching it, it is them — these *kulak*s [rich peasants]! Look how much unrest there has been in the villages this year! What is it? It is a sortie by the class enemy.

Aleksey: And if you start a revolution, what will happen to the economy and to the real people? You have to put your faith in the force of authority, in the state. But does that faith come from socialism? The state does not till the land or harvest the grain. It does not raise the livestock. It does not produce the tractors or sew the pants and shirts. It is the people who do all that . . . You tell me, can you make anyone do high quality work by force?

Petr: Not by force alone, by enthusiasm. We need to mobilize everyone, we need to leap forward. We need sacrifices. It may take another 10 to 15 years, but we will take the country to a bright future. If we do not squeeze resources out of the peasantry, there will be no industrialization. It is very simple: either — or. There is no alternative.

Father: And what are you going to squeeze out of us, you blockhead? As soon as the people hear about your plans, the first thing they will do is to start killing the livestock. So you will not gain much from that, Petrukha! You will not gain much.

Petr: They will not do that! And if they do, we will make such a bloodbath they will remember it for a long time! The proletarian power will not let anyone play tricks on it.

Aleksey: There is an alternative. Lenin looked at it differently. How did he conclude his articles "On Cooperatives" and "Better Less, But Better"? He said outright that the system of cooperatives in the city and in the countryside is the socialist system. And proposed gradual cooperativization. The gradual gathering together of resources, so as to dismount from the peasants' horse and mount the industrial horse.

Petr: We too have gained some experience since Lenin. The 5-year plan — that is our method. Two or three 5-year plans, and our industry will be as good as Germany's or France's.

Aleksey: The plan? Well, that is fine. The GOELRO [State Commission for the Electrification of Russia] plan — that was born in Lenin's time. But what kind of plan? Real or a chimera? What kind of idea are you hatching? The normal indicators have been discarded. You plan in 5 years to increase the volume of capital investments in industry three- to fourfold, to expand production of the means of production more than threefold .... Superindustrialization. What does "super" mean? Over and above the real potential? Over and above common sense? Or over and above the truth? We want to deceive people. That is the crux of the matter. Do you not remember? Dzerzhinskiy, when he came to the leadership of the Supreme Coun-



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cil of the National Economy, stated that the report figures on the development of our economy are fantasy and highly skilled lies. ( . . .)

Petr: You are twisting things! You keep twisting things!

Aleksey: You want to build everything on fear alone.

Petr: What do you mean, on fear?

Aleksey: Think for yourself: Why will the peasants work in the common fields? Why will a plant fulfill its pledges? For one reason alone: If you do not fulfill the plan — off with your head. You are building military-bureacratic socialism.

Petr: And what kind of socialism do you favor?

Aleksey: Me? Socialism for man, people's socialism.

Petr (after a pause): On the whole, here is what I will say to you, Alekha. If you start making a noise with ideas like that, you will dig your own grave and ruin us. And who are you trying to keep up with? Look at it, can you not see who is dragging you down? Total anarchy has been let loose at the institute. We have read the protocols, all kinds of people speak here. All fellow travelers. Babel, Pilnyak, Mandelshtam [Soviet writers who perished during the Great Purge]. What is all this about, do you think? Is it proletarian culture?

Aleksey: And what would you prefer?

Petr: I would not let all these fellow travelers and counter-revolutionaries across the threshold. What do they write about the revolution? "Hoarders!" I would put that son of a bitch up against the wall without a second thought.

Aleksey: And culture — would you put that up against the wall too?

Petr: Well, are they going to make any concessions? Are they going to give in? They are the corrupters of the people's consciousness. They put people's minds in such a state that you and I then have to disentangle the mess with sabers. To cut through the knots. Since we have proletarian power, we should have proletarian literature too. Anyone who does not want to serve the proletariat — out!

Aleksey: We have to work with them, work with them! Bring them all over to our side! Without them, we cannot become the civilized society that Lenin wrote about.

Petr: And how Lenin thundered against the liberal intellectuals — do you not remember that? Do you dream of a party of intellectuals?

Aleksey: Not intellectuals, but people who can tell Babel from Bebel and Hegel from Gogol. Otherwise you have raised the stagnant masses and you can manipulate them however you like.



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Petr: Now you have said it! Look where you have ended up! But tomorrow, tomorrow that will not be what we are talking about. Who is for the party line and who is against. That will be the question. And we will pose it, point-blank. And you, Aleksey, should make a choice. If you do not leave this gang, you will end up under the guillotine. (Pause.) Well, if you like, Lekha, I will get down on my knees to you — drop it, do not ruin yourself, take pity on Father at last!

Father: Maybe ... really ... could be ... You should give it some thought, Lekha. Petr may be a hothead, but he will turn out smarter than you. You were where things are leading. He has made his way into the leadership. And if they drive you out, you will be letting me down .... Petr too, you will ruin the whole family.

Petr: They are using you as a shield, you peasant's son. As for them, they spit on you.

Aleksey (after a pause): No, I cannot. I will not do it. Do not expect me to repent tomorrow. I do not believe in all that (shouting.) I do not believe it!

Petr: You must understand, Aleska, you must finally understand, if we do not follow that path, the path of hard trials, the imperialists will crush us. War could break out at any moment. If we have no heavy industry, we will have no defense. And that will be the end of it. The end of Lenin's cause.

Aleksey: And when will this war be, according to you?

Petr: In the next 5 years, I think, no later.

Aleksey: And if there is no war, do you agree — all the sacrifices you want to condemn the party and people to are not necessary? ... So here is what I say to you. Let us come back to this conversation in 10 years. If we are still alive. I think there will be a war — only not a foreign war, an internal one.

Petr: And if there is a war with the imperialists, in 5, 10, or 15 years, if they attack us — what will you say then?

Aleksey: Then, you cannot get away from it, we will all be there. You. Me. And our dad will be there too.

Petr: But for now — for now, it is hard, brother, but all of you, yourself included, you fool, will have to be thrown out of the party. There is no other way. If we do not sweep you away, there will be no *kolkhozes*, there will be no industry, and our power will be no more. [dialogue ends]

[Burlatskiy conclusion] In this brief fragment I have tried to let people who fought sincerely for socialism, but saw its paths of de-



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velopment in different ways, speak for themselves. Industrialization of the country made it possible to secure victory in the Great Patriotic War and paved the way for further progress. At the same time, the ineffectiveness of the methods of administrative decrees in socialist building became increasingly clear. Now that the party and people are carrying out a radical restructuring and renewal of our society and now that heated debates are in progress, it is important to remember the lessons of history, the reasoning and arguments that were put forward at a time when ideas about real socialism were only just beginning to take shape. And once again to evaluate the true political testament [*volya*] of Ilich.

## A Civil War in Soviet Literature?

*Many members of the Soviet elite recall Stalin's times as a period of glory and accomplishment. Stalin created the present system, led the victory over Nazi Germany, and industrialized the country. Neo-Stalinists admit errors but argue that these were an inevitable by-product of revolutionary construction. As for mass terror and economic aberrations, they caution against overstatement.*

*Mikhail Suslov, the Soviet ideological grand priest who died in January 1982, championed the opposition to de-Stalinization. He banned literary masterpieces, stifled cultural expression of all sorts, and forced brilliant intellectuals into exile. Sycophantic writers who thrived in those times of political numbness are now threatened by* glasnost. *Significantly, they have close links with important party leaders. The following text shows how they approvingly quote Yegor Ligachev, Gorbachev's second-in-command and reportedly a staunch opponent of radical reforms.*

*The discussion in the Secretariat of the Board of the Russian Republic Writers' Union includes some of the chief complaints about the current thaw. Yuriy Bondarev draws an analogy between current problems in Soviet culture and the disastrous situation that followed the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. This gifted novelist seeks a "political Stalingrad," that is, a neo-Stalinist counter-offensive.*

*The following discussion is a partial transcript of a meeting of the Secretariat of the Board of the Russian Republic Writers' Union on March 17, 1987.*[5] *The Board took up the task of Russian writers in light of the January 1987 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee. S. Mikhalkov, Chairman of the Board of the Russian Republic Writers' Union, opened the meeting.*

[5] *Literaturnaia Rossiya*, March 27, 1987, translation copyright 1987 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at Columbus, Ohio, Volume XXXIX, Number 21, June 24, 1987, pp. 8-9. Reprinted by permission.



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We are called upon to treat talent solicitously and with respect and at the same time, in a Party-minded way, to give fundamental assistance to the artistic process and to promote public initiative and the development of criticism and self-criticism.

However, criticism sometimes reaches a point at which we read in the press words of a very insulting nature directed at people who have done a good deal for the Soviet regime. There have been many examples of this.

This must be stopped. It's no accident that Comrade Ye. K. Ligachev said at a meeting in Saratov that it is necessary to take a solicitous attitude toward talented people who, through their creative work, have established a place for themselves in our culture in general and in literature. At present, many people are prepared simply to ignore those who wear Stars [an indication of official honors], who are USSR People's Artists, and so on. This is a very disturbing fact, comrades. Some timeservers, speculators, mediocrities and very shady people hide behind the slogans "Hail to openness! Hail to restructuring!" and extend them into other spheres of human relations. ( . . . )

**V. Dementyev** (secretary of the Board of the Russian Republic Writers' Union): I would like to talk about Comrade Ye. K. Ligachev's recent speech in Saratov, where he expressed what is, in my view, an important thought: we should not forget the many years' experience of our classic Soviet literature. Not only not forget it but turn to it again and again with today's concerns to discover the inexhaustible richness of the prose, poetry and drama of previous decades.

Unfortunately, in present-day criticism there is a noticeable tendency that would chop off significant elements of the prose and poetry we call Soviet classics. But this is the very time when we should take a new look at the work of such complex writers as, for example, Andrei Platonov. ( . . . )

In current conditions, the role of literary and art criticism in all spheres of art has increased very much. However, I get the feeling that our criticism is sometimes unprepared to fulfill its tasks, because a whole series of theoretical concepts needed for the present day simply do not exist. For example, for many years running our academic criticism and our scholars discussed the problem of socialist realism as an open system. A good many lances were broken, and there were both opponents and supporters of that system. But today, when works that are very complex in terms of their means of artistic expression and metaphorical structure are gaining a huge readership, it is self-evident that our creative method never was "closed" to works that do not just strictly reflect reality but transform it, i.e., that are based on grotesquerie, fantasy, etc. ( . . . )

Present-day literary criticism, in my opinion, is still not prepared to introduce a whole series of artistic phenomena, which, of course,



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it must introduce into the context of the times, rather than to restrict itself to the mere fact — for example, to the fact of the publication of [Vladimir] Nabokov's novels or his rather mediocre poetry. ( . . . )

**A. Keshokov:** Today certain names are returning to literature. I believe that this fits in with restructuring, but these works, which sounded forth a long time ago, should not be printed in magazines. In my opinion, this applies to *Doctor Zhivago*. Pasternak's novel should not be published in a magazine and create an unnecessary fuss. It should be published as a separate book. ( . . . )

**P. Proskurin:** I want to say that some of our critics are operating with methods that are unacceptable for our time — hooligan methods. Thus, for example, *Moscow News*, a newspaper [for foreign consumption] that is sent abroad and tells about our internal life, printed an interview with T. Tolstaya. In reply to the correspondent's provocative question, "Aren't you afraid to show up in the same company as such a fierce opponent of female emancipation as the writer Vasily Belov and his novel *Everything Lies Ahead*?" she said:

> I will gladly believe that Belov wrote his book with the best of motives, but he wound up with something misanthropic. It's a protest against woman as such, not just the drawbacks of emancipation. The very fact of woman's existence stirs malice in him and a desire to destroy her, to prevent her from breathing and moving. The view of woman as a vessel of evil smacks of sanctimoniousness, which is especially awkward for such a master as Belov.

At the end of the interview this Tolstaya was asked about shortcomings she is inclined to forgive. She replied, "everything can be forgiven except misanthropy."

It seems to me that such instances should not be overlooked by our criticism. It is unthinkable to call a writer who belongs among those who are termed the conscience of Russia a misanthrope. And to say this while addressing foreigners is a bad thing. I see this as a manifestation of yellow journalism in our press. This incident with Belov really shook me up personally, because this is no longer our morality or our press, and God only knows what's going on. There have been many such incidents.

The magazine *Ogonyok* has been behaving very strangely lately [i.e. since Vitaliy Korotich's appointment as chief editor]. This magazine is considered to be a "weekly socio-political, literary and art magazine," that is, one assumes, a periodical for an all-Union readership. Then why is it that a spirit of cliquishness, even a kind of caste exclusiveness such as has not been seen for a long time in our country — not since the 1920s, I think — has been recently manifesting itself more and more in it, especially in its basic assumptions about literature and art? In my view, you won't strengthen socialist culture this way, much less advance it to a new aesthetic stage.

And another thing. Has criticism really failed to notice that there have been several generations of young people who have come to



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literature ashamed to mention the word "communist" in their books? And our criticism keeps quiet. *Pravda* keeps quiet, and *Literatunaia Gazeta* discusses what sort of novel has come out in Argentina but pays no attention to what is happening here in Russia. Is the word "communist" forbidden, or something? Is it present in our life? Several generations of young writers have been ashamed of it in their works. This is what we must talk about. (. . .)

**Yu. Bondarev:** Foreign correspondents ask: "Do you really have a civil war going on in literature?" No, I must say that so far I don't see any civil war in art. But I would compare the present state of Russian literature, besieged by the total-destruction element of our criticism, to the situation that existed in July 1941, when the progressive [Soviet] forces, offering a disorganized resistance, retreated under the onslaught of the battering blows of the civilized barbarians [the Nazis], intent on destroying a great culture. If this retreat continues and the time of Stalingrad does not arrive, things will end up with national values and everything that constitutes the people's spiritual pride being toppled into the abyss.

## Pamyat — The Dark Side of Glasnost

*No recent development in the Soviet Union has greater potential significance than the rise of long-repressed Russian nationalist sentiments. The resurgence of Russian nationalism can affect the distribution of power in the Soviet Union and alter the state's future course.*

*Russian nationalists take great pride in Russian — not Soviet — traditions, such as the Orthodox Church, the empire, and the army. They revere authoritarian government and deeply fear the destabilizing effects of too much individual freedom. In their view, the Russian soul yearns for authoritarian leadership. There is a heritage of extreme Russian nationalist thinking in Soviet politics. In his later years, Stalin saw the world this way, vividly seen in the 1948-1953 campaign against "cosmopolitanism." As a result of the 20th Congress, these views went underground, though neo-Stalinists prospered under Brezhnev's corrupt regime and rose to positions of power.*

*Anti-democratic and xenophobic fringe groups, heirs of extreme Russian nationalism, worship Stalin because he expanded the frontiers of the Russian empire; and Stalin exalted the Russian people's unequalled virtues and intellectual achievement. These elements see Stalinism as the means to achieve Russian grandeur, and a nostalgia for Stalin's times permeates their ideology.*

*Two things have happened since 1985. First, Gorbachev's reforms threaten the status of the neo-Stalinists, especially those in the military, the KGB, and the Komsomol. Attempts to regenerate the system undermine their privileged status. Second,* glasnost *allows*



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*them to express themselves. The blossoming of extreme Russian nationalism is a direct, if unintended, result of* glasnost.

*Admirers of the later Stalin have recently taken the offensive. Key to their efforts is the movement called Pamyat ("memory" in Russian). Created as a semi-legal "historical and patriotic" association, the group sees itself defending pure Russian cultural and moral values. For Pamyat, the Communist party has lost touch with the genuine aspirations of the Russian people. The liberal (by which they mean pro-Western) intelligentsia dominates the media and pollutes the minds of the Russian people. Decisive counter-reaction is thus urgent. The following text analyzes the Pamyat mindset.*

### IN A FRENZY OF FORGETFULNESS: WHERE THE LEADERS OF THE SO-CALLED PAMYAT ASSOCIATION ARE HEADING

by Ye. Losoto[6]

Perhaps the reader already knows that a so-called informal association named Pamyat exists in our country. It calls itself a "patriotic association." At Pamyat meetings, speakers are introduced as follows: "Architect and patriot and so-and-so has the floor." If not architect, then something else, but the second part is always "patriot." "Patriotism" is the moving spirit of these meetings. But let's take a look at the content that is invested in this word. ( . . . )

Dragging behind us from out of the past is a patriarchal patriotism — the dusty tail of a country that has moved ahead rapidly and was quite recently populated by vast, benighted masses of almost totally illiterate peasants who had believed for centuries in God and tsar and had for centuries ascribed all evil to devil and infidel. The patriotism of the small-scale property owner (petit bourgeois patriotism) is quite different from the patriotism of the class-conscious proletariat. The first kind of patriotism has on its banner not socialism as the fatherland but its own farmstead and landholdings as the fatherland, Orthodoxy as the fatherland, and national traits as the fatherland. That kind of patriotism turns into nationalism in the twinkling of an eye. Touch the lighted match of anti-Semitism to it, and you will see Pamyat.

The archaic can be crude and obvious to everyone. Or it can be "cultivated." An interest in history, in the past, is natural . . . . But one does not have to drag everything behind oneself, declaring both the progressive and the reactionary equally to be the *single Russian culture* that we need. Lenin always separated progressive culture from reactionary culture (including Black Hundreds culture, clerical culture, etc.). We should take for ourselves all the best, not everything in general.

[6] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 22, 1987, ibid., pp.1-4.



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Let's keep this in mind, since we are going to come up against the unscrupulous (or ignorant) association of "Leninism" with the ideological platform of Pamyat's leaders. An unscrupulous mixture of clericalism and mysticism with "Leninism" is a characteristic feature of their statements. And not only theirs! There are even "theoretical" works appearing in our periodicals whose authors shamelessly claim Lenin as an ally, in the process expressing thoughts that are directly antithetical to both the spirit and the letter of Leninism.

I go out of the Kropotkin Street subway station, not in the direction of the Moscow Swimming Pool, which Pamyat hates and calls "the round ablution puddle" at its meetings, but in the opposite direction, toward Moscow City's Lenin Borough Party Committee. For certain reasons, the borough Party committee was forced to give space to Pamyat. Strange speeches, of which a brief summary is offered for the reader's attention, can be heard from the conference hall. ( . . . )

K. Andreyev, the chairman of Pamyat's council, says that the provision of space "is to the credit of the borough Party committee . . . . The news of this will travel across all of great Rus, to the glory of socialism and communism." In the speaker's firm opinion, we must improve people's attitude toward labor, and to do this we have to give the people's history back to them, but the history must be "rehabilitated." What does he mean? "I will work for the rehabilitation of our history. The people have had their history knocked out from under them. If you look at a calendar, there was an ice age or virgin soil in our land before 1917."

The people should know their history and their heroes, of course. Representatives of all trends of thought in our society agree on this. To know it, yes. But to know doesn't mean to exalt . . . . But now people are exalting various things. Every trend of thought exalts its own heroes, its own monuments, its own historical events and segments of history.

One trend exalts the Bolsheviks and democrats. Another, in contrast, exalts that which has no relation to the revolutionary struggle: abstract humanism and pluralism. A third lives in the 1930s. A fourth digs up and restores the olden times of Orthodoxy. Not just what is artistically beautiful (about which there are no arguments: it's necessary) but everything that is Orthodox and "holy." ( . . . )

O. Zhurin, a Pamyat council member, is next. In his words, "some figures have ignored Lenin by saying that culture is class-based." According to Zhurin, Lenin said that culture was class-based only before October [1917]; after October he began to say something else.

"There are patriotic forces, and there are pogrom forces." The "pogrom forces," in the speaker's words, were the ones who destroyed monuments. "All this was carried out in company with nasty little



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rhymes. Proletkult and the Union of Militant Atheists headed it up. There is no longer a single building from Pushkin's era in Pushkin Square. Pushkin has turned his back on Russia-symbolically!" (The speaker has in mind the Rossiya Movie Theater, in front of which the monument to Pushkin stands.)

Two people are specified by name as being culprits responsible for the drastic reduction in the number of churches in Moscow: "Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, who handled the reconstruction of Moscow [in the 1930s, under Stalin]. He said: 'All old cities were built haphazardly. When you walk around Moscow, you get the feeling that it was built by a drunken builder.' Also, Yaroslavsky (originally Gubelman), Chairman of the Union of Militant Atheists" [one of the chief Stalinist propagandists].

V. Vinogradov, a member of the [Pamyat] council, speaks. Once again, the speaker begins with Lenin's ideas. Then he moves on to Moscow as "the third Rome, the heavenly city." In view of the fact that Moscow is the third Rome, it is "the world's chief shrine."

Old Russian city planning was not understood by those who rebuilt Moscow. The architect Ginzburg said in the 1930s: "We must simply not invest any money but wait for deterioration over time." Now is the moment when the fatherland must be saved. The destruction of national shrines is being continued by accomplices to Kaganovich's crimes.

D. Vasilyev speaks: "The USSR State Committee for Agitation and Propaganda is sewing political labels on us. If this doesn't stop, we will have to restort to the criminal code's article on slander. A stream of cosmopolitanism has engulfed the mass news media. Rock groups are Satanism; they pledge allegiance to Satan!" ( . . . )

V. Shumsky runs onto the stage from the audience and talks ecstatically about V. Kozhinov's [nationalist] article [in the magazine *Moskva*] and proclaims:

We are for Leninism! What was destroyed was destroyed by the hands of Satan! I was struck by the fact that a great many of the designs for the monument on Poklonnaya Hill contained — Masonic and Zionist symbols, even fascist ones! That is how the werewolves of art act. Since New Year's, the Order of Lenin has disappeared from the cover of the magazine *Ogonyok*. Certain people are coming to us in Moscow from overseas by the thousands! Away with them! We don't need them here!

Everyone claps and shouts: "Away with them!" "Hail to the Russian people!"

D. Vasilyev resumes and proposes that K. Andreyev be nominated for the borough Soviet. A furor arises once again when the audience recalls the name of the hated key official with the patronymic "Moiseyevich." A tape of an interview with a Doctor Iosifovich had been played. The audience's reaction to such patronymics can be expressed in one simple sentence: "Ah, then everything is clear."



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It's interesting that the audience is not embarassed by the public playing of a secretly made tape recording. In my view, this is indecent. (. . . )

[On another occasion] Pamyat holds a meeting in one of Moscow's Palaces of Culture. The theme is "Your Civic Stance." D. Vasilyev speaks: (. . . )

I will give as brief an account of the speech as possible: Imperialism and Zionism are planting agents who breed bureaucracy. This enemy has ensconced itself everywhere and has driven us into a corner. Among those of us who are sitting in this hall, every third one is a genius, but the enemy has not allowed us to show our worth. Those who ruin the economy and science are given send-offs into retirement, but they ought to be put against the wall. They are the enemy. ( . . . )

Examples of Masonic-Zionist intrigues follow: Babies' jackets bearing a depiction of the moon are being sold in the stores. "The moon is a symbol of protection of the Jews." "You see? They are swaddling you and me in these swaddling clothes!" ( . . . )

On the whole, "a caste of thinkers has been created who insult us, yet live on the people's money." These thinkers themselves "don't know up from down" — all they can do is "desecrate our historical past." But what must be done now is not desecrate the past but "open the churches with the chiming of bells." Again, it is the non-Orthodox, the non-Russians, the Masons, who have "destroyed the Orthodox monuments."

Hold the newspapers up to the light! They write about the purity of the Dnepr's water, while showing through the other side of the page — if you hold it up to the light — is a skull! "That's what our press amuses itself with!" The headline reads "Lessons of Cernobyl" — but when it's held up to the light, you can see "It Ought to Become a Tradition." "This is material for the KGB!" The audience applauds. Everywhere in the newspapers are "encoded menorahs" and "six-pointed stars," and this "stands for the [Jewish] presence." Try squares and compasses are Masonic symbols. So are rectangles and squares. The number 33 is the sign of "a special Masonic initiation."

In conclusion, we must "close ranks to carry out the new political course" and wage a "final, decisive battle against bureaucratism — that hydra of world Masonry, Zionism and imperialism." "Brothers and sisters! We must unsheathe our weapons" and give battle to cleanse the country "of the black forces of evil. We've had enough!" ( . . . )

Let us undertake a firsthand analysis of Pamyat as a fact of public life. It is a manifestation of the many-sided attitudes of the petite bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is cosmopolitan, the small-scale property owner is nationalist, and the proletariat is internationalist. The ideology of the small-scale property owner is tenacious, and periodically there are great upsurges of it. In place of heroes, we are offered



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"saints." They refuse to see the class struggle; in place of it, it is proposed that we detect the scent of a "single national spirit" so strong that in one novel even a Chekist [i.e., a secret police officer] kills himself, unable to bear the death of White bandits *who are of his nationality*, although he has risked his life every minute to do away with them. ( . . . )

Pamyat should only gladden the Zionists, since it only plays into their hands; they have a reason to yell loudly about anti-Semitism in the USSR. ( . . . )

*The crusading zeal of Pamyat derives from a commingling of Orthodox Church theology, a mystical belief in the divinely appointed mission of the Russians, and an unorthodox form of Leninism. Pamyat adherents despise internationalism and attribute it to non-Russian, mostly Jewish, Bolshevik luminaries. They envision the Third Rome as a powerful military empire based on Christian morality. Writers associated with Pamyat frequently praise the Soviet Army's "liberating" role in Afghanistan. In their view, Soviet expansionism is vital and tolerance for other nations' freedom a sign of weakness. Pamyat has carried the arrogant ideology of the* nomenklatura *to a new extreme.*

*An obsession with the glorious past and talk of "alien vermin" is reminiscent of Nazi ideology. For Pamyat, Jews and Freemasons infect the Soviet system, and the group has established close connections with anti-Zionist propagandists. These include Vladimir Yakovlevich Begun, author of a recent book on Freemasonry; Valeriy Nikolayevich Yemelyanov, the linguist who wrote* samizdat *literature on the "Judeo-Masonic conspiracy" which will take over the USSR by the year 2000 (and who murdered his wife in April 1980); Yevgeniy Yevseev, author of* Fascism under the Blue *[i.e., Israeli]* Star*; Aleksandr Zakharovich Romanenko, anti-Zionist "expert" and author of* The Class Essence of Zionism*, a book that attributes plans of world supremacy to Zionists.*[7] *Not surprisingly, Pamyat regards the fraudulent* Protocols of the Elders of Zion *as a privileged source. Pamyat's unmitigated anti-Semitism reflects the traditional fantasies of the Russian extreme right.*

*Dmitriy Dmitrievich Vasilyev, who describes himself as a "journalist and photographic artist," is the group's main organizer and thinker. Other Pamyat activists include Kim Andreyev, chairman of Pamyat council, "worker" and party member; A. Chvalyuk, a senior draftsman at the special construction bureau of the Siberian branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences; Andrey Gorskiy, deputy chairman of the Commission for the Preservation of Monuments of the Russian Republic Union of Artists; D. Polyakov, founder of Novosibirsk Pa-*

[7] *Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report*, London, July 1987.



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*myat; Viktor Alexandrovich Vinogradov, an architect and chairman of the Moscow branch of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments.*

*Although Pamyat apparently began as an apolitical association in the early 1980s, it is now a conspiratorial group with a full-blown political structure, ambitions, and ideology. Pamyat originated within the Soviet Ministry of Aviation Industry as a discussion group concerned with the preservation of natural and historical monuments. It then expanded to other Moscow institutions and established a branch in Novosibirsk. Associated groups emerged in Sverdlovsk and Leningrad. Grigoriy Romanov, the Leningrad boss, encouraged nationalism in his fief, and although he was ousted by Gorbachev, Leningrad party officials remain in place and encourage the* Spasenie *(salvation) association.*

*Pamyat may only be in its embryonic stage, but its mere existence is unprecedented in Russia after 1917 — indeed, it contains the essence of a new political party. There are signs that the movement is becoming autonomous. Learning from Bolshevik experience, Pamyat values the role of centralized organization. Like a secret society, it has infiltrated Soviet institutions and appropriated many themes of the official doctrine; its adherents, for example, claim to be the only genuine supporters of the current politics of* perestroyka *(restructuring). The following article published in the weekly magazine* Ogonyok *unambiguously indicts Pamyat; its concluding lines link Pamyat directly to Stalin.*

WHAT ARE YOU MAKING SO MUCH NOISE ABOUT?
by Anatoliy Golovkov and Aleksey Pavlov[8]

( . . . ) The scene is a hall in one of Moscow's Palaces of Culture. Above the stage, written out in ornamental Slavic script, is the word "Pamyat." There are three banners, stylized as gonfalons: The first reads "When Moscow speaks, the whole country listens!"; the second says "Truth does not fear judgment!"; and the third reads "Courage every day!"

I have to say that no announcements were posted anywhere regarding the fact that the next meeting of the Pamyat historical and patriotic association would be held in the Dynamo Plant's House of Culture. However, right on time, the rather spacious hall was full to the rafters. At 7 p.m. sharp, "We Will Not Waver in the Battle for Our Capital" started coming from the loudspeakers, after which a "battle for the capital" began right on the stage.

The master of ceremonies, a young man named Nikolay, appeared and outlined in a few words the "full gravity of the situation" in which, in his opinion, "true patriots" find themselves. He paid

[8] *Ogonyok*, No. 21, May 1987, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, ibid., pp. 4-6.



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tribute to the courage of those who, in spite of everything, had gathered in that hall. He did not name outright the enemies from whom he so much feared persecution, but from all indications their power and possibilities were great. (We learned that some Pamyat activists had been "brutally beaten in broad daylight right on Gorkiy Street, with the complete connivance of the police [militia].") Nikolay called on the audience to continue standing firm against the pressure of the dark forces, and gave the floor to the first speaker.

The "worker-tribune" — that was how his function was designated — reported first of all: "The women at work tell me, 'You're such a modest man, like all Russian people.' " Moving on, he came right out with a home truth: "1941 has come into our lives, and we don't even itch!" This desperate statement failed to startle a great many people in the audience. He offered prophecies for about 10 more minutes about the enemies who are drawing the iron ring ever tighter. The speaker did not, in fact, name the enemies, but he was given an ovation. ( . . . )

Speakers followed one after the other, and we learned all the new details of a "monstrous conspiracy." The same "enemies" — still unnamed, however — are not only destroying monuments of olden days on the streets of Moscow, are not only forbidding the holding of evening gatherings on patriotic themes in the Central House of Artists and are not only imposing the "subversive lecture series 'Ancient Cities of Italy' " there, they are also building subway lines "in such a way that it will be possible to blow up highly important state institutions without difficulty." They are purposefully bringing epidemics to Moscow. ("How do they do it? Scientists have proven that the mellow chiming of Moscow's bells ionized the air, thereby destroying bacteria, but now that the churches have been razed. . . .")

We must confess that we didn't believe what we heard and recorded in our notebooks and on tape. But all this was only a prelude to the main number on the program: a speech by the "journalist and photographic artist" D. D. Vasilyev. He spoke for about three hours. "I don't know whether I will ever be able to appear before you again. I could wind up on the street with a broken head any minute. So every time I speak, I want to say everything that's on my mind." And he said it. In any case, the "enemies" were finally named, with all the straightforwardness of a "non-Party Bolshevik." ( . . . )

So, you see, those who are "to blame" for all our misfortunes and all our difficulties are "in every instance, international Zionism and the Masons." They, Vasilyev claims, "have penetrated all the pores of our social organism," having set themselves the joint goal of paralyzing it. And since the main obstacle to this is the national consciousness of the Russian people, those "chosen people" are capable of countering the diabolical machinations of an enemy who has gone too far. ( . . . )



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We realize the great responsibility we are undertaking in drawing this parallel, but it's difficult to shake off altogether the sensation that there is an amazing similarity between D. Vasilyev's "ideological aims" and the theorists of the Black Hundreds movement at the beginning of the century. ( . . . )

The "Appeal From the Pamyat Historical and Patriotic Association to the Russian People," adopted before our very eyes, is really something! Listen to this:

> The whole thrust of the Masons and Zionism in our country is directed against the Russian people and our fatherland. Be bolder in finding and naming the enemy's secret addresses. Seek out and promote the true leaders in our midst. Hold demonstrations and referendums throughout the country. Monitor the mass news media, identify the venal journalists and take action against them. The homeland is in danger! Courage every day!

Maniacal raving? But hundreds of people were listening! And just think how many cassette tapes of Vasilyev's speeches have spread through our cities and villages! ( . . .)

What kind of association is Pamyat? Where did it come from? In the early 1980s, the association was organized under the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry by people who set themselves the goal of halting the destruction of Moscow's historical and cultural monuments. A fine goal. We can remember, unfortunately, how wide a field of activity opened up before the enthusiasts at that time. After all, those whose official job it was to come to the defense of these monuments sometimes really did nothing at all. For that reason, people fell in behind Pamyat. Hundreds and thousands of people went to organized volunteer workdays and gathered at lectures at which specialists, historians and writers spoke.

Then the situation began to change, and people who had nothing to do with the aviation industry or with history turned up in the association's leadership. More and more energy began to go into a search for mythical enemies rather than into real matters. Then Pamyat moved to the Gorbunov Palace of Culture. But it was unable to stay there, either (after an evening meeting under the innocent title "Moscow, How Much There Is in That Name!"). The Party committee, after discussing the irresponsible speeches that had been given there, and taking into account the fact that there had been virtually no workers in the hall, denied Pamyat use of the building. The homeless association set off on its wanderings.

After the evening gathering at the Dynamo Plant's Palace of Culture, we telephoned its director: "Do you know what kind of an event you held?" "Of course, an evening for students of a cultural enlightenment school," the director answered readily. It turned out that one of the members of Pamyat, an instructor at that school, had easily duped the club's management. ( . . . )



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Using roughly the same arrangement, Pamyat tried to hold an evening gathering this February in a conference room of the Yunost Hotel . . . . The Yunost meeting did not take place because of technical reasons. True, those reasons seemed unconvincing to the "patriots" who had gathered near the hotel. Only the first secretary of the borough Party committee, who had come to the site, was able to assuage them. And he did so only after suggesting that they meet in the offices of the borough Party committee and discuss all the problems that had come up.

This meeting was conceived as a discussion of something that was really worth discussing: the preservation of historical memory and the attitude toward cultural values. The borough Party committee invited prominent scholars to participate in it. The caliber of the proposed discussion was determined by the participation in it of V. L. Yanin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Any person truly interested in Russian history would have considered it an honor and a rare stroke of luck to hear the director of the Novgorod Archaeological Expedition, one of the major specialists on Russian antiquities in the country. There are few to whom the memory of the fatherland owes so much as it does to Yanin, who has brought the voices of the past close to us.

It was unspeakably shameful that people who call themselves patriots in essence cut off V. L. Yanin's speech. We don't want to accuse all the members of Pamyat, but it's worthwhile pondering the fact that Vasilyev's illiterate expatiation on historical themes proved closer to their taste! But, strictly speaking, what is surprising about that, when the "photographic artist" has shamelessly described even Academician D. S. Likhachyov's activity as working for Zionism! That, among other things, has been reported by the newspaper *Vechernіy Sverdlovsk* in describing Vasilyev's recent visit to his kindred spirits in the Urals. The newspaper quoted from the Moscow traveler's revelations, which he made publicly.

"For Vasilyev," the newspaper writes, "the means of fighting for the preservation of national cultural property is war. Falling into hysterics, he literally howled that enemies of the people are all around, that they must be 'torn to pieces and thrown out the window,' and that 'we will grind into powder all those who stand in our way.' " ( . . . )

*Pamyat has powerful protectors because, after decades of torpor some party officials see Russian nationalism as the vehicle for regenerating Soviet patriotism. When 400 Pamyat supporters demonstrated in front of the Moscow Party Committee in May 1987, neither the police nor the KGB reacted. More surprising yet, Boris Yeltsin, the Moscow bailiff and a champion of* glasnost, *received the Pamyat's leaders and promised to consider recognizing the organization. These*



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*events suggest hesitation in the top Soviet leadership about dealing with this emerging force.*

*Pamyat has a role in struggles taking place at the very highest level of Soviet politics — otherwise its astonishing freedom of action cannot be explained. It has attacked Aleksandr Yakovlev, a Politburo member and party secretary, for a "lack of sensibility" to Russian national pride. Under Brezhnev, Yakovlev was critical of authoritarian cultural policy and publicly attacked the thesis of Russian superiority over other nations. His spectacular rise under Gorbachev has upset neo-Stalinists; Pamyat considers Yakovlev responsible for the current intellectual liberalism.*

*Yegor Ligachev, Yakovlev's chief rival within both the Politburo and the Central Committtee's Secretariat, is Pamyat's hero. He is widely regarded as the candidate of the neo-Stalinists to replace Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary. Ligachev, an air engineer with strong personal connections to the Pamyat network within the the Ministry of Aviation Industry, has repeatedly warned against the exploitation of* glasnost *for "anti-Soviet purposes."*

*Some party leaders have noticed the dangerous implications of Pamyat activities. An expert in semiconductors in the Siberian academic center of Akademgorodok, A. Kazantsev, was expelled from the party for involvement in Pamyat actions. According to a newspaper report, he had slandered party and government officials in lectures "full of provocative and fabricated materials."*[9] *Unofficial reports from Moscow state that Kazantsev accused two of Gorbachev's closest economic advisers, Academicians Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegyan, of being Zionists and supporters of Masons. An* Izvestia *article sums up the official assessment of Pamyat activities.*

WHERE DOES PAMYAT LEAD?
by G. Alimov and R. Linev[10]

( . . . ) In Moscow and certain other cities, the informal association called Pamyat is announcing its presence more and more loudly. It is a historical and patriotic association, as its activists emphasize. In a number of places it has held a series of evening gatherings dealing with special themes, and in early May in the center of Moscow, on the square next to the Manezh [Central Exhibition Hall], its activists held a demonstration that the press has already reported. They carried signs demanding official recognition for Pamyat and a stop to the work on Poklonnaya Hill (in point of fact, it had already stopped). There were also signs reading: "The memory of the People Is Sacred!" and "Down With the Saboteurs of Restructuring!"

[9] *Sovetskaya Rossyia*, June 28, 1987.
[10] *Izvestia*, June 3, 1987, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, ibid., pp. 6-7 and 27.



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In the ranks of the demonstrators, one man stood out, the one who gave the orders: "Take your places! Hold up the signs! Banners of Russia, forward march!" Curious Muscovites and visitors to the capital, including some foreigners, addressed questions to him — it was D. Vasilyev, one of Pamyat's leaders: "What sort of a demonstration is this?" they asked. He replied that those who had come to the square were "the people — the courageous part of the people," who no longer have the strength to put up with the bureaucrats and other enemies who "are destroying our history and our culture." ( . . . )

All anyone had to do was doubt the conclusions drawn by D. Vasilyev and company, and the cry went up: "Comrades! He's a CIA agent, don't listen to him!"

Jumping ahead somewhat, let us say that our questions, journalists' questions, to the members of Pamyat were also considered by the leadership to be "provocative and improper," and, on that basis, it decreed that there were to be no contacts with us. ( . . . )

On that day, B. N. Yeltsin, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, received the participants in the demonstration in the offices of the Moscow City Soviet, heard them out, and answered their questions. They left the meeting satisfied. Someone even recalled: "It's no coincidence that today is the day of St. George the Victorious!"

However, even after this, Pamyat's leadership has continued to complain that malicious cock-and-bull stories are being spread about it. Who would need to do that? Enemies. In order to besmirch Pamyat. ( . . . )

Pamyat's leaders tried to convince us of this during an interview held in D. Vasilyev's apartment on the Sadovoye Ring. The apartment in which our conversation took place reminded one of a museum. On the walls were icons, paintings and old photographs, including some royalty and Stolypin — yes, the same Stolypin who is remembered by the people for his "neckties": the gallows. On the table was a volume of V. I. Lenin's works, open to the spot where Ilyich's letter on the need to punish bureaucrats more severely is printed. (. . .)

Everything here was serious. As it should be in an organization one of whose aims is "To affirm the way of life that is the essence of the nation."

All our questions were answered, primarily by the master of the house; the rest of the group — including the chairman of the association's council, K. Andreyev, a worker who is a CPSU member, as Vasilyev constantly emphasizes — listened, joining in only occasionally. We were constantly given to understand that our conversation was not between equals, and that much would become clearer to us when we listened to recordings of Pamyat meetings, felt their at-



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mosphere and became at least somewhat "initiated." We listened to these recordings and met with members of Pamyat (until their leadership imposed the ban on meetings that we mentioned earlier). What can one say?

After listening to a recording of such a meeting or attending one, a serious historian would have to admit that the professional, scientific level of the discussion is not very high. This is manifested both in the fragmentary nature of the information that the participants in the meetings take on faith and in the absence of any sort of debate. The version put forth is offered as the highest truth. The atmosphere that is created is one of mental blinders, one that admits no doubts. Isn't this the reason that some members of Pamyat and people close to it can be heard saying: "Debate? What for? We've been listening for 20 years. Now let somebody listen to us." ( . . . )

Here is what happened at Pamyat's evening gathering on the theme "Moscow — How Much There Is in That Word," which brought together several hundred people. First, the traditional call letters: Pealing bells and a brass band. Then a film on the capital's surviving architectural monuments. Later, an architect told about the damage that had been done to the capital's appearance at various times for various reasons. ( . . . )

D. Vasilyev took the floor . . . . [He said:] "Underlying all the troubles described above, and others as well, is only one thing; the action of secret hostile forces. What forces? Listen." And we hear from the stage whole chunks of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which many of those sitting in the hall never heard of before. ( . . . )

Historians find the authenticity of the *Protocols* so doubtful they don't even consider it necessary to thoroughly investigate the story of the appearance of this "document" — a dark story rooted in the intrigues of international adventures and literary imitators of the last century, in the tricks of the Okhranka [the tsarist secret police], and in the atmosphere of religious mysticism that thickly shrouded the imperial court at that time. ( . . . )

In short, the *Protocols* had taken a long, tortuous and dirty path before they began to be heard from Pamyat's rostrum and became, for its adherents, one of the keys to a "genuine" understanding of the past, present and future of the country in which you and I live. And what a key they became! The *Protocols* for example, talk about underground passageways "in all the capitals, from which they will be blown up with all their organizations and the countries' documents" (!). D. Vasilyev makes the following comments on these lines to the participants in an evening gathering: "When I read these *Protocols*, I suddenly looked with horror at a map of Moscow's subway lines. All the principal transfer stations are located under Party and government institutions!"



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The audience is excited. Someone protests, but he is immediately forced to stop talking and leave the meeting, the participants in which now "know" exactly who is destroying Moscow and why, where its "trade mafia," headed by the convicted Tregubov, came from, who protected it and why — everything has been explained, everything has come out into the open, and it must not be tolerated any longer! They file out to the strains of the march "To the Attack in Ranks of Steel." ( . . . )

In talking with the people who come to hear the "revelations" of Vasilyev and the other leaders of Pamyat, one senses that they are genuinely troubled by many real problems. But at the same time, they take an attitude of surprisingly insouciant trust toward the strange world of high-flown words that Pamyat's leadership creates around itself, a world in which almost all aspects of the ambient world are filled with some kind of subtext related to the action of those same "dark forces." . . . The hand of the secret forces even edits the speeches of the General Secretary, abbreviating everything good that is said about the Russian people. ( . . . )

There is no denying that the development of openness and the expansion of democracy are yielding various fruits. Among them are such fruits as clamorous, "coarse" self-expression and the claim — the draft charter for Pamyat indicates this — to the creation of a kind of new political organization that claims the right to establish monitoring over anything and everything but takes virtually no responsibility and has a rigid structure. ( . . . )

*As Gorbachev strives to market the shining face of* glasnost, *Pamyat's success reminds us that the ghost of Russian autocracy still very much haunts the Kremlin.*



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# Brief Reviews

## THE UNITED STATES

*America Outside the World: The Collapse of U.S. Foreign Policy.* Louis Rene Beres.

*Biographical Dictionary of the American Left.* Bernard K. Johnpoll and Harvey Klehr, eds.

*Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement.* Douglas C. Waller.

*Containment: Concept and Policy.* Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.

*"Democracy is in the Streets": From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago.* James Miller.

*Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Issues and Responses.* R. J. Vincent, ed.

*Human Rights and International Relations.* R.J. Vincent.

*Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Relations.* Stanley Hoffmann.

*Pentagon Games: Wargames and the American Military.* John Prados.

*Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years.* Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb.

*Today's American: How Free?* James Finn and Leonard R. Sussman, eds.

*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.* Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds.

## INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

*The Costs of Default.* Anatole Kaletsky.

*Economic Policy and Development.* Tashio Shishido and Ryuzo Sato, eds.

*How the West Grew Rich.* Nathan Rozenberg and L.E. Birdzell, Jr.

*Land Reform and Democratic Development.* Roy Prosterman and Jeffery Riedinger.

*Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of the Organized Textile Trade.* Vinod Aggarwal.

*The Political Economy of International Money.* Loukas Tsoukalis, ed.

## WAR STUDIES

*The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons.* Shaun Gregory.

*The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1914-1918.* Paul G. Halpern.

*Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance.* Richard K. Betts.

*Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations.* Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Robert S. Litwak, eds.

*Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense.* Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David Yost, eds.

*A Thoroughly Efficient Navy.* William W. Kauffman.

## THE MIDDLE EAST

*Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon.* Augustus Richard Norton.

*Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land.* David K. Shipler.

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*Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance.* Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler.

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*The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis.* Efraim Karsh.



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*Religious Strife in Egypt.* Nadia Ramsis Farah.

*The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration.* David B. Nissman.

*Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf.* Joshua M. Epstein.

*The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax.* Faik Ökte.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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*The Chinese Army After Mao.* Ellis Joffe.

*Japan Re-armed.* Malcolm McIntosh.

*Pakistan: A Nation in the Making.* Shahid Javed Burki.

*Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy.* S.J. Tambiah.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

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*Gorbachev.* Zhores A. Medvedev.

*Gorbachev's Challenge.* Marshall I. Goldman.

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*Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union: A Historical and Statistical Handbook.* Shirin Akiner.

*The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia.* Martin Walker.

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*Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua.* Thomas W. Walker.

*The Real Secret War: Sandinista Political Warfare and its Effects on Congress.* L. Francis Bouchey, J. Michael Waller and Steve Baldwin, eds.

*Sendero Lunminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* James Anderson.



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THE UNITED STATES
by Adam M. Garfinkle

**America Outside the World: The Collapse of U.S. Foreign Policy**. By Louis Rene Beres. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987. 163 pp. $19.95. *Trahison des clercs* is not what it was during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, but anyone who doubts that it still exists should take a look at *America Outside the World*. Consider this sample: American foreign policy is "deformed and misdirected" because of its "Sovietophobia. . .From Washington and Madison Avenue (they are actually the same place) we witness the endless recitation of fantasy dressed up as fact." Or this: "The barbarians are not outside the gate. They are ourselves." Beres perceives a deep social sickness born of inauthentic values and alienation that can only be rectified by "rejecting the futile dynamics of partisan politics as a delusion . . ." for normal politics "can only consecrate our flirtations with the apocalypse." In each topic Beres takes up — South Africa, Central America, the Middle East, terrorism, and genocide — the message is the same. Because it is so sick inside, the United States has become the enemy of mankind. Wherever American power is felt, innocent and decent people suffer. His revisionist logic is manifest: when the United States errs, it errs by choice; when enemies of the United States act badly, they do so because the United States forces them to. A purer example of delusionary political masochism is hard to find.

**Biographical Dictionary of the American Left**. Edited by Bernard K. Johnpoll and Harvey Klehr. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986. 489 pp. $65.00. This valuable reference work brings together data on hundreds of individuals and institutions. Entries reveal the human side of the interminable schisms and small publications that have littered the American left's history. Useful bibliographic information about the subjects is provided. Fascinating appendices group subjects by ethnic origin, party affiliation, and date of birth; and a final list catalogues those who abandoned the radical left.

Some contributors show too much sympathy for their subjects, but the editors maintain a scrupulously dispassionate tone. Occasional errors of detail appear, but these are small. All variants of leftist radicalism are included, but only activists — not intellectuals — are included. The New Left receives only capricious attention. The editors included many media celebrities but ignored some of those who organized; hence, Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman are in; Norma Becker and Sidney Peck are out. Perhaps a second edition will set this defect aright.



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**Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement**. By Douglas C. Waller, with a foreword by Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. 368 pp. $30.00 ($12.95, paper). A former aide to Representative Ed Markey describes the nuclear freeze movement from a pro-freeze viewpoint within the Congress. His book mostly chronicles congressional wrangling over the nuclear freeze resolution. Although the narrative offers many revealing details, it omits an entire dimension — the effort of congressmen to ride the freeze issue for personal and partisan political gain. According to Waller, freeze supporters have no dirty laundry. The author fails to note the radical leftist roots of the freeze movement; to him, everybody is a "liberal" or a "reformer." He ignores the broader social and political context, and caricatures anti-freeze advocates as dark messengers of evil. He wrongly claims the freeze forced Ronald Reagan to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Curiously, nowhere does Waller defend the freeze proposition on logical grounds.

*Congress and the Nuclear Freeze* is neither scholarly, balanced, comprehensive, nor persuasive. But it does show how radical impulses in American politics enter mainstream institutions. And it displays the pathology of some liberal arms control advocates who oversimplify the issues and assume that those who disagree with them are either stupid or in the thrall of the military-industrial complex. This syndrome accounts for the infuriating golly-aren't-we-wonderful language that suffuses both the book and the dustjacket praise from Carl Sagan, Mark O. Hatfield, and Paul Warnke.

**Containment: Concept and Policy**. Two Volumes. Edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986. 746 pp. $22.00. The National Defense University has provided thirty-two original essays on containment that include such illustrious authors as Henry Beinen, Lynn E. Davis, Alton Frye, Selig Harrison, Jerry Hough, Ole Holsti, Catherine Kelleher, George Kennan, Norman Podhoretz, George Quester, Eugene Rostow, Dimitri Simes, Howard Wiarda, and Donald Zagoria. In addition, Walt Rostow, Eugene Rostow, Dean Rusk, Clark Clifford, and U. Alexis Johnson comment on Kennan's lead essay.

Vietnam is the dog that did not bark. Even essays on Asia mention the war only in passing, although it was clearly the major dénouement of containment after a quarter century as the U.S. foreign-policy consensus. Though still a vital part of the U.S. foreign-policy discourse, containment has never been the same since Lyndon Johnson's speech of March 31, 1968. The failure to appreciate and address this widely recognized truth is a strange lapse.

Most essays — good, mediocre and tedious — are historically oriented and basic, suggesting that these volumes may be used as a text



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in undergraduate courses on postwar U.S. foreign policy. For a more advanced audience, the theme is too diffuse. Containment, after all, is virtually synonymous with U.S. foreign policy since 1947. In the end these volumes are therefore about everything, and everything is too much even for a 746-page book to cover.

**"Democracy is in the Streets": From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago.** By James Miller. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 431 pp. $19.95. *"Democracy is in the Streets"* offers a personal tale of the Students for a Democratic Society between 1962 and 1968. It is personal both because the author was there and because the book focuses on personalities like Tom Hayden, Al Haber, Richard Flacks, Paul Booth and Paul Potter. There is new material in the book, though it is of uncertain significance, and bound to be of uneven interest.

*"Democracy is in the Streets"* is a contribution to the history of SDS and the political youth culture of the 1960s if only because most other books are so poor in thought or so distant in experience. Miller is marginally more thoughtful and less emotional about SDS than previous histories by Kirkpatrick Sale, Urwin Unger, Alan Adelson and others. He is contrite mainly over tactical excess and the foibles of youth, but is not critical, in essence, of "participatory democracy" or of its current reduced incarnations (such as Hayden's notion of "economic democracy"). The author's personal "location" limits his objectivity but it does provide the reader with an important glimpse of the subjective experience that is invaluable to understanding this period. Like many once active in SDS, Miller has broken intellectually with the volcanic narcissism of the time, but his emotions are ineluctably tied to the memories of exuberant youth.

**Human Rights and International Relations.** By R.J. Vincent. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 186 pp. $34.50 ($12.95, paper); and **Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Issues and Responses.** Edited by R.J. Vincent. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 283 pp. $39.50. R.J. Vincent, a fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, informs these two books with a single thesis: the human rights question challenges the realist conception and practice of international relations. Realism, through the principle of non-interference, holds to a pluralistic definition of rights, i.e., those of individuals within the state as that state defines them, and those of states as international law and practice define them. Human rights issues muddy this distinction and cast a shadow not only on realism but on other political doxies as well. With a refreshing respect for precise philosophical language, Vincent shows that the "revolutionary" and the "conservative" approaches both view human rights as disguised interests. He attacks both and rejects cultural relativism, insisting that human



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rights have an ontological basis in themselves, and that no one can talk about them with a single voice and vocabulary.

The essay is contemplative and balanced but the edited volume does not meet Vincent's own standards. Most of the essays are unimaginative, with the one on "Palestine" by Sally Morphet of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in particular, pedantic in the extreme. As a group, the contributors failed to understand their editor's challenge.

**Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Relations**. By Stanley Hoffmann. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 457 pp. $39.95. Hoffmann has acquired a reputation as a most eminent and accomplished scholar of international relations. Here he collects twenty essays written over twenty-five years on philosophical, theoretical, and policy-oriented topics. All but five of the essays have appeared in English in other places.

Hoffmann divides the volume into five parts, but it really contains two different kinds of essays. In the first, Stanley Hoffmann the professor offers discourses on epistemological and methodological questions that concern the study of international relations. Here he is the sober European-educated traditionalist who writes on international relations as an intellectual endeavor, international law, the problem of intervention, Rousseau, Morgenthau, and Aron. Next comes Hoffmann the liberal partisan and polemicist who urges trust in existential deterrence, less worrying about the Soviet Union, and more pushing of America's allies toward "human rights." Though controversial, Hoffmann is usually civil and always consistent — neither his style nor his views have changed much in the last quarter century. The reader could more easily investigate this consistency if the book had an index.

**Pentagon Games: Wargames and the American Military**. By John Prados. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 81 pp. $9.95 (paper). In this folio-sized book, the author of *The Soviet Estimate* (1982) has not given us the definitive intellectual analysis of wargaming. But no one has done that. What he has done in six succinct and suggestive chapters is to provide probably the best, most readable primer available on the subject.

Prados puts wargaming into contemporary policy context. Then, recounting its historical development, he zeros in on nuclear weapons. The author dabbles competently at an elementary level in the esoterica of game theory and explores the implications of the recent computerization of wargames. His conclusion includes a three-part warning: do not allow the realism and emotional engrossment of gaming to obscure the epistemological problems of simulation; do



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not suppose that computerization can solve these problems; and do not imagine that gaming can ever substitute for field maneuvers.

Prados, a professional designer of wargames, includes three playable and intriguing games in the book. The first, a budget game called "Pentagon: Monopoly in the Military," is perfect for frustrated OMB workers. The second, a broader bureaucratic game called "The R&D Game: Congressional Chutes and Ladders," seems to be designed for ambitious congressional staffers. Finally, he includes a dour mini-max game called "Last Days of Saigon: Playing to Break Even," which one hopes will prove of no practical use in the future.

**Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years.** By Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1987. 495 pp. $24.95. Conventional knowledge has it that aside from the Glassboro Summit and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, not much happened with respect to arms control during the Johnson presidency. *Stemming the Tide* corroborates this view; it tells of marginal approaches, abortive proposals, and preoccupation with other subjects. But the period between the Partial Test Ban in 1963 and the beginning of serious negotiations leading to SALT I in 1969 was not entirely barren, and Seaborg's memoir fills a substantial gap here, particularly on the quest for a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban. He also offers some new information on the origins of SALT. Unfortunately, Seaborg, who was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission throughout this period, tells little about signed agreements concerning space and the seabed. His perspective on larger issues is necessarily selective from having sat in the AEC as opposed to State or Defense or the White House.

What stands out from Seaborg's account is the conceptual and bureaucratic continuity from the end of the Kennedy period into the Nixon years. Also noteworthy is the complete absence of hysteria in the Democratic party about not having signed a major arms control agreement with the Soviets. Though Seaborg does not admit it, one suspects that he and other liberals lived easily without arms control in those days because the United States enjoyed a healthy margin of strategic superiority. This makes the urgent call for a return to arms control in Seaborg's conclusion ring oddly.

**Today's American: How Free?** Edited by James Finn and Leonard R. Sussman. New York: Freedom House, 1986. 178 pp. $15.00. A dozen essays by the board and staff of Freedom House celebrate the forty-fifth anniversary of the organization's founding in 1941 by the estimable George Field to fight isolationism. The struggle continues, but this volume is not one of its best weapons. However illustrious the authors — and they include Zbigniew Brzezinski, Leo Cherne, John Diebold, Sidney Hook, Max Kampelman, Morton Kondracke,



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John Riehm, Burns Roper, the late Bayard Rustin, Paul Seabury, and Philip van Slyck — the book is uneven and unsatisfying.

The authors are candid and clearheaded about the challenges to American freedoms but their topics are disparate and have only glancing relevance to the question raised in the title. More problematic is that most essays lack an interesting thesis; they tend to contain little more than remarks on rarified politico-moral topics. Some of the essays are better than others; those by Rustin, Hook, and Brzezinski, in particular, are worthy — though all three have done better elsewhere.

**Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy**. Edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 715 pp. $49.50 (paper). Some claim that the Reagan era has witnessed a shift from authoritarian toward more pluralistic forms of government, notably in Latin America. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* offers a timely and valuable contribution to this discussion. The volume contains four sections — Southern Europe, Latin America, Comparative Perspectives, and Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies — each of which is separately available in paperback. (This leads to a small annoyance: the volume is not editorially integrated. Page numbers start over with each of the four sections, indices are divided in four, and there is no composite bibliography.)

The authors, all specialists, clearly know their topics; this assures considerable data and ample background; but reading the case studies is a tedious task. The first two sections serve best as a reference work. The third section aspires to assessment and prognosis, and while not all the authors rise to the occasion, some (notably L. Whitehead and A. Przeworski) do very impressively. The last section, by O'Donnell and Schmitter, is the most intriguing and suggestive. The authors attempt to compose new concepts for assessing democratization as a cross-cultural phenomenon. Their arguments may be right or wrong, but to focus intently on this topic and to raise so many new questions is very important.

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## INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

**The Costs of Default**. By Anatole Kaletsky. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1985. 116 pp. $7.00. Writers on Third World debt too often treat default like a black hole; once approached, all sorts



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of strange things happen and disaster is inevitable. Kaletsky's monograph has this merit: it treats default as an extreme policy option, subject to the usual calculus of costs and benefits. Unfortunately, Kaletsky does not take his analysis much further. He ignores the many nuances of the defaulting process. As some Third World governments have discovered, why repudiate debt and risk the wrath of the industrialized nations' governments and banks when one can simply stop paying, all the while assuring the banks that payment has only been temporarily suspended until a more orderly rescheduling in line with the country's capacity to pay can be arranged? Furthermore, Kaletsky seriously underestimates the costs of default for borrowing governments. Practically the only cost he considers is a 5 to 10 percent penalty on trade, stemming from the need to arrange more expensive trade credits when banks become leery of dealing with a defaulter. More important is likely to be market access. The heavily indebted countries depend on negotiated agreements for access to industrialized markets on favorable terms. These agreements could become a pressure point to force Third World governments back to the bargaining table.

**Economic Policy and Development**. Edited by Toshio Shishido and Ryuzo Sato. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1985. 320 pp. $32.00. Some very distinguished American and Japanese economists dedicated this series of essays to the former foreign minister Saburo Okita. The twenty contributions examine trade policy, economic development, industrial policy, and the Japanese experience. A common thread in most of the essays is the advantages of export-led growth. Gerald Meier dissects arguments that the East Asian economic miracles cannot be reproduced because industrial countries would block access to their markets. Toshio Watanabe analyzes the impact of export industries on expansion of the domestic market in Korea. Other essays represent a broad range of issues of contemporary economics, including the most cogent presentation by Lester Thurow of his argument for industrial policy in the United States. The articles on Japan focus on technology absorption and development, including Ryuzo Sato's thesis that Japan's "imitation strategy" is a universal approach to technology competition and that Japan's uniqueness is only in its success at this standard tactic.

**How the West Grew Rich**. By Nathan Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, Jr. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 335 pp. $19.50. In the context of current debates on how to make economies more dynamic — whether in the Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, Britain, or the United States — Rosenberg and Birdzell present convincing evidence that innovation is the key to wealth. Western societies promoted experiment in technology and organization through wide diffusion



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of authority and resources, freedom to experiment, and an effective reward system. Due weight is given in the account to the moral codes and political institutions that allowed market relations to flourish. Alternate explanations of the West's growth, mostly by neo-Marxists, are nicely summarized in the introduction. The authors are respected economic historians, well-versed in their field, and present this broad thesis in a straightforward style without a mass of footnotes or references. The main reservation about the analysis as a guide to contemporary policy is whether the changes in the world economic environment brought on by the development of the Western economies make the techniques used by the West inapplicable today.

**Land Reform and Democratic Development**. By Roy Prosterman and Jeffery Riedinger. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. 303 pp. $29.50. Prosterman and Riedinger tackle a burning question of the 1960s: can land reform reduce the risk of communist takeover while simultaneously promoting growth? Their response shows little awareness of the developments in Third World agriculture and associated research in the last twenty years. One of the most surprising features of agricultural development has been the gap between the tremendous production increases in some countries and the stagnation in other areas. Many researchers ascribe this difference not to land reform but to factors that Prosterman and Riedinger barely mention, such as unrealistic government-set prices, heavy tax burdens on rural producers, and unrealistic exchange rates that make imports scarce (and thus unreliable). Are governments that concentrate their scant resources on land reform capable simultaneously of pursuing policy initiatives for democratic development? After all, land reform has often been difficult to implement both technically and politically. Perhaps land reform is a cost-effective approach, but one would never know from this book.

**Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade**. By Vinod Aggarwal. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 292 pp. $27.50 ($9.95, paper). Aggarwal has clearly done his homework on the history of textile trade agreements since World War II, interviewing officials and researching archives. From this information, one would have hoped for a book that analyzed (1) whether "organized trade" prevents a slide from liberal trade into protectionism or promotes it; (2) how GATT, an organization devoted to freeing trade, has come to legitimate a variety of trade restraints; (3) the actual impact of agreements on trade flows, given that trade seems to have evolved in recent decades in much the direction the agreements were meant to prevent; or (4) the interaction, in the determination of trade policy in each country, of domestic and international considerations. Unfortunately, Aggarwal provides almost



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none of this. Besides a narrative, his work is largely confined to upholding the usefulness of the "international regimes" approach to political science theory. One hopes that other political scientists can do more to show those outside their discipline the usefulness of their theories.

**The Political Economy of International Money**. Edited by Loukas Tsoukalis. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985. 304 pp. No price given. The title of this research project carried out by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London could mislead a potential reader. The contributors to this volume are all European (six British, six Continental); and the essays are about exchange rates and monetary policy, with essentially no treatment of such popular topics as Third World debt or financial innovation and deregulation. A theme of dissatisfaction with the existing system of floating exchange rates emerges — without clear agreement on what could replace it. The authors hope closer coordination among the major powers can achieve greater stability in exchange rates but present no clear means to that end. John Williamson shows nicely that the academic theorists bear their full share of responsibility for the current situation: their advice was solicited and heeded, and they were not particularly perceptive about the effects of their proposals. Without the intellectual vigor of a Ronald McKinnon or the clear policy advice of a Robert Roosa, the interest of these essays lies in their revelation that European thinking on exchange rates differs little from the American.

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## WAR STUDIES
by John Maurer

**The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons**. By Shaun Gregory. University of Bradford: Peace Research Report Number 13, 1986. 146 pp. No price given. A cottage industry has grown up to examine the command, control, and warning systems of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. Much less attention has been given to the systems that direct the nuclear forces of Britain, China, and France. Because these powers might well be the first to use nuclear weapons, this is an important topic. Gregory analyzes Britain's arrangements for controlling nuclear weapons in this fascinating study and concludes that the sophistication of its command arrangements lags significantly behind the weapons those arrangements control. This vulnerability jeopardizes the viability of Britain's independent deterrent. Without major improvements, for example, the early warning



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systems and command communications of the new Trident system will remain vulnerable to Soviet attack. It is to be hoped that this highly recommended study will spur analyses of the command and control systems for French and Chinese nuclear forces — as well as changes in the British system.

**The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1914-1918**. By Paul G. Halpern. Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1987. 651 pp. $29.95. The author of *The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908-1914* has written a sequel that chronicles the naval campaigns in the Mediterranean during the First World War. Based on archival research in six countries, this study brings a wealth of new information on a neglected topic. Halpern provides a succinct and authoritative account of the initial operations in the Mediterranean and of the campaign by British and French forces in 1915 to break through the Dardanelles and knock Turkey out of the war. The most striking feature of Halpern's narrative is the role played by national jealousies in preventing an allied pooling of resources in waging war. In particular, he provides an informative study of the incredible lack of coordination between the navies of Britain, France, and Italy in fighting German and Austrian submarine attacks against Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. His study suggests what problems the Atlantic Alliance might face in case of conflict with the Soviet Union.

**Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance**. By Richard K. Betts. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987. 240 pp. $28.95 ($10.95, paper). What is the diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons during a confrontation? Does nuclear superiority matter in a diplomatic showdown between great powers? These questions lie at the center of this first-rate study on nuclear brinkmanship. Based on recently declassified documents and building on case studies of past crises, Betts illustrates how decision makers in the United States used nuclear threats to support diplomatic ends. The result is a useful survey of Cold War crises that enriches strategic theory by making concrete such notions as compellance and deterrence. Betts attempts to relate the nuclear balance to political decision making during a confrontation, and he argues that the arrival of nuclear parity between the superpowers has "changed the behavior of [U.S.] leaders less than is often assumed." Meanwhile, for the Soviet leadership, nuclear parity decreased the threat posed by U.S. attempts at coercive diplomacy, thereby permitting a more active Soviet foreign policy in the Third World. Consequently, a confrontation between the superpowers runs the dangerous risk of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons, because neither side is clearly inferior to the other at the strategic nuclear level. It is likely that neither will back down and accept a Fashoda-like foreign-policy defeat. Betts's sober judgments about con-



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tinued reliance on nuclear threats is a useful reminder of dangers inherent in diplomatic brinkmanship.

**Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations**. Edited by Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Robert S. Litwak. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987. 232 pp. $29.95 ($16.95, paper). Current debate about strategic defenses is sometimes said to be but a pale imitation of a debate during the Johnson and Nixon administrations over the deployment of the ABM systems. This superb collection of essays proves that contention to be entirely untrue. Of particular value is Benjamin S. Lambeth's assessment of Soviet views on strategic defenses; he shows that strategic defense is a long-term goal of Moscow, and that it receives intense study and a commitment of considerable resources. Lambeth cautions, however, that Soviet pronouncements on strategic defense must be viewed within the context of a "parallel emphasis on the indispensibility of overwhelming offensive forces." Kevin N. Lewis argues that the United States cannot ignore the importance of offensive force modernization in the debate over deterrence and the shift to a defense dominant strategic environment. In the near term, offensive forces remain the decisive weapons in the deterrent, and any period of defense transition will rest on the stability of the balance of these forces. In a critique of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Charles Glaser argues that an orderly transition in the strategic balance permitting defenses to dominate nuclear weapons is not feasible. Indeed, he considers SDI a provocation. David Yost provides a useful net assessment of strategic defenses in the Soviet-American relationship, neatly cataloging the principal Soviet objections to SDI. He reminds us that the U.S.-Soviet geopolitical contest will remain even if defense dominates the strategic balance; this means that deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals are likely to require increases in conventional forces.

**Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense**. Edited by Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David Yost. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. 381 pp. $35.00. The interaction of strategic thinking, technological innovation, weapons programs, and war planning creates a complex tangle of policy options. This valuable collection of essays, edited by three respected strategic analysts, examines the potential impact of new technologies on the strategic balance. Albert Wohlstetter weaves together an overall assessment of the dynamic changes taking place in the strategic balance. He skillfully examines the interaction between offense and defense in the strategic balance. Fine essays by Notra Trulock and Dennis Ghormly assess Soviet operational doctrine for the limited use of nuclear weapons and for offensive strikes against targets in Western Europe. David Yost provides a



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superb examination of Soviet strategic defenses. He makes the important, but often neglected, point that Soviet strategic defense efforts can indirectly draw resources away from the conventional defense of Western Europe. Soviet strategic defenses reduce the credibility of the British and French nuclear deterrents, and these countries must undertake expensive modernizations to maintain the relative effectiveness of their nuclear forces. The modernization programs then strain British and French defense budgets, forcing economies in improvements of conventional forces. Fred Hoffman elegantly argues for an increased emphasis on strategic defenses in U.S. strategy. This volume is an important addition to the debate over U.S. strategy.

**A Thoroughly Efficient Navy**. By William W. Kaufmann. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987. 147 pp. $8.95 (paper). Has the commitment of the Reagan administration to build a 600-ship navy been a major strategic blunder and waste of resources? Yes, according to Kaufmann. He castigates the navy's inability to "define realistic missions and fulfill them with fewer than 600 ships" and argues that a smaller force would be sufficient to meet U.S. global commitments and achieve allied strategic objectives in the event of a superpower conflict.

There are several major flaws with this analysis. First, it is not that the navy has failed to define a mission for itself in case of a war with the Soviet Union, but that Kaufmann disagrees with that mission and wants to reduce U.S. naval forces so they cannot fulfill it. Second, the navy's missions cannot be so clearly defined as those of ground forces. The navy must be prepared for the broadest spectrum of contingencies, from police actions to nuclear strikes. Between these extremes lie countless missions. More ships, obviously, help carry out this wide range of tasks. Third, Kaufmann's small fleet would be less capable of responding to crises in the Third World while maintaining the U.S.-Soviet balance of forces at sea. The Soviet Union has put considerable resources into the building of its fleet over the past two decades, and turmoil in the Third World requires the availability of U.S. naval forces. No one should want to return to the condition of the 1979-1981 period, when the fleet was strategically overextended.



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## THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

**Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon**. By Augustus Richard Norton. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1987. 238 pp. $25.00 ($10.95, paper). The author's indulgence in the classic sins of a novice book writer distract from his useful analysis. The first person pronoun appears regularly, and most distressingly, other authors' efforts are dismissed as "reportorial myopia," "opportunistic," "self-deceiving," and "piffle." Norton indulges in frequent references to his own articles (including even a 750-word op-ed piece), and his study exudes an unwholesome tone of arrogance.

But if the reader can inure himself to these deficiencies he will learn much about the recent rise to power of the Lebanese Shi'is. Rejecting the common notion that it was the Iranian revolution that caused this once disorganized community to find itself politically, Norton argues that "the present activism of the Lebanese Shi'a is the result of a long process of modernization." He emphasizes the uprooting of the Shi'a from their traditional ways and shows how the civil war intensified this process. Looking to the future, he sees an inexorable process of partition in Lebanon.

**Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land**. By David K. Shipler. New York: Times Books, 1986. 596 pp. $22.50. Shipler's *Arab and Jew* follows in the new tradition of the *New York Times*'s foreign correspondents writing long, anecdotal, and lyrically styled books on the subject of their most recent assignments. In a way, these books have replaced the travelogues of the nineteenth century as the genre that serves as an adjunct to scholarly literature. Like the travelogues of yore, journalists' accounts of complex political and cultural collisions have their limits. But Shipler's writing, more ambitious and openly passionate than most of this genre, provides a good feel for the tensions of daily life astride the Arab-Israeli conundrum. It is no substitute for spending a few months in Israel and the West Bank, but it is about as close as one can get between the covers of a book. Shipler has acted the role of a talented tablet upon which many others have written their messages of hope and fear. But Shipler cannot convey a deeper understanding; when he aims at profundity, the sentences become trite or mildly misleading. And like many of his fellow journalists, Shipler is sometimes more intent on dissecting his own emotions than on conveying those of others.

*Arab and Jew* has not been well received by some who have charged the author with bias against Israel. And though his use of language at full throttle overdramatizes conditions here and there, the accusations seem unfounded. It is disheartening that some par-



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tisans of Israel, particularly those living outside its borders, cannot distinguish between Israel the state and Israel the repository of their ideals and dreams.

— A.M.G.

**Ben-Gurion: The Burning Ground, 1886-1948**. By Shabtai Teveth. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. 965 pp. $35.00. Shabtai Teveth, senior researcher at Tel-Aviv University's Dayan Center, worked thirteen years on a biography of David Ben-Gurion, Israel's preeminent political figure. Three full volumes have already appeared in Hebrew and a topical excerpt of sorts, titled *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, was published by Oxford University Press two years ago (reviewed in these pages, Fall 1985) The work presently under review represents the first English language installment of the larger work.

It is masterful, and considering the life of Ben-Gurion, this is a special achievement. The present volume alone covers the distant world of Poland, Ottoman-ruled Palestine, British mandatory Palestine, and the politics of the worldwide Zionist movement. Ben-Gurion wrote voluminously and kept everything — his diaries comprise fifty thick volumes. Beyond this, Teveth interviewed hundreds of people. And Ben-Gurion was an unusual man, single minded and self-confident, but by no means a narrow ideologue or a cultural ascetic. Teveth succeeds in capturing Ben-Gurion the whole man and this is a great achievement.

— A.M.G.

**Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon**. By Avner Yaniv. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 355 pp. $24.95. Now that the journalists have written their chronologies, revelations, and "snap" books, the time has come for a more reflective scholarship on Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon. Yaniv's *Dilemmas of Security* is the first to offer a comprehensive evaluation from the Israeli point of view. His theoretical focus includes Jervis's notion of the security dilemma with a dash of Rousseau here and there. Yaniv deftly analyzes the various schools of thought that seek to uncover the sources of Israeli conduct, and finds them all wanting. For his part, the author's impulse is to subsume Israel's behavior within a "universal, systemic, existential predicament" without overlooking Israel's uniqueness.

Yaniv takes the story of Israel's involvement in Lebanon from the beginning through 1985. His account is detailed, dispassionate, and free of obvious factual error. Yaniv is especially complete on the Israeli domestic debates, public and private, and proportionately thinner on the nuances of the U.S. policy debates over Lebanon. What the book lacks, perhaps, is a broader conclusion on the effects of the



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war on Israel's self-image but, then again, it may be presumptuous to draw conclusions on such a subject so soon after the war. Certainly, Yaniv sets a new standard of scholarship on the war in Lebanon.

— A.M.G.

**Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance**. By Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler. Boulder: Westview, 1987. 156 pp. $25.00 (paper). Four chapters make up this little book: a summary of institutional arrangements pertinent to the problems of establishing a unified West European foreign policy; a review of the formal diplomacy of the European Political Cooperation vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1970 and 1982; the same topic extended to the 1982-83 war in Lebanon; and then the curious final chapter.

The final chapter offers a theoretical mystification typical of pure academics followed by some overly general, if sensible, advice for the European Community (EC). The authors contend that the EC must resolve its internal problems before sallying abroad, must coordinate more with the United States, must "cease making solemn declarations and proposing ready-made solutions," and must not appear biased. None of these things will happen, but Greilsammer and Weiler, because they prefer to quote tedious documents rather than do real analysis, do not not seem to have a clue as to why. They do not discuss the interests of West European states in the Middle East, they ignore the chasm between U.S. and European views, and they do not mention Europe's economic stake in the region.

Greilsammer and Weiler discuss European proposals as if there were no strategic, economic, and domestic political contexts, as if legalisms and good intentions were all that mattered. On this score, the book does not so much analyze as reflect contemporary European parochialism. All things considered, that Westview Press asks $25 for this 156-page paperback is an act of mercy.

— A.M.G.

**Futile Diplomacy**. Volume I: *Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913-1931*. Volume II: *Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate*. By Neil Caplan. London: Frank Cass, 1983 and 1987. 277 and 358 pp. $32.00 and $32.50. Caplan's survey of Arab and Zionist efforts before 1948 to resolve their differences peacefully reveals a little-known willingness of the two parties to compromise. So accustomed have we become to thinking of the Arab-Israeli conflict as military, it may come as a surprise to follow the negotiations in detail. These efforts were not obscure undertakings; notable participants included Chaim Weizmann, Felix Frankfurter, H. St. John Philby, T.H. Lawrence, David Ben-Gurion, Abba Eban, King 'Abdallah of Jordan, King Ibn Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, and King Faysal of Iraq. In each volume, Caplan's meticulous analysis fills about half the



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text, with the other half devoted to publishing (often for the first time) all the known records pertaining to this subject. So thorough is Caplan, in one case (the report of a 1921 meeting between British, Arab, and Zionist delegations), he provides three sets of minutes. This is the final word on the subject.

**The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis**. By Efraim Karsh. Adelphi Papers no. 220. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987. 72 pp. $6.50. In very brief compass Karsh manages to provide an immensely useful survey of the war between Iraq and Iran. Noteworthy conclusions include: Although Iraq picked the right moment to go to war with Iran from the military vantage point, the two sides were qualitatively equal when hostilities began in September 1980. The Iraqi forces failed to gain a quick victory because President Saddam Husayn stopped them within a few days, long before they had exhausted their momentum. Iraq's strategy of pursuing a limited war could not have worked; Baghdad "should either have avoided the war completely or resorted to a general war strategy." On either side, decisive victory on the battlefield occurred only when "a relatively satisfactory pattern of combined-arms operations" had been achieved.

Karsh draws two major operational lessons from the war. First, "even non-conventional wars are won or lost by conventional means"; revolutionary zeal cannot substitute for competent leadership. Iranian human-wave tactics, for example, only worked when joined with a combined-arms operation. Second, forces in the Third World find offensive operations even more difficult than do their Western and Soviet counterparts; they should lean to wars of attrition and avoid wars of maneuver.

**Missed Opportunities for Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy 1981-1986**. By Ronald J. Young. Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1987. 192 pp. $8.95 (paper). Although the title implies a broader canvas, *Missed Opportunities for Peace* deals only with the Arab-Israeli problem, not the Gulf War, Afghanistan, or any of the region's many other many problems. Actually, it is even less than that. Young purveys his gleanings from the daily newspaper — mainly the *Washington Post* and the *Christian Science Monitor* — for the last six years, sandwiched between an indictment of the Reagan administration and the standard left-liberal blame on Israel. No Arabic or Hebrew language press is cited, no perusal of scholarly analysis is evident, and only a few interviews (mostly anonymous) pass for evidence.

Young spent most of the 1960s as part of the radical wing of the Vietnam antiwar movement and spent the years 1982-85 in Amman as the AFSC Middle East representative. He wishes the United States



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embraced the PLO and pressured Israel. But those are two mistakes that the administration has *not* made. On other issues, Young exhibits less bias than lack of understanding. For example, he completely misreads the reason why the United States depended on a U.S.-led multinational force and not on an enlarged U.N. force in Lebanon in 1982-83. He thinks it had to do with antipathy toward the United Nations and President Reagan's desire to overcome the "Vietnam Syndrome" by sending U.S. forces abroad. Young is oblivious to the impracticality of creating a U.N. force at that time and vastly overestimates the Reagan administration's interest in seizing the moment. Well written and well intended, this is a superficial and flawed effort.
— A.M.G.

**Religious Strife in Egypt**. By Nadia Ramsis Farah. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1987. 135 pp. $42.00. Why did strife between Muslims and Christians grow so much in Egypt during the early 1970s and continue to the death of Anwar Sadat in 1981? Farah rejects common sense explanations in favor of a Marxist interpretation. She argues that the strife followed the shift from Gamal Abdul Nasser's populist strategy of import-substitution to Sadat's policy of integrating Egypt into the international economic system. The change created great strains, which the ruling elite sought to ease by promoting fundamentalist Islam. The author never allows the possibility that religious motives had something to do with communal strife; for her, it all boils down to economics. This singular interpretation may interest those who study Marxist thinking; but anyone trying to understand modern Egypt should take a pass.

**The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration**. By David B. Nissman. Boulder: Westview, 1986. 123 pp. $18.95. "Of all Soviet-backed national liberation movements, that concerned with the national liberation of the Azeris of Iran is the oldest and the most significant." Although the Azeris (a Turkic-speaking people) number 12 million in Iran and only 6 million across the border in the Soviet Union, Moscow has already twice this century established regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan — the Gilan Soviet Republic of 1920-21 and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1945-46 — in an effort to wrest this territory from Iran.

Nissman shows that the Soviets had high hopes for a third republic after the shah fell in 1979. Exploiting both sentiments of Azeri nationalism and the quasi-anarchy in Iran during the 1979-1981 period, the Soviets called for "One Azerbaijan," and a break by Iranian Azeris from Iran. This message had powerful resonance; so the Iranian authorities shut down communications with the Soviet Union in 1981, and (for the third time) ended the Soviet threat. As a result, Nissman does not foresee the Soviets achieving their goals in Iran's Azerbaijan



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except through the use of force. Indeed, the whole Soviet plan may backfire, for permission to Soviet Azeris to express a longing for One Azerbaijan may awaken nationalist feelings that will come back to haunt Moscow.

**Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf.** By Joshua M. Epstein. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 169 pp. $10.95. The question of defending Western interests in the Gulf has been politically volatile since Paul Wolfowitz's study for the Pentagon in 1979 suggesting that, short of using nuclear weapons, the United States would probably be unable to stop a Soviet occupation of Iran. Epstein answers that the United States can deter and defeat a Soviet military thrust aimed at Iranian oil fields with conventional forces alone, indeed, with weaker forces than those currently available. Taking a hypothetical Soviet attack on the Iranian province of Khuzistan, Epstein offers forty-nine pages of complex algebraic formulas and regression analyses to prove that a conventional defense obviates the need for other strategies — including vertical escalation to nuclear weapons or horizontal escalation to seizing targets-of-opportunity (like Cuba).

By its nature, this mathematical conclusion depends on a number of assumptions about crisis management, escalation patterns, and attrition rates. These are always hard to predict, and all the more so in a kind of war that has never been fought. Epstein ignores larger considerations that should figure into such a study, such as public support, troop morale and training, and leadership capabilities. Even more astonishing, he leaves aside entirely the consideration of Iranian behavior in a war occurring in their own country, blithely assuming that if they did anything, they would help the United States. Even accepting Epstein's narrowly hewn set of variables, a few altered numbers completely change the outcome. That does not mean Epstein is certainly wrong; it does mean he is likely to be wrong.

To the extent that this study reopens a serious debate about the possibility of relying on conventional forces worldwide, it is all to the good. But if Epstein intends his study to prove that the United States can do more with less and do it more safely to boot, it is of no real value to either Washington or Khuzistan.

— A.M.G.

**The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax.** By Faik Ökte. Translated by Geoffrey Cox. Kent: Croom Helm, 1987. 95 pp. $25.50. Initially published in Turkish in 1951, Faik Ökte's firsthand account of the Capital Levy imposed in 1942 by the Ismet Inönü government is a unique document. As Istanbul's director of finance, Ökte was in charge of implementing this tax (called the Varlık), which exacted outrageous sums from Turkey's religious minorities — the Greeks,



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Jews, and Armenians. Although the government claimed that the tax was designed simply to raise revenues, Ökte claims that it was inspired by Nazi success and the Turkish government's resolve to eliminate the minorities' role in commerce. Separate lists were drawn for Muslim and non-Muslim taxpayers, and, when unable to pay, the non-Muslims were dispatched to forced labor camps. The account points to the seeming effortlessness with which this endeavor was carried out, capturing the plight of minorities in Turkey, and a little-known aspect of Nazi influence in the Middle East. It also provides testimony to the inner workings of an authoritarian and xenophobic government.

— Henri J. Barkey

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## ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
by Arthur Waldron

**China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict**. By William J. Duiker. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986. 146 pp. $10.00. In the days before 1975 one could get away with explaining Vietnam by reference to Washington. But the poverty of that approach has become painfully evident since the North Vietnamese victory: without an American peg on which to hang stories, most commentators have been at a loss to explain developments such as the Sino-Vietnamese border fighting or Hanoi's treaty of friendship with Moscow. A reading of this book helps. To understand Chinese-Vietnamese relations of the last thirty or so years, Duiker turns not to Washington but to Asia. He has used Asian-language sources and interviewed specialists in Peking and Hanoi. He gives the inside story on the transformation of what in 1975 looked to become a warm Chinese-Vietnamese relationship, showing how history, geography, and inter-party politics turned three decades of common struggle into bitter rivalry.

Duiker repeatedly stresses the role of Cambodia as linchpin: both Peking and Hanoi seek suzerainty over that country (which itself seeks independence). These fundamentally incompatible goals are among the most basic roots of conflict: they (and not the American fumbling of initiatives launched by Hanoi, as some suggest) explain Vietnam's turn to the Soviet Union. If these roots are as deep as Duiker believes, no early resolution is in sight.

**China's Special Economic Zones**. By Michael Oborne. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and



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Development, 1986. 185 pp. No price given. The immediate model for the four Special Economic Zones established in China in 1979 came from Taiwan, but the ultimate source of the attempt to bring rapid growth with foreign participation to the China coast was almost certainly a memory of how dynamic cities like Shanghai were before 1949. Emulating those liberal models has not been easy for a Communist party accustomed to tight central control. Oborne devotes most of his attention primarily to practical problems such as choice of currency, calculation of prices and exchange rates, and the structure of economic organizations, about which he is lucid and informative. But most interesting is his effort to deal with the ideological and political questions raised by the four zones. Are they to be closed laboratories of economic change, or junctions through which the world economy may enter a hitherto isolated China? Oborne proposes that the zones were envisioned as being closed and easily controllable in 1979, and that this was key to their early acceptance. Subsequently and despite their lackluster economic performance, experience with the zones emboldened the Chinese leadership to undertake wide-ranging reforms in China proper, the scale of which may be such as to marginalize the zones themselves. Should that happen, Oborne concludes, the zones will have been a great success.

**The Chinese Army After Mao**. By Ellis Joffe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987. 220 pp. $20.00. China's post-Maoist leaders faced the difficult task of balancing immediate security requirements with the long-term modernization of their economy and armed forces. In this informative survey based on Chinese sources, Joffe examines the changes in doctrine, armaments, force structure, and civil-military relations that have occurred in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) since the death of Mao. He argues that a fundamental transformation has taken place in China's strategy and military doctrine, with the new leadership almost totally abandoning the Maoist dogma of "people's war." In Joffe's opinion, the essence of the military reforms "is a sustained effort to raise the combat capability of the PLA through a slow improvement of technology and a sweeping improvement of the non-technological components of military power." Increased professionalization and training in the PLA has enabled the military leadership to think in terms of defending China's frontiers, rather than fighting a protracted guerrilla struggle against an invading force. Moreover, this increased capability to meet an invader at the frontiers has occurred despite reductions in the overall manpower size of the PLA. In addition, China has worked to build a secure second-strike nuclear capability, developing a force of ICBMs and SLBMs, demonstrating a MIRV capability, and upgrading command, control, and early warning systems for nuclear weapons. Perhaps Joffe might have provided a greater appreciation of the



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staggering costs involved in modernizing China's nuclear deterrent. British and French decision makers have learned to their dismay that their modernization programs carry a high price tag, and the cost of China's nuclear buildup must be enormous. Joffe's thesis about the transformation in Chinese strategic doctrine is skillfully argued, and his survey of recent military developments will be valuable both to strategic analysts and Sinologists.

—J.H.M.

**Japan Re-armed**. By Malcom McIntosh. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 185 pp. $27.50. McIntosh has written a mildly alarmist account of Japan's foreign and military policies in recent decades. He detects the ugly head of "militarism" and "nationalism" stirring once again in spite of today's prosperity and ostensible pacifism. He blames this on Japanese social factors and on pressure from the United States. The argument draws on Japanology of a vaguely new left flavor and conventional revisionist history, updated with information on the growth of Japan's military forces and odds and ends about incidents such as the Korean Airliner 007 — all from Western-language sources. There is some truth in the author's description of contemporary Japan: it is indeed prouder and much more concerned about security than thirty years ago. But his explanation gets a lot wrong. Not foreign influence, but arguably its diminution, has been decisive in the new emphasis on the military. While it contains useful information, McIntosh's book is chiefly of interest for what it reveals about thinking on Japan in some influential quarters of popular opinion.

**Pakistan: A Nation in the Making**. By Shahid Javed Burki. Boulder: Westview, 1986. 226 pp. $28.00. Burki's sharply focused look at Pakistan contends that establishing Pakistan on a religious basis impeded the definition of the country's borders. This lay at the heart of the ethnic conflicts and border disputes that ultimately led to a bloody civil war and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971.

But malleable frontiers were not, Burki argues, the only reason that Pakistan still remains a nation in the making. The country has had a half-dozen different political systems and four formal constitutions. Governments failed to follow a consistent set of policies and the country's economic potential suffered as a result. He attributes the low level of social development to high fertility and low literacy. Challenges facing Pakistan are enormous, he concludes, but so too is the potential.

—Shaheen Ayubi

**Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy**. By S.J. Tambiah. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986. 198 pp. $17.95. Tambiah's impressive study, surely one of the best



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ever of an ethnic conflict, underlines our limited ability to understand and deal with the ethnic violence that threatens to destroy Sri Lanka. It also challenges conventional approaches. Tambiah lays to rest the myths that portray Tamils and Sinhalese as utterly opposed since ancient times and shows that far from being a manifestation of a long tradition of differences, the current crisis results from grievances that developed or were manufactured over the last century. While supplying details of how economic stagnation and demographic growth have exacerbated the situation, Tambiah lays particular stress on the recent development of a new and unhistorically exclusive Sinhalese identity, and its political expression, as the root problem. He suggests saving the situation even now by restoring the rule of law, secularizing, and renouncing dreams both of Sinhalese domination and of Tamil separatism. But — as the reactions of extremists on all sides to recent peace proposals demonstrate — once the kind of process Tambiah so lucidly traces gets under way, it is virtually impossible to halt.

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## THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

**Between Two Worlds: The Life of a Young Pole in Russia 1939-46.** By K. S. Karol. A New Republic Book. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1986. 309 pp. $19.95. Born into an assimilated Jewish family in Poland, Karol fled the German occupation only to land in the Soviet world of repression, poverty, and despair. The author also discovered both cowardice and valor. Among fellow Red Army soldiers he found a deep sense of comradeship and a healthy mistrust of official demagoguery. Slandered by an NKVD informer, Karol was deported to the Gulag. He spent thirteen months in the camp, resumed his studies in Rostov, and returned to Poland in 1946, when the memoir concludes. Currently he is an editor of the French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur* and an authoritative writer on contemporary communism.

Karol shows the human face of a system too often seen only in abstract terms. He perceives timid hopes and individual courage behind the anonymous, overwhelming institutions of totalitarianism. Contrary to conventional wisdom, he reveals that many Russians were not mesmerized by Stalin's cult. His is a compassionate report of Stalin's Russia.

**Comrade Chairman: Soviet Succession and the Rise of Gorbachov.** By Richard Owen. New York: Arbor House, 1987. 253 pp. $17.95.



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Student of the late Leonard Schapiro and perceptive observer of the Moscow political scene, Owen focuses on the moments of transition in the Soviet Union between 1924 and 1986 and draws some general conclusions. The six post-Lenin successions confirm that the Communist party remains the only source of real power in the Soviet Union. He argues that the struggle for power is not restricted to the period when the incumbent leader is dead or terminally ill. Khrushchev, for instance, was demoted when he was ostensibly at the height of his power. Victory hinges on the right choice of political patron. A complex interplay of institutions and personality usually decides the succession struggle. All these characteristics were illustrated by Gorbachev's successful elimination of his opponents and quick consolidation of authority. Presumably, they will also apply the next time around.

Owen, *The Times*'s Soviet correspondent in 1982-85, regards Gorbachev as a moderate reformer; he does not expect basic political restructuring, nor will the Communist party's monopoly be challenged in the effort to make the Soviet system more effective. Gorbachev does not intend to overthrow the system that produced him. His power derives from good relations with the younger generation of *obkom* (provincial) party secretaries whom he cannot afford to alienate. Why, then, has Gorbachev embarked on a policy so obviously different from the safe conduct recommended by bureaucratic prudence? Here Owen's account offers no answers.

**Crosscurrents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture**. Edited by Ladislav Matejka. No.6. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1987. 504 pp. $15.00. *Crosscurrents* covers such topics as the value of civil disobedience under communist regimes, the program of the Czechoslovak Charter 77, Milan Kundera's philosophy of the novel, nonconformist poetry from East Germany, the impact of Sandor Csoori's poetry on Hungarian consciousness, Yugoslav political-literary coteries and polemics, and Romanian poet Ion Caraion's tortured life.

Yugoslav novelist Danilo Kis contributes a thought-provoking essay on "Variations on the Theme of Central Europe." Kis believes one can no longer speak of Central Europe as a spiritual area after Yalta and Helsinki. This split of a once coherent European civilization inspires nostalgia for Central Europe in Paris and Manhattan. Also, the very idea of modernity is associated with the part of Europe "standing geographically in the Center, culturally in the West and politically in the East" (Milan Kundera). The yearning for Central Europe also responds to a need for political self-assertion by intellectual elites who want to escape the Soviet cultural ghetto. Kis knows all too well that hard geopolitical facts cannot be denied. Unlike some Western mandarins who toy with the idea of a neutral Central Eu-



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ropean federation, including a united Germany, Kis sees Central Europe as a metaphor.

*Crosscurrents* is a major source of information about political and intellectual evolutions in countries that politically belong to the Soviet bloc but whose traditions and aspirations are Western. It highlights the common values that guarantee the survival of Central European heritage and distinguish those cultures from the Russian (Soviet) one. Dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Hungary are therefore among the main contributors to this issue of *Crosscurrents*.

**The Eagle and the Small Birds: Crisis in the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to Solidarity**. By Michael Charlton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 192 pp. $14.95 ($8.95, paper). Memory and analysis intertwine in this masterful collection of interviews with political personalities, political scientists, writers, and historians whose deeds and thoughts have influenced events in East and Central Europe. Charlton's book also provides a fascinating setting for the confrontation in their viewpoints and those of Western intellectuals and political personalities.

Charlton reveals the intrinsic illegitimacy of the Soviet-imposed regimes in Eastern Europe. To quote Leonard Schapiro, one of Charlton's interviewees: "Nobody has ever elected the Party, no Communist Party has ever come to power on the basis of popular acclaim (except, perhaps, by accident or misunderstanding); and therefore the foundation of the Party's predominance has to be ideological." The chapter on the eclipse of ideology, one of the most illuminating in the book, is a breathtaking revelation of the basic fallacies associated with the Marxist utopian project. Leszek Kolakowski, the Polish philosopher who once spearheaded the struggle for the humanization of communist societies, puts it bluntly: "Mendacity is the immortal soul of Communism."

**From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Infighting in the Kremlin**. By Baruch A. Hazan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 260 pp. $34.95. Hazan relies on the available Soviet primary sources — and not the journalist's diet of Moscow rumors — to analyze the path of succession since Brezhnev's decline. He explains the role of different institutions (party apparatus, the military, KGB) in the outcome of the struggle for domination and shows how vested interests are paramount. In Gorbachev's case, one cannot dismiss the possibility of a conspiracy that would moderate the scope of reforms by replacing him with a less demanding *apparatchik*. Hazan himself admits that Gorbachev's "main battles still lie ahead" and "his struggle against the party apparatus is yet to be won."

Hazan's approach has strengths and weaknesses. The birth of alliances in the Kremlin cannot be understood only with reference



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to official discourses. Leninist rhetoric conceals the real distribution of forces and competition for power. Soviet leaders are masters of dissimulation and even shrewd Western observers get caught in their propaganda web. Paying attention to some of those journalists' rumors would not be such a bad idea.

**Gorbachev**. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: Norton, 1986. 272 pp. $15.95. Medvedev has remarkable sources of information within the Soviet *nomenklatura* and the result is a pioneering biography. Together with his brother Roy, Zhores Medvedev has long been active in the Soviet dissident movement. Now exiled in Britain, he remains one of the most knowledgeable analysts of Soviet affairs.

For Medvedev, Gorbachev's rise marks a watershed in recent Soviet history; in him, the Soviet managerial class has its most articulate spokesman. Gorbachev is not inclined to engage in perilous systemic changes; he has repeatedly warned against any foolish expectations of the sort. To be sure, he has spoken about revolutionizing the whole society, but basic Soviet institutions have remained intact. Medvedev correctly points out that the Gorbachev generation of communist leaders should be expected to prefer improvement and continuity to bold reform. In international politics this means a new diplomacy in pursuit of old goals.

Medvedev is best at describing Gorbachev's manipulative skills. The current champion of *glasnost* was one of Brezhnev's most obedient lieutenants. In the conflicts that plagued the Kremlin throughout the first half of this decade, he kept a low profile, thereby placating the possible apprehensions of king-makers. And his discovery of the need for reforms is very recent.

**Gorbachev's Challenge**. By Marshall I. Goldman. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987. 296 pp. $16.95. In this thought-provoking and wide-ranging new study, Goldman examines the economic dilemmas and policy options available to Gorbachev as he attempts to revitalize the Soviet economy. Goldman sees three choices open to Gorbachev: (1) a far-reaching reform that emphasizes a heavy reliance on the market; (2) an improved version of central planning and control; and (3) a hybrid system combining elements of each of the systems. Goldman advocates scrapping the Soviet Union's entire economic structure and re-educating Soviet managers and workers to understand risk, profit, and market price.

In actual fact, the choices facing the Soviet leadership are far more varied and difficult to implement. While Soviet citizens might eagerly accept the productive side of the market reform, they will find far less palatable the higher consumer costs associated with the end of state subsidies. Goldman fails to see that the greatest enemy of widespread economic reform comes from the Soviet people them-



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selves — an adversary far stronger than any coalition of party, government, and military *nomenklatura.* Many Soviet citizens, though dissatisfied with the political ramifications of the system, have internalized its limp social welfare structure and maintain high expectations about the state's stewardship. To benefit from the economic growth and openness of the marketplace would require the Soviet people to redirect their talents and efforts from something they excel in — outwitting the government and its distribution system — to meeting the challenges of the job market and higher consumer prices. After sixty years of the communist "social welfare system," however fictitious it is in fact, the new insecurities brought in by the impatient reformer may be too much to accept.

— Miron Wolnicki

**Ideological Struggle: A Study in the Principles of Operation of the Soviet Political Mechanism.** By Fabian Vaksman. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1987. 226 pp. $24.75 ($12.75, paper). Is ideology indispensable to the survival of the Soviet system? Abandoning the Leninist dogmas remains as unthinkable under Gorbachev as under his predecessors. In this ambitious, idiosyncratic book, Vaksman maintains the opposite is true: ideological claims are mere smoke screens, and those who accept their influence are irretrievable victims of delusion. In his view, Soviet politics is governed by the imperative of preserving power in the hands of the ruling party. Vaksman believes that the main thrust of Soviet politics is the conservation of internal stability. His underlying assumption is not far from Isaac Deutscher's explanation of Stalinist terror as a means to implement the forceful industrialization of a backward society. Unfortunately, the effort is laced with unfounded speculations and half-baked conclusions.

Vaksman is profoundly discontented with Western interpretations of communist political systems, which err in attributing a decisive role to ideology in Soviet policy making. He patronizingly discounts Western scholarship of the Soviet Union for failing to make appropriate distinctions, bemoaning Western confusion between such different political doctrines and practices as Leninism, Trotskyism, and Stalinism. Richard Pipes and Zbigniew Brzezinski are reprimanded for explaining Soviet expansionist behavior through internal goals and motivations. Vaksman, to the contrary, thinks that questions of Soviet domestic affairs and those of world security should be treated separately. Such an approach would underestimate the profound link between Soviet domestic and international objectives. There is a correlation between the Soviet elite's need for internal stability (obtained through actual or potential terror) and the imperialist drive that has led the Soviet military (or their proxies) to Eastern Europe, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.



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But Vaksman ignores the role of Leninist ideology as an ingredient for political cohesion and social obedience. Also, the issue is not how much the Soviet elite feels attached to the ideas it pretends to serve, but the all too practical role of those ideas in defining internal and international goals. Soviet ideology serves more than a defensive function; it serves as the basis for offensive operations to spread Soviet-type communism.

**Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union: A Historical and Statistical Handbook**. By Shirin Akiner. London: KPI, 1986. Second edition. 462 pp. $57.95. Akiner's survey stresses the diversity of the 45 million Muslims living in the Soviet Union: "Soviet Muslims are found as far west as the borders of Poland, as far east as the borders of China; they are found in Siberia to the north and Central Asia and Transcaucasia to the south." They speak ten Iranian languages, fifteen Turkic ones, and thirty Caucasian ones, "not to mention Chinese, Mongol, and an obscure form of Arabic." In short, the Muslims of the Soviet Union have no historic corporate identity, but are only slowly gaining one after decades under Soviet rule. Akiner's useful work presents a great assembly of demographic information on nearly one hundred Muslim ethnic groups. Sources of information being what they are, the author must necessarily rely on Soviet census figures; still, one wishes she had applied a more critical eye to the statistics, or at least offered guidelines for judging their credibility.

— D.P.

**The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia**. By Martin Walker. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 298 pp. $17.95. Among the many essays by Western reporters in Moscow, some are impressed by the pace of *perestroyka* (restructuring) and others express skepticism about the extent of the reforms. Walker, a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, supports the first position. He regards Gorbachev as a successful innovator, a daring experimenter, and an accomplished infighter. In his account, Gorbachev appears as the scourge of bureaucracy, a maverick *apparatchik* whose main concern is the modernization of a rusty political machine. Walker thinks that a technocratic elite will soon replace the moribund Brezhnevite generation.

All this may be true, but it is still debatable whether the newcomers stand for values different from those of their forerunners. Gorbachev recruits from within the party apparatus reared under Brezhnev; further, sweeping reforms challenge people accustomed to paternalistic leadership. Unlike Nikita Khrushchev, Gorbachev has shunned dramatic attacks on Stalinism. Walker's optimism is tempered by sobering conclusions about the increased role of the KGB under Gorbachev. Provocative and discerning, his book offers useful insights even if one does not accept his conclusions.



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BRIEF REVIEWS

LATIN AMERICA
by Michael Radu

**Brigadista: Harvest and War in Nicaragua**. Edited by Jeff Jones. New York: Praeger, 1985. 227 pp. $32.95. *Brigadista* is an oddly important book whose significiance may grow yet further. Its importance lies not in its style, which is embarassingly poor ("When President Ortega and Fidel Castro went up onto the stage, the crowd went bananas"). Nor does it lie in any insights into the Sandinistas' reality, nor its coherence, nor its unjustified pretensions at scholarship. One reads this book not to learn about Nicaragua but to find out — contrary to the intent of contributors or editor — about the state of the Left in the United States.

To begin with, the contributors are quite a bunch. Victoria Alba boasts credentials as someone who is "of Filipino-Mexican-Apache ancestry and writes for El Tecolate, a bilingual community newspaper." Gwendolyn Gilliam is "a burlesque dancer and writer." Thai Stein Jones, "eight, is a third grader in a New York City public school and would like to go to Nicaragua." Thai Stein Jones epitomizes the intellectual attainments of the contributors. Then there is the ideology: Zachary Sklar (a "writer and editor" at the Columbia Journalism School) writes that "It was inspiring and thrilling to be in a country where socialism is not a dirty word, where people share my values... Indeed, Nicaragua today is the ideological, political, and psychological equivalent of the old movies on the South Seas; the promised land, where perhaps milk and honey, and certainly a serious and real party line would always satisfy the pilgrims' thirst." Heaven help the Sandinistas if this is the intellectual level of their friends in the United States!

**Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled**. By Gordon K. Lewis. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987. 239 pp. $25.00. For the Latin American Left, the collapse of the Bishop regime in Grenada in 1983 remains a traumatic experience. Lewis, who unabashedly admits his analysis is leftist and anti-imperialist, seems to care less about Grenada than to express hatred for the United States. Thus, he argues that the Reverend Jim Jones of Jonestown, black racist violence in Guyana and Trinidad, and Ronald Reagan all "exemplify the deep, psychotic sickness of the American capitalist society."

The author knows little and understands less about the English-speaking Caribbean. As for Latin America, the less said the better; Lewis thinks "Che" Guevara died in Ecuador! He does no better with his main topic, Grenada; according to Lewis, one of two major achievements of the New Jewel (1979-1983) was a successful mobi-



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lization of the people — a claim belied by the regime's own assessments, as seen in captured documents that are publicly available.

Lewis's one addition to our knowledge has to do with the factional struggle within the New Jewel. He shows how — in a tropical recapitulation of the Bolshevik Revolution — it went from personality cult to forced confessions, purges, and finally murder. Lewis establishes that the Grenadian regime, in fact, was going through a process of Stalinization by the time it collapsed.

**Intervention on Trial: The New York War Crimes Tribunal on Central America and the Caribbean**. Edited by Paul Ramshaw and Tom Steer. New York: Praeger, 1987. 215 pp. $32.95. The National Lawyers Guild (a widely suspected front of the Soviet Union) has produced a book that makes no claims to objectivity. Boringly predictable in tone, it features such remarks as: "The Reagan administration's foreign policy in Central America and the Caribbean threatens our constitutional form of government and has created a serious threat to international peace and security." The "War Crimes" tribunal brought together an equally predictable panel of judges, including Ben Chavis, Paul O'Dwyer, and Bruce McM. Wright. The witnesses, or contributors, include such New and Old Left stalwarts as Robert Armstrong of NACLA, Noam Chomsky, fellow travellers like the ubiquitous Charles Clements (an ex-FMLN guerrilla militant hiding behind Quaker pacifism), and Central American Leninists like Rigoberta Menchu (Guatemala) and Ramon Flores (El Salvador). Were it not published by a reputable house, the book would have enjoyed the obscurity it richly deserves. Books such as this and the *Brigadista* volume noted above severely damage Praeger's reputation.

**Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua**. Edited by Thomas W. Walker. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 337 pp. $30.00. Walker offers the opening salvo in this collection of passionately pro-Sandinista propaganda. He denies as groundless the accusations that the Sandinistas are Communists and pro-Soviet. On the contrary, he writes with a straight face, Managua's human rights performance, "though not flawless," places it in the top ranks of Latin America's countries. Eva Gold argues that the Nicaraguan government (possessor of the largest army in Central American history) is actually a victim of "military encirclement." Martin Diskin rehearses the official Sandinista line on the Miskitu Indian issue — yes, there were a few mistakes at the beginning, due to overenthusiasm, but they are all corrected now and the issue is raised as a reactionary provocation. Betsy Cohn and Patricia Hinds falsify the record of



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Sandinista-church relations and explain their conflict as the result of a ploy that includes the Reagan administration, the Institute on Religion and Democracy, the Knights of Malta, and theologian Michael Novak. Margaret E. Leahy writing on "The Harassment of Nicaraguanists and Fellow Travelers," reveals a rare paranoia. Her description of FBI persecution makes pathetic reading.

**The Real Secret War: Sandinista Political Warfare and Its Effects on Congress**. Edited by L. Francis Bouchey, J. Michael Waller, and Steve Baldwin. Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, 1987. 210 pp. No price given. The existence in the United States of large, sophisticated, and influential pro-Sandinista networks of support has been known for some time, in part due to the efforts of the Council for Inter-American Security. Here, CIS offers an accurate, carefully researched indictment of the information used by that network. Almost every incident of human rights abuses by the Contras alleged in the main anti-Contra reports, it turns out, is false. Reports by Reed Broody, Michael Glennon, Donald Fox, and Mary Dutcher are shown all to have been written in fact by Sandinista fellow travelers and bona fide Communists; they derive largely from the testimony of regime agents, victims of blackmail, or are made up of whole cloth. *The Real Secret War* does more, too; it provides information on the Sandinista propaganda machine, its inner workings, and its representatives in the United States. It is hard to believe that any bona fide human rights or liberal activist will accept Nicaraguan propaganda against the insurgents after examining the evidence presented in this volume.

**Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?** By James Anderson. London: Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1987. 87 pp. No price given. Structure and brevity unfortunately limit the usefulness of this monograph on one of the largest and certainly the most peculiar Marxist-Leninist insurgent organizations in the world.

Anderson devotes far too much attention to Peru's social and economic conditions; after all, the group's founder and leader, Abimael Guzman Reynoso ("President Gonzalo"), established his plan of action at least thirteen years ago and has applied it ever since without any regard to changes in the country. Indeed, Sendero Luminoso challenges the tendency of Western social scientists to assume a causal relationship between economics and the rise of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. Sendero's underground preparations and recruitment began under a leftist military regime, its violent operations started only days after the restoration of democracy in Peru in 1980, and have dramatically increased since the 1985 election of the populist Alan Garcia. The author entirely misses this important point. He pays too little attention to Sendero's recruitment practices, military structure and



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tactics, and far too much to its peculiar mix of pre-Colombian nativism and Maoism. In fact, Guzman's Maoism has much more weight than his nostalgia for the Incas.

Such criticisms aside, the monograph is a valuable first step toward understanding a new, important, and deadly version of Marxist-Leninist guerrilla warfare in the Americas.



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# ERRATUM

Regrettably, the Spring issue of ORBIS contained a number of errors.

In the article "Beyond MBFR: The Atlantic to the Urals Gambit" by David S. Yost, footnote 14 on page 105, the second sentence should read:

> This would rule out the Soviet Union re-deploying forces directly from the negotiations area to Hungary, but would not prevent the Soviets from deploying *other* units from the USSR to supplement Soviet forces already in Hungary.

On page 108, sentence number 4 of the extract should read:

> By continuing and sharpening its focus on aggregate troop levels, *NATO is pursuing an agreement in Vienna that may be irrelevant to the realities of the military balance in Europe.*[18]

On page 124, the third sentence under the heading ZONAL UNCERTAINTIES should read:

> The zone would not be the same as in the CDE if the territory and forces of the neutral and non-aligned states were excluded.

In the book review "Soviet Utopia Revisited" by Vladimir Tismaneanu, the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 144 and continuing to the top of page 145 should read:

> Heller and Nekrich know the Soviet system from within. They know its intimate articulations and arcane rationalizations, the techniques of manipulation and the matrix of power. It is precisely this biographical particularity that helps them to enrich our understanding of the Soviet phenomenon. Mikhail Heller, who has written several brilliant studies on Soviet literature, is also the author of an essay on the formation of the Soviet man, published in Paris in 1985.



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